Shocks, preferences, and institutions: experimental evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa by Cecchi, F.
   
 
Shocks, Preferences, and Institutions 
Experimental Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Francesco  Cecchi 
  
This research was conducted under the auspices of the  
Wageningen School of Social Science (WASS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
 
 
Promotor 
Prof. Dr E.H. Bulte 
Professor of Development Economics 
Wageningen University 
 
Other members 
Prof. Dr E.H.P. Frankema, Wageningen University 
Dr C. Gardebroek, Wageningen University 
Prof. Dr D.P. van Soest, Tilburg University, the Netherlands 
Dr J. Fenske, University of Oxford, United Kingdom 
  
 
 
Shocks, Preferences, and Institutions 
Experimental Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Francesco  Cecchi 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at Wageningen University 
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. Dr M.J. Kropff, 
in the presence of the 
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Wednesday March 18, 2015 
at 4 p.m. in the Aula.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Francesco  Cecchi 
Shocks, Preferences, and Institutions:  
Experimental Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
198 pages. 
PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2015) 
With references, with summaries in Dutch and English 
ISBN 978-94-6257-262-1  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my families. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 2 Prenatal Trauma and Cooperation 13 
Chapter 3 Conflict Exposure and Competitiveness 43 
Chapter 4 Market Experience and Rational Choice 67 
Chapter 5 Formal Insurance and the Dynamics of Social Capital 95 
Chapter 6 Statutory Law and Customary Change 123 
Chapter 7 Synthesis 153 
References 163 
Summary (English) 193 
Samenvatting (Dutch) 195 
Acknowledgements 197 
 
  
 
 
 
SHOCKS, PREFERENCES, AND INSTITUTIONS 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 Overview 1.1
Both preferences and institutions are central to economic theory (Simon, 
1959; Acemoglu et al., 2005). Insofar as they cannot be taken as given, it is 
important to understand how they are formed, and how they “respond” to 
shocks. This thesis investigates the endogenous formation of preferences 
and institutions. It presents field-experimental evidence from Sub-Saharan 
Africa – specifically Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia – gradually 
zooming out through different levels of responses to shocks. It starts by 
looking at the formation of individual preferences in utero and during 
childhood. Next, it explores the endogeneity of rational choice among 
adults. Finally, it looks at the cumulative outcome of these responses in 
terms of changes in local norms and informal institutions. Shocks are 
thought of in their broadest possible definition. Conflict is a shock, but so 
is the introduction of exogenously planned and implemented institutions, 
or the penetration of statutory law into predominantly customary settings.  
While each chapter is envisioned as a self-standing contribution to 
economic literature, the crosscutting thread is equally crucial. Not always 
do endogenous responses to shocks fit existing economic theory. Rather, 
the evidence presented sometimes highlights unforeseen dynamics. It 
moreover strongly rejects the notion of passive acceptance of shocks; 
individuals and institutions “respond” to shifting circumstances through 
“rational” – although not necessarily conscious – behavioral changes. These 
findings contribute to the understanding of the micro-foundations of 
preferences and institutions, and emphasize the need to continuously 
underpin theoretical predictions with empirical evidence.  
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 Preferences 1.2
‘Where do preferences come from? Do they drop from the skies? Are they 
innate in the mind? No, they come from social practice. [...] In their social 
practice men engage in various kinds of struggle, gaining rich experience 
both from their successes and their failures’ (Mao, 1966: p.1). This loosely 
translated quotation from Mao Zedong involuntarily makes him an early 
proponent of the “endogeneity of preferences”—the notion that individual 
preferences may not be as hardwired as economic welfare theory assumes. 
Actually, despite Stigler and Becker’s (1977) arguments in favor of the 
opposite, economists have long acknowledged that shocks and experience 
may alter individual preferences (e.g. Marshall, 1920; Friedman, 1962). 
‘The question is whether or not economists should concern themselves with 
such changes’ (Albert and Hahnel, 1990: p.76).  
The answer may lie in the very events that preceded Chairman Mao’s 
thoughts on the subject. The agrarian reforms implemented during the 
Great Leap Forward caused the death of over 30 million Chinese people 
between 1958 and 1961 (Ashton et al., 1984); such “struggle” may have 
affected the preferences of those suffering from it. In fact, an increasing 
body of literature investigates behavioral responses to individual life 
experiences. They show that shocks such as conflicts (e.g. Voors et al., 
2012) and natural disasters (e.g. Cassar et al., 2011) considerably alter 
individual risk, time and other-regarding preferences—fundamental drivers 
of consumption, saving and investment decisions. This in turn has 
strengthened the hypothesis that shocks impact the performance of 
economies far beyond their immediate consequences. If so, the traumatic 
experience of the Great Leap Forward may not only have altered 
individual preferences, but also the long-run growth trajectory of the whole 
Chinese economy. Understanding the relationship between shocks and 
individual preferences may therefore be central to studying the long-term 
dynamics of economic development. 
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What Mao Zedong’s quotation does not acknowledge is that preferences 
are, to a certain extent, “innate to the mind”. In fact, people acquire 
preferences not only through life experiences and learning, but also genetic 
inheritance. In the lab, monozygotic twins display consistently more similar 
trust and risk behavior in comparison with dizygotic twins—a sign that 
genetic variation accounts at least partially for differences in individual 
preferences (Cesarini et al., 2008; Zyphur et al., 2009). Preferences are thus 
transmitted to the progeny through at least three channels: deliberate 
efforts by others to shape behavior and beliefs, independent learning from 
life experience, and genetics—the so called gene-culture coevolution 
(Bowles, 1998, 2006; Henrich, 2004; Dohmen et al., 2011). This suggests 
that economic development is affected by traits selected and transmitted 
across generations over the very long run (see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 
2013), providing a ‘solution to the puzzle of strong reciprocity and large-
scale human cooperation’ (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003: p. 789).  
At the other end of the time spectrum – the very short run – behavioral 
economists have looked at how the brain generates decisions. Neuroscience 
is becoming ever more complementary to economic theory in 
understanding human decision making (Camerer et al., 2005). Studies 
using neuroimaging and hormonal manipulation are increasingly 
supporting the neuroeconomic foundations of trust and social preferences 
(see Fehr et al., 2005). Variations in hormone levels have been found to 
influence a wide range of behaviors (see Mehta and Josephs, 2010), 
including fairness in ultimatum bargaining (e.g. Eisenegger et al., 2010), 
trust (e.g. Kosfeld et al., 2005), and parochial altruism in public good 
games (e.g. De Dreu et al., 2010). Moreover, sudden maternal hormonal 
variations are known to interact with the fetus during early development, 
triggering epigenetic modifications that may shape the child’s brain 
evolution and behavior (Dörner et al., 2001; Keverne and Curley, 2008). If 
these prenatal effects extend to the domain of preferences, a fourth channel 
of preference transmission may be at play. 
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The epigenetic channel lies at the intersection of “nature” and “nurture”. 
Experiencing a shock during pregnancy will not result in a modification of 
the genetic imprint of the fetus, but may alter the “gene expression”. In 
other words, identical genetic information may produce very different 
outcomes. This epigenetic dimension is widely recognized within biological 
and medical literature (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Jablonka 
and Lamb, 2014). Nevertheless, it has only recently come under scrutiny 
by economists (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 
2013). In the lab, markers of in utero hormone exposure have been found 
to correlate in different ways with altruism, cooperation, and risk 
preferences (Garbarino et al., 2010; Buser, 2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 
2013). Chapter 2 in this thesis explores this channel by looking at prenatal 
hormonal shocks, and how they affect contributions to a public good 
among children born during a violent conflict. 
Conflicts affect individuals and societies along multiple dimensions. 
‘Humans regulate intergroup conflict through parochial altruism; they self-
sacrifice to contribute to in-group welfare and to aggress against competing 
out-groups’ (De Dreu et al., 2010: p. 1408). Parochial altruism has likely 
developed as result of coevolutionary pressures that favored both in-group 
cooperation and out-group antagonism (Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi and 
Bowles, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008). Coevolutionary economic models are 
concerned with changes happening over the very long run, but typically 
recognize that parochial altruism may also be affected by individual 
experience (Choi and Bowles, 2007). In fact, several studies have looked at 
the effect of war exposure on in-group altruism and egalitarianism (e.g. 
Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et 
al., 2014); fewer at out-group aggressiveness (e.g. Miguel et al., 2011; Bauer 
et al., 2014). Arguably, however, spite and aggressiveness are but one 
aspect of increased antagonism; greater willingness to compete may well be 
the other side of the coin. Chapter 3 looks at both aggressiveness and 
competitiveness towards in- and out-groups, and how these are influenced 
by individual exposure to violent conflict during childhood. 
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Competitiveness is a keystone to the economic problem. Competitive 
markets, populated by traders willing to compete over finite resources to 
satisfy “infinite wants”, are a fundamental prerequisite to reach 
competitive equilibria over prices and quantities—and Pareto efficient 
allocations of resources (Walras, 1889; Marshall, 1920). This however 
implies that traders maximize a certain utility function. Economic theory 
typically assumes that preferences are stable at least in the very short run, 
and that individual choices satisfy the axioms of revealed preference theory 
(Samuelson, 1938). More often than not, however, empirical studies have 
shown that people exhibit “irrational” violations of these axioms (e.g. 
Sippel, 1997; Mattei, 2000; Harbaugh et al., 2001). Chapter 4 tests the 
notion that people may endogenously “learn” to behave more “rationally”, 
studying how rational choice is affected by the exogenous exposure to an 
institutional setting that mimics a competitive market. 
 Institutions 1.3
Why did Mao Zedong initiate the purges of the Cultural Revolution, only 
a few years after the failures of the Great Leap Forward? An increasing 
number of scholars would argue that both these disastrous policies – and 
the human and socio-economic consequences they entail – are the result of 
“bad institutions” (North, 1990; Platteau, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
Institutions are humanly devised incentive frameworks that shape social, 
political and economic interactions, determining the choices individuals 
make, and affecting the performance of economies over time (North, 1990, 
1991). They comprise both the “institutional environment” – formal laws 
and rules, informal conventions, social norms and beliefs – and the 
“institutional arrangements”—governance structures and organizational 
modes that define the actual “play of the game” within the institutional 
environment (Williamson, 2000). In the words of Acemoglu et al., ‘bad 
institutions are [...] kept in place, not for the benefit of society as a whole, 
but for the benefit of the ruling elite’ (2005: p.407). 
INTRODUCTION 
6 
Like preferences, institutions affect individual decisions about savings, 
investments, and consumption. Institutional features like security over 
property rights are positively correlated to economic performance (Hall 
and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Also, Dell (2010) finds that “bad” 
historical institutions such as forced labor have persistent effects on 
contemporary underdevelopment, over two centuries after being abolished. 
More generally, in any “social dilemma” situation – where individual 
interests conflict with the maximization of social welfare – institutions 
rewarding cooperators and/or sanctioning free-riders are essential to 
sustain high levels of cooperation (Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). 
The quality of formal and informal institutions is thus widely believed to 
be a fundamental determinant of economic development (Acemoglu et al., 
2005), if not the primary one (Rodrik et al., 2004). At the same time, 
much remains to be understood about their formation and functioning. 
In recent years, the interaction between formal and informal institutions 
has stimulated a wealth of literature. Formal institutions are typically 
treated as exogenous constraints, while informal institutions are modeled 
as endogenous self-enforcing rules (Greif, 1993; Aoki, 2001a, 2001b). 
Within this framework, economic theory predicts a certain degree of 
interdependence between formal and informal institutions, viewing them 
either as complements or as substitutes. Some scholars argue that formal 
constraints facilitate the self-enforcement of non-contractible dimensions 
(Lazzarini et al., 2004), increasing the effectiveness of informal rules by 
lowering information, monitoring, and enforcement costs (North, 1990). 
Others that formal institutions ‘do not produce trust but instead are a 
functional substitute for it’ (Granovetter, 1985: p.489), or even that, as 
long as there are non-contractible dimensions, formal institutions may only 
“imperfectly” substitute for informal arrangements (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998). Chapter 5 studies whether formal institutions substitute 
informal arrangements, investigating the effect of introducing a formal 
insurance on the within-village dynamics of social capital and cooperation.  
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Those who challenge existing laws and norms are typically subject to some 
sort of punishment. Formal legal institutions oversee the compliance to 
formal constraints, such as laws, while informal ones preside over norms 
and customs. As a result of this duality, ‘virtually every society is legally 
plural’ (Merry, 1988: p.869). The punishment of non-compliers is thus often 
regulated through competing and sometimes overlapping institutional 
arrangements. The penetration of formal legal institutions, however, is far 
from homogeneous. Many regions worldwide remain effectively excluded 
from its direct influence, especially relatively poorer rural areas. Sandefur 
and Siddiqi (2013) suggest that improving access to formal law may result 
in direct gains for those disadvantaged by informal institutions. Yet, if 
formal legal institutions become accessible and competitive, indirect 
changes in customary outcomes may be even more salient (see Aldashev et 
al., 2012a, 2012b). Chapter 6 explores the effect on customary arbitration 
outcomes of increased “competition” by formal law. 
 Objectives 1.4
Preferences are endogenous to the institutional environment and 
arrangements (Bowles et al., 2003). On the other hand, institutions emerge 
as a result of cumulative individual choices, and are continually reshaped 
by changing beliefs and preferences (Williamson, 2000). Shocks may thus 
have three orders of effects on economic development: directly, though 
changes in physical and human capital; indirectly through changes in 
preferences and institutions; and through the changes that these may 
induce in each other (see Palacios-Huerta and Santos, 2004). The 
overarching objective of this thesis is to identify behavioral responses to 
exogenous shocks at the individual and community levels, contributing to 
the understanding of the endogenous formation of preferences and 
institutions—and the dynamics of economic development.  
The chapters separately address the following research questions: 
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Chapter 2: Does prenatal trauma affect individual preferences for cooperation? 
Chapter 3: Does conflict exposure alter the willingness to compete? 
Chapter 4: Does market experience promote rational choice? 
Chapter 5: Does formal insurance crowd-out social capital? 
Chapter 6: Does (the threat of) formal law affect customary legal outcomes? 
The individual preferences discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 are shaped by 
existing norms, customs, and laws, but at the same time represent the very 
building blocks of the latter. Similarly, the institutional changes discussed 
in Chapter 5 and 6 are underpinned by individual choices. Chapter 4 
embodies the juncture between these chapters, as it investigates individual 
behavioral changes induced by an institutional shock. Hence, it should not 
come as a surprise that the strongest common thread across the case 
studies is the focus on individual decision making (see Williamson, 2008). 
The next section outlines the methodological similarities across chapters, 
discussing the advantages and pitfalls of the field experimental approach. 
 Methodology 1.5
1.5.1 Field experiments 
Theoretical propositions are the backbone of economic science. Yet, after 
modeling a general hypothesis scholars must illustrate its functioning, and 
test the underlying causal mechanisms, through empirical case studies. At 
the same time, case studies ‘enable the analyst to examine off-path 
behavior’ (Alston, 2008: p.120), upon which more solid theoretical 
foundations can be developed (Becker, 1993). Traditionally, micro-
economic data is gathered through questionnaires and other forms of field 
data. These are then analyzed quantitatively – through econometric and 
statistical inference – to identify patterns and relationships. In addition, 
economists may use incentive compatible laboratory experiments, 
randomizing “treatment” and “control” groups, to improve the 
identification of causal mechanisms (see Wilde, 1981; Smith, 1982).  
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To bridge field and lab-generated data, experimental economists have 
increasingly turned to “field experiments” (see Harrison and List, 2004; 
List, 2007; Gerber and Green, 2012). In essence, field experiments can be 
classified within three broad categories (List, 2014). Artefactual field 
experiments – also known as lab-in-field experiments – mimic experiments 
in the lab, except for drawing participants from the “field” of interest (e.g. 
Binswanger, 1980; Fehr and List, 2004; Gneezy et al., 2009). Framed field 
experiments add the contextualization of  the experimental setting—in 
terms of the tasks, commodities, or information sets used by participants 
(e.g. Duflo and Saez, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2004). Finally, natural field experiments take place in the very 
environment where participants normally undertake a certain task, and 
subjects may be unaware that they are taking part in an experiment (e.g. 
Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Gneezy and List, 2006; DellaVigna et al., 
2012). Field experiments are becoming a popular tool in economic 
research. Not only have they proven useful in assessing the effectiveness of 
development interventions, but – when informed by economic theory – may 
help to study relationships that can hardly be gauged through 
observational data (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008). 
This thesis roughly covers the entire spectrum of field experiment 
categories. All chapters in the main body make use of one or more 
decontextualized artefactual field experiments, such as public goods games, 
ultimatum games, or risk games. Chapter 2, 4, and 6 also expose 
participants to contextualized dilemmas, such as dispute arbitration by a 
local customary judge, or the trade of sesame produced by local farmers. 
Finally, Chapter 2, 3, and 5 make use of quasi-natural experimental 
settings, such as the varying exposure to violent conflict, a street football 
tournament, or the introduction of a formal health insurance in some 
parishes prior to others. The case studies often stem from broader research 
projects in the areas of study. The experiments conducted in Uganda, for 
instance, are part of a broader impact evaluation effort of development 
initiatives that are co-financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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1.5.2 Ethical dimension 
The improvement of identification and data collection methodologies – and 
increasing accessibility of relatively remote areas of the world – has 
permitted an unprecedented surge in both the quantity and quality of 
information gathered from developing countries. In particular, the Sub-
Saharan African context offers a wealth of opportunities to understand the 
dynamics of poverty and development—‘much of the economics that really 
matters’ (Schultz, 1980: p.639). Yet, using experimental methods in the 
field raises several ethical concern, especially because it involves 
“manipulating” the setting and opportunities available to subjects (see 
Teele, 2014). Interventions that randomly assign one group to a treatment, 
and take another group as control, raise immediate worries with respect to 
fairness, as well as about the extent of the “mandate” one has to do so. 
Similarly, artefactual field experiments that provide monetary incentives to 
some participants and not to others may have downstream consequences 
on community dynamics, even when played anonymously. In other words, 
even though an experiment is intended to be entirely beneficent, it may 
bring about unforeseen risks for those involved. This issue is not unique to 
experimental settings. A notable non-experimental example is that of a 
gender-targeted microfinance program which unintentionally resulted in 
increased violence against participating women (Rahman, 1999). Yet, 
researchers’ capacity to manipulate the “rules of the game” makes 
voluntary participation and informed consent even more essential.  
On top of this, a more utilitarian argument is often omitted. In the words 
of Hicks, data collection has ‘been most successful in those cases where it is 
possible to induce the people questioned to take some trouble over the 
answers; generally this means paying them to do so. [...] Poor people can 
be induced to take this trouble for a very small fee; to give the same 
inducement to richer people would be impossibly expensive’ (1942: p.3). 
The lower the opportunity cost of participants, the cheaper it is for 
researchers to collect data—even more so when using experiments.  
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In the research we conducted for this thesis we carefully explained the risks 
related to participation to all involved subjects. We stressed the 
importance of anonymity, both to participants and those executing the 
experiment, clearly marking non-anonymous choices before these where 
taken. We required informed consent from participants, granting the 
freedom to voluntarily terminate interviews and experiments at any time.  
The use of field experimental methodologies in developing countries can 
contribute immensely to target global food security and the eradication of 
poverty. Moreover, field experiments may help speed up policy change—as 
long as they do not divert resources destined to development interventions. 
A well-planned field experiment, for instance, may have identified the 
unintended consequences of the targeted microfinance example mentioned 
above both more rapidly and more precisely than the way it happened. 
Nonetheless, Sub-Saharan Africa should never become a giant testing field, 
and researchers should never underestimate the ethical dimension.  
 Outline 1.6
Chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the effect of prenatal 
trauma on the cooperation of those born during the Lord’s Resistance 
Army insurgency in northern Uganda. Chapter 3 investigates the effects of 
war exposure on the preferences for competition of youth in Sierra Leone, 
using the group dynamics generated by a local football tournament to 
separate in- and out-group behavior. Chapter 4 studies rational choice and 
its relationship to market exposure in rural Ethiopia, through a laboratory 
experiment involving local brokers and farmers. Chapter 5 explores the 
dynamics of social capital – proxied by individual public good 
contributions – in response to introducing a formal insurance scheme in 
southwestern Uganda. Chapter 6 studies the customary changes induced 
by the increased penetration of the rule of law, by looking at arbitration 
decisions made by real customary judges in Ethiopia over lab-in-field 
disputes. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Prenatal Trauma and Cooperation  
Evidence from a Public Goods Game 
in Post-Conflict Uganda 
 
Abstract 
We look at the impact of prenatal trauma on the social 
preferences of children born during an armed conflict. We 
play a dichotomous one-shot public goods game in 
Northern Uganda with children born during a period of 
intense fighting and civilian victimization. To proxy for 
prenatal trauma we use the 2D:4D digit ratio—a marker 
of in utero hormone exposure negatively associated with 
high maternal distress during early fetal development. We 
find that a rise in our marker of prenatal hormonal shock 
robustly reduces the child’s probability of contribution to 
the public good. Our findings are consistent with literature 
on the fetal origins of preferences. If prenatal trauma 
affects next generation’s taste for cooperation, violent 
conflict may have farther reaching socio-economic 
consequences than previously thought.  
 
 
Publication status: Cecchi, F., & Duchoslav J., 2014. Prenatal Trauma and Cooperation: 
Evidence from a Public Goods Game in Post-Conflict Uganda. Working paper.   
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 Introduction 2.1
The nine months in utero may well be the most critical time in a person's 
life (Almond and Currie, 2011). During pregnancy, suffering from severe 
trauma and stress alters the hormone exposure of the child, triggering 
epigenetic processes that may shape brain evolution and behavior (Dörner 
et al., 2001; Keverne and Curley, 2008). Later-life behavioral characteristics 
are in fact increasingly associated with “fetal origins”. Different scientific 
disciplines have studied the correlation of in utero hormone exposure with 
sexual identity, personality traits, and even financial trading ability 
(Csathó et al., 2003; Luxen and Buunk, 2005; Coates et al., 2009). In the 
lab, economists have investigated its relationship to altruism, cooperation 
in public goods games, and risk preferences (Garbarino et al., 2010; Buser, 
2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2013). We bring these studies to the field, and 
look at the impact of prenatal trauma on the social preferences of children 
born during an armed conflict. We shed light on an alternative, epigenetic 
mechanism of preference transmission—beyond the standard nature-
nurture debate. If prenatal trauma affects next generation’s taste for 
cooperation, violent conflict may have farther reaching socio-economic 
consequences than previously thought. It may affect regional long-run 
development trajectories and post-conflict recovery across generations, even 
if the episodes of violence are limited in time. 
We play a dichotomous one-shot public goods game with 440 children born 
in Pader district in Northern Uganda during the 1998-2006 period of 
intense fighting between government forces and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). Simultaneously, we conduct an extensive socio-economic 
questionnaire including war exposure, post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) symptoms, and a closely related public goods game, with their 
main caregiver. To proxy for prenatal trauma, we use the 2D:4D digit 
ratio––a marker of in utero hormone exposure (Manning et al., 2003; 
Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng and Cohn, 2011). The 2D:4D digit ratio is 
established during early fetal development, and remains relatively stable 
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throughout life. It measures the relative length of the index finger with 
respect to the ring finger, and is negatively related to the fetal testosterone 
to estradiol ratio (T:E2) (Manning et al., 2003; Lutchmaya et al., 2004). 
High levels of prenatal distress are associated with higher offspring T:E2 
ratios (Vom Saal et al., 1990), and lower 2D:4D ratios (Lilley et al., 2010). 
We find that a one standard deviation rise in our marker of prenatal 
distress reduces the child’s probability of contribution to the public good 
by about 8 percentage points (or 20% of the mean prevalence). We control 
for alternative mechanisms such as early life deprivation, caregiver public 
good contributions, and war exposure after birth. We show that adult 
PTSD predicts lower digit ratios in children, and that the average digit 
ratio of biological mothers and siblings born before the war is significantly 
higher. We discuss the sensitivity to exogeneity assumptions, and the 
likelihood that our findings are driven by unobserved characteristics.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature on the subject. Section 2.3 briefly describes the context and 
background. Section 2.4 outlines the experimental design. Section 2.5 
discusses the empirical strategy and identification. Section 2.6 illustrates 
the results, and Section 2.7 concludes. 
 Conflict, trauma, and preferences 2.2
This paper explores the fetal origins of preferences for cooperation in a 
post-conflict setting. It builds upon three strands of literature—that on the 
role of violent conflict in shaping preferences, that on the consequences of 
trauma in utero, and that on the relationship between prenatal hormone 
exposure and economic behavior.  
The relationship between violent conflict and the functioning of societies 
has been at the forefront of economic debate for years. War violence 
persistently impacts health, education, and poverty (Ghobarah et al., 2003; 
Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Gates et al., 2012), but also affects 
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individual preferences and behavior. It has been found to increase 
community participation and political engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 
2009; Blattman, 2009), out-group aggressiveness and competitiveness 
(Miguel et al., 2011; Cecchi et al., 2014), as well as risk propensity, and 
discount rates (Voors et al., 2012). Individuals exposed to inter-community 
violence display more altruistic behavior, higher public good contributions, 
and trust within their networks (Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014). 
Intra-community violence, instead, decreases social cohesion and trust, and 
increases sentiments of group identity (Cassar et al., 2013; Rohner et al., 
2013). These studies focus on the postnatal impact of violent conflict 
exposure. The effect of prenatal exposure on preferences may follow 
distinct pathways, perhaps more associable to those related to extreme 
prenatal stress; these have yet to be investigated in a post-conflict setting.  
Several studies have looked at the physical and psychological consequences 
of stress and traumatic events in utero. Maternal prenatal anxiety may 
suppress the development of a functioning immune system, increasing the 
incidence of several health complications in infants (Stott, 1973). Moreover, 
exposure to violence during pregnancy has been found to deteriorate birth 
outcomes, typically in terms of birth weight, fetal growth, and preterm 
delivery (Mancuso et al., 2004; Lauderdale, 2006; Camacho, 2007; 
Koppensteiner and Manacorda, 2013; Black et al., 2014; Quintana-
Domeque and Rodenas, 2014). Independent positive shocks, such as a rise 
in cocoa price at birth – expected to reduce financial distress in cocoa-
producing areas of Ghana with respect to other regions – decrease the 
likelihood of mental distress during adulthood (Adhvaryu et al., 2014). 
Prenatal negative shocks, such as extreme weather or military invasions, 
are instead associated with higher prevalence of schizophrenia and autism 
(van Os and Selten, 1998; Walder et al., 2014).  
The prolonged emotional disturbance and distress induced by conflict 
increases the likelihood of trauma, mental health problems, and PTSD (de 
Jong, 2002; Lopes Cardozo et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2008). The higher the 
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post-traumatic hormonal release, the greater the chance that subjects 
develop PTSD (Delahanty et al., 2000). PTSD, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of persistent hormonal imbalance, particularly with respect to 
cortisol—the stress hormone in humans (de Kloet et al., 2008; Song et al., 
2008; Steudte et al., 2011). During pregnancy, maternal stress is 
transmitted to the fetus through hormonal releases (Mancuso et al., 2004; 
Weinstock, 2008). Prenatally stressed rodents exhibit higher concentrations 
of serum testosterone and higher testosterone to estradiol ratios (Ward and 
Weisz, 1980; Vom Saal et al., 1990). In turn, the fetal testosterone to 
estradiol ratio is negatively related to the 2D:4D digit ratio (Manning et 
al., 2003; Lutchmaya et al., 2004). Connecting the dots, Lilley et al. (2010) 
show that high levels of maternal corticosterone, the rodent equivalent to 
cortisol, are associated with lower offspring 2D:4D digit ratio. They suggest 
that the latter may be a useful phenotypic indicator of maternal distress 
during early fetal development. 
The 2D:4D digit ratio measures the relative length of the index finger with 
respect to the ring finger. It is established through changes in gene 
expression which take place without a change in the DNA sequence – 
known as epigenetic modifications (Jirtle and Skinner, 2007) – and is 
widely accepted as a noninvasive marker and ‘lifelong signature of prenatal 
hormonal exposure’ (Zheng and Cohn, 2011: p. 16289). During early fetal 
development, increased androgen hormones (e.g. testosterone) or the 
inactivation of the estrogen receptor (ER-α) stimulate the ring finger 
growth, which leads to a lower 2D:4D ratio. On the other hand, the 
addition of estrogen (e.g. estradiol) or the inactivation of the androgen 
receptor (AR) decrease the ring finger growth, resulting in a higher 2D:4D 
ratio (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Zheng and Cohn, 2011).  
In the lab, Garbarino et al. (2010) show that a low 2D:4D is associated 
with greater risk-taking. This is confirmed by evidence that low digit ratio 
MBA students self-select more into risky finance careers (Sapienza et al., 
2009), and that the financial ability among male high-frequency traders is 
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negatively related to their 2D:4D ratio (Coates et al., 2009). Its 
relationship to other-regarding preferences is relatively less studied, 
especially on non-experimental populations. Among undergraduate 
students, Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) find a non-monotonic impact of the 
digit ratio on altruism. Also, self-assessed low digit ratios (2D<4D) predict 
lower giving in ultimatum, trust, and public good games (Buser, 2012). We 
use the 2D:4D digit ratio as a marker of maternal distress, to explore how 
prenatal trauma induced by violent conflict may reflect on the preferences 
for cooperation of the next generation. 
 Context and background 2.3
In the last 25 years Uganda achieved high and steady GDP growth rates, 
averaging about 6.7% per year (World Bank, 2014). This, however, has 
been more of an exception than the rule. Since independence in 1962, 
Uganda has witnessed few short periods of peace and relative prosperity, 
and many long periods of violence and constitutional suspension. In fact, 
even while the country’s overall growth rate was faster than that of many 
of its neighbors, the North was enduring the last of a long series of 
conflicts: Joseph Kony’s LRA insurgency (1987-2006).  
Violence has been escalating recurrently in Uganda since 1971, when Idi 
Amin took power from the discredited President Milton Obote.1 Amin 
ruled the country until the 1979 Uganda-Tanzania War led to his ousting. 
Obote’s comeback triggered instead the Ugandan Bush War, against the 
southern rebels of the National Resistance Army (NRA) headed by the 
current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni. Obote lost power for the 
second time in 1985, short before the NRA faction assaulted Kampala—
gaining the power it still holds today (Finnström, 2008).  
                                      
1 In 1966 Obote was implicated in a corruption scandal together with the then deputy 
commander of armed forces, Idi Amin. He responded by suspending the constitution. 
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As the balance of power shifted southwards again, rebel movements in the 
North gathered under the flag of the LRA (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). 
Limited in numbers and resources, the LRA resorted to pillaging villages 
and abducting local youth: an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people were 
abducted across two decades (Annan et al., 2006; Pham et al., 2007). 
Throughout the years, weak government responses and the setup of an 
Acholi self-defense militia invigorated the LRA, which scaled up operations 
to discipline the local population.2 Yet, civilian victimization in these years 
was not only the result of LRA violence, and abuse from government 
troops was not uncommon (Finnström, 2008; Dolan, 2009). The 
widespread killing and mutilation of Acholi civilians escalated dramatically 
after 1996, especially in the Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader. 
In these districts, more than a quarter of the males aged 10 to 25 at the 
end of the war had been abducted for at least two weeks, and only 80% of 
them returned from captivity (Blattman and Annan, 2010). 
Pader district was particularly hit from 1998 onwards, when LRA 
operations gained momentum and moved southwards (Figure 1 and 
Appendix Figure A1). Civilian fatalities peaked in 2002, after the start of 
“Operation Iron Fist” against rebel bases in South Sudan set off a bloody 
reaction by LRA forces. A truce between the LRA and the government 
was signed in 2006, and fighting in Uganda has been sporadic ever since.3  
                                      
 2 Between 1994 and 2002, in response to Uganda’s support for the rebels in South Sudan, 
the Sudanese government provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment. 
3 Since then, the LRA has not been disarmed nor demilitarized, and has been active in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. 
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  Figure 1: Civilian targeting in Pader district 
 Experimental design 2.4
2.4.1 Sample and setting 
Our sample includes 440 children and their caregivers from Pader district 
in Northern Uganda. In November 2012, we visited 42 primary schools in 
the district, and randomly selected 12 students from a list of pupils 
enlisted at the beginning of the year.4 The descriptive statistics for children 
and caregivers are presented in Table 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. On average 
the children are 11 years old, half of them are female, and their body mass 
and height are respectively 0.4 and 1 standard deviation below the mean 
for their age (de Onis et al., 2007). Caregivers are instead 42 years of age, 
53% are female, and 79% did not complete primary education.5 Almost the 
                                      
4 The randomization was stratified according to grade: 4 students were selected from grade 
2, 4 from grade 4, and 4 from grade 6.Out of a total of 504, 64 students born prior to the 
intensification of violence in the area, around 1998, were excluded from the analysis. 
5 188 caregivers are biological mothers. Another 161 are biological fathers, while the 
remaining 91 were uncles/aunts, grandparents, siblings or other relatives (in descending 
order of prevalence). On average, caregivers had taken care of the child for 92.8% of the 
child’s life. Only 10 are not blood-related to the child (see Appendix Table A1). 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics (Children) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2D:4D 440 0.94 0.04 0.73 1.11 
Public good contribution 440 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Age 440 11.1 2.2 6 14 
Female 440 0.50 0.50 0 1 
School grade 440 3.6 1.49 2 6 
Height-for-age 439 -0.43 1.38 -4.82 5.8 
BMI-for-age 438 -1.04 1.09 -5.98 2.01 
IQ-for-age 440 94.98 14.99 79 162 
Time preferences 440 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Risk preferences 440 0.64 0.33 0 1 
War exposure 436 0.57 0.27 0 1 
Notes: See Appendix for variable definitions.  
 
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics (Caregivers) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Public good contribution 440 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age 435 42.1 12.1 19 92 
Female 440 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Education level 440 0.84 0.80 0 4 
Risk preferences 440 0.14 0.24 0 1 
War exposure 436 0.75 0.17 0.17 1 
PTSD (dummy) 440 0.40 0.49 0 1 
PTSD (factor) 440 0.00 1.00 -1.92 2.34 
Christian 440 0.99 0.10 0 1 
Acholi 440 0.97 0.16 0 1 
Household size 440 8.08 2.99 2 25 
Assets index 440 0.00 1.00 -0.56 5.62 
Notes: See Appendix for variable definitions.  
entire sample is ethnically Acholi and Christian by religion. Households are 
typically composed of 8 people. To control for additional potential 
confounds, we also collect information about the children’s cognitive ability 
(IQ) through standard Raven’s progressive matrices (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 
2012), time and risk preferences (Voors et al., 2012), as well as the 
household size and relative asset wealth (Sahn and Stifel, 2003). 
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2.4.2 The digit ratio 
The index and ring finger lengths were measured on the ventral surface of 
the right hand from the midpoint of the basal crease to the tip of the 
digit. 6  Given the contextual constraints and instruments available, 
measurement precision does not exceed 1 mm, resulting in an error of 
±3.3% at the mean of our estimations.7 While this is still far from the 
precision obtained in the lab (see Voracek et al., 2007), it represents a 
significant improvement with respect to Buser (2012)—whose subjects self-
report if they have a shorter, equal, or longer ring than index finger. 
Independent raters measured the digit lengths unaware of their scientific 
significance; errors should therefore result in unbiased random noise.8  
2.4.3 Public goods game 
We played a one-shot dichotomous public goods game with both the 
children and the caregivers. In each school, children played in randomly 
assigned groups of 6, and anonymously decided whether to select a 
“private card” or a “group card”.9 Children could in no way infer which 
other 5 participants belonged to their group (out of the 11 other children 
selected in that school). The private card allotted 3 candies to themselves 
and none to other unknown group members. The group card gave instead 
1 candy to each group member including themselves (a graphical 
                                      
6 The 2D:4D ratio varies between ethnic groups (Manning et al., 2000). The average ratio 
measured in our sample was around 0.94. 
7 In a pilot 30 raters separately measured 35 right hands, revealing comparable margins. 
8 Approximately two years after the main data collection we re-measured the digit lengths 
for a sub-sample of 258 respondents. While the absolute length of the fingers had 
undoubtedly changed in the meanwhile, their ratio should remain relatively stable 
throughout lifetime. In line with expectations, the average error was ±3.7%. Results are 
not driven by systematic measurement error, and excluding measures with potentially 
greater error does not significantly alter the results (see Appendix Table A2). 
9 Contrarily to many public good games in which participants can choose their preferred 
contribution level, we opted for a dichotomous choice: respondents could either cooperate 
or not. While this reduces the nuances present in the experimental sample, we believe that 
it facilitated the decision making process, especially for the youngest. 
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representation of the two cards can be found in the Appendix, Figure A2). 
The joint surplus is therefore maximized when all participants choose the 
group card, such that each group member receives 6 candies. Nevertheless, 
free riders selecting the private card may obtain up to 8 candies. The Nash 
equilibrium is reached if everyone selects the private card, receiving 3 
candies only. Caregivers played a very similar game, but played in groups 
of 12 instead of 6. The game was played in an isolated environment – 
typically their home – and caregivers where unaware of the identity of 
other participants. The private card was worth 4000 UGX, equivalent to 
approximately 1.5 USD; the group card was instead worth 500 UGX. The 
non-cooperative equilibrium thus yielded 4000 UGX each, joint 
maximization returned 6000 UGX each, and free riders could earn as much 
as 9500 UGX.10 On average, 41% of the children and 51% of the caregivers 
opted for the cooperative option offered by the group card. 
2.4.4 War exposure and trauma 
We do not ask war-related questions to children. Instead, we use 
information on the individual war exposure of their caregivers, and weigh 
it against the war violence that happened after the year of birth of the 
child. We use an adapted version of the War Trauma Questionnaire 
(WTQ), excluding the questions about shelling and bombardment which 
are not relevant to our setting (Macksoud, 1992; Papageorgiou et al., 
2000). This questionnaire provides information on 23 war related traumatic 
events that a person may have witnessed, rated through ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
statements. We create a victimization index using the average of positive 
responses to these violence related questions (Bellows and Miguel, 2009). 
                                      
10 The variation in pay-outs between the child and caregiver versions of the game was 
determined during a pilot. We adjusted the relative values of the “private” and “group” 
cards to obtain relatively similar cooperation prevalence ratios across the two samples, 
with around half the sample opting for cooperation. Specifically, the number of candies 
assigned by the “private” card in the child version was dropped from 4 to 3 to increase the 
likelihood that children would select the “group” card.  
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On average, caregivers responded positively to 75% of the questions, with a 
minimum observed exposure of 17%.11 To proxy the child’s postnatal war 
exposure we weight the caregiver’s victimization index by the portion of 
violence potentially witnessed by the child after birth. To this end, we take 
the fraction of total civilian fatalities that occurred in Pader district 
following the child’s birth (see Figure 1) or, in alternative, the fraction of 
LRA-related violent conflict events after birth (see Appendix Figure A1). 
We measure PTSD symptoms in adults using the civilian version of the 
PCL self-report checklist (Weathers et al., 1993).12 We convert individual 
scores into a PTSD dummy, following the recommendations of the US 
Department of Veteran Affairs, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM4).13 As additional robustness 
check, we perform a factor analysis to extrapolate a factor for “trauma”. 
We find a robustly positive and significant relationship between war 
exposure and trauma in our adult sample, with a higher prevalence of 
PTSD for women. A one standard deviation increase in our victimization 
index increases the likelihood of PTSD by almost 10%, and scores on the 
trauma factor by 20% of a standard deviation (see Appendix Table A3). 
 
                                      
11 Unfortunately, 4 caregivers asked to terminate the module prior to its completion; any 
analysis including war exposure measures will be made on the remaining 436 respondents. 
12 This 17-item questionnaire has been found to have strong psychometric properties, high 
internal consistency, and high test-retest reliability (Blanchard et al., 1996; Ruggiero et al., 
2006; Conybeare et al., 2012). Moreover, it is strongly correlated with alternative measures 
of PTSD such as the Mississippi, MMPI-2 Keane, IES, and CAPS scales (Weathers et al., 
1993; Dobie et al., 2002; Freedy et al., 2010). 
13 In our setting we expect high rates of PTSD (Roberts et al., 2008; Pfeiffer and Elbert, 
2011). We therefore take a conservatively high threshold for PTSD, at >66% of the 
maximum item score, to minimize the likelihood of false positives (Keen et al., 2008). We 
therefore find a lower PTSD prevalence (40%) than previous studies in the region that do 
not apply this correction. The DSM4 cut-off point requires at least 1 moderately positive 
answer in questions 1-5, 3 in 6-12, and 2 in 13-17. At the selected threshold, only 4 out of 
440 caregivers do not meet this requirement. Our analysis is robust to their inclusion or 
exclusion from the PTSD count. 
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 Empirical strategy 2.5
2.5.1 Main result 
We hypothesize that maternal distress during pregnancy may reflect on the 
cooperation preferences of the offspring. The 2D:4D digit ratio is an 
indicator of maternal distress during early fetal development, negatively 
correlated to maternal corticosterone levels during pregnancy as well as to 
in utero testosterone to estradiol ratios. We use the negative standardized 
digit ratio as our (relative) measure of prenatal trauma: 
 
	 
 	2: 4	  2: 4  
 
(1)	
where 2: 4	  is the digit ratio of individual ; 2: 4 is the mean digit 
ratio in the sample;  is the standard error; and the negative sign produces 
a positive relationship between our proxy and actual prenatal trauma—for 
ease of interpretation. 
We estimate a specification with only the prenatal trauma proxy as a 
regressor, and gradually include other variables to reach the following fully 
specified linear probability model:14 
                                      
14 Literature highlights several trade-offs between linear probability (LPM) and probit 
models. First, compared to a probit, the LPM does not estimate the structural parameters, 
but this paper is mostly concerned with marginal effects (intuitively interpretable with 
LPM). Second, LPM error terms are heteroskedastic by construct; we thus use cluster 
robust standard errors, which are heteroskedasticity-consistent. Finally, Horrace and 
Oaxaca (2006) show that the potential bias of LPM increases with the fraction of 
predicted probabilities that lie outside the (unconstrained) unit interval. In our main 
specification, the predicted probabilities lie between 0.003 and 0.815; we thus expect our 
estimations to be largely unbiased and consistent. In fact, marginal effects calculated 
through a probit very closely resemble those of our selected LPM (see Appendix Table A4, 
column 1). 
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 	 
 	 + 		 + ′	 +  	 + !"′	 +	#	 (2)	
where  is a dummy taking value of 1 if individual  played the 
group card in the public goods game; 	  is our measure of 
prenatal trauma; X′	  is a vector of child characteristics including age, 
gender, age × gender, education, and caregiver characteristics including 
age, gender, age × gender, education and ethnicity;  	 represents spatial 
fixed effects at the sub-county level; and Z′	  is a vector of potentially 
endogenous covariates such as household size, assets, time preferences and 
risk preferences of child . Standard errors are clustered for 42 villages. 
From Buser (2012), we expect  < 0.  
2.5.2 Alternative mechanisms 
Next, we investigate potential alternative mechanisms. First, the literature 
discussed in Section 2 predicts that prenatal stress may capture the effect 
of early life deprivation. Height, for instance, is an anthropometric 
indicator of early-life experiences comparable to longitudinal measures such 
as height and weight at birth (Currie and Vogl, 2013). Similarly, low birth 
weight is associated with later-life low BMI (Walker et al., 2002),  and 
severe deprivation at an early stage has persistent effects on cognitive 
ability (Beckett et al., 2006; Figlio et al., 2014). Second, the preferences of 
children may be driven by those of their caregivers through environmental 
as well as genetic mechanisms (Dohmen et al., 2011). Third, Section 2 
highlights the role of postnatal war exposure in shaping individual 
preferences. Bauer et al. (2014) find that experiencing war may affect 
social preferences even at a very young age. We control for such covariates 
through the following fully specified linear probability models:  
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	 + 	 + 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 	 + 		 + (	 +  		+6748	 +	#	 
	(3)				(4)				(5)	
where *	 is the height-for-age of child , ,-.	 is the body-mass-index-for-
age of child , and .0	 is an age-standardized measure of cognitive ability; 2	 is a dummy taking value of 1 if the caregiver of child  
played the group card in the public goods game, and 245	 is a 
measure of the caregiver’s risk propensity; 748	 is the measure of child 
postnatal war exposure discussed in section 4; and all other notations have 
the same meaning as in (2). 
2.5.3 Causality and unobserved selection 
We use the 2D:4D digit ratio as an indicator of maternal distress during 
early fetal development (Ward and Weisz, 1980; Vom Saal et al., 1990; 
Lilley et al., 2010). If prenatal traumatization results in smaller digit 
ratios, we should observe this pattern in our data. First, we test this using 
the following equation:  
 2: 4	 
 	; + <27=>	 + ?′	 +  	 + #	 	(6)	
where 27=>	  is a measure of the PTSD symptoms of the 
caregiver; and all other notations have the same meaning as in (2). 
Next, we compare the digit ratio of (83) biological mothers to that of their 
offspring, and of their female offspring only (43). Moreover, we identify 
same-mother siblings born between 1990 and 1996, a relatively non-violent 
period in Pader district. We test the hypothesis that (42) siblings born 
prior to the intensification of war violence have a significantly higher digit 
ratio, and verify its robustness by looking at (26) same-sex siblings. 
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Finally, our results may be biased by unobserved selection. Following 
Blattman and Annan (2010), we explicitly model relaxations of 
unconfoundedness by applying the sensitivity analysis proposed by Imbens 
(2003) and further developed by Harada (2012). Unobservable covariates 
may induce bias only if sufficiently correlated to the assignment and 
outcome variables. We identify a contour representing the degree of partial 
correlation with prenatal trauma and cooperation required for a pseudo-
unobservable to reduce the coefficient by ¼. For comparison, we also plot 
the partial correlations of five benchmark covariates.  
 Results 2.6
We test the effect of prenatal trauma on preferences for cooperation of 440 
children born during the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, in 
Northern Uganda. We find that our marker of prenatal distress is 
negatively correlated with the child’s probability of contribution to the 
public good (See Appendix Figure A3). Parametrically, one standard 
deviation drop in the digit ratio reduces the child’s probability of 
contribution by about 8 percentage points (Table 2). At the mean 
prevalence (41%), this results approximately in a 20% lower likelihood of 
cooperation. The effect is robust to individual, caregiver, spatial and 
potentially endogenous controls (Table 2, columns 2-4).15 
 
Result 1: Prenatal trauma reduces the taste for 
cooperation. One standard deviation drop in the digit ratio 
decreases the child’s probability of contribution to the 
public good by 20%. 
 
                                      
15 Results are robust to using a probit model; including village fixed effects or enumerator 
fixed effects; and to two-way clustering of standard errors for village and year of birth. See 
the Appendix Table A4 for details. 
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Table 2: Prenatal trauma reduces cooperation 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.085*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Child controls N Y Y Y 
Caregiver controls N Y Y Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N N Y Y 
Child risk and time preferences N N N Y 
Household size and assets index N N N Y 
Observations 440 435 435 435 
R2 0.024 0.042 0.045 0.047 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Education, Acholi. See Appendix Table A5 for the full list coefficients. 
Next, we control for potential alternative mechanisms driving such effect. 
First, we look at the impact of early life deprivation. We find that height-
for-age is positively associated with cooperation: one standard deviation 
increase in the height-for-age increases the likelihood of contribution to the 
public good by 6 percentage points. BMI-for-age and IQ-for-age do not 
enter significantly (Table 3, columns 1-2). Nonetheless, prenatal trauma 
remains significant: its coefficient is stable and robust to controlling for 
markers of early life deprivation (Table 3, columns 3-4).  
Second, we study the intergenerational transmission of preferences by 
controlling for caregiver public good contributions and caregiver risk 
propensity. Notably, we find a strong relationship between the social 
preferences of the caregiver and the child, but not between the risk 
preferences of the caregiver and the social preferences of the child. Children 
are 16 percentage points more likely to contribute if their main caregiver 
contributes to the public good in a separate game (Table 4, columns 1-2). 
Prenatal trauma is not affected by these controls (Table 4, columns 3-4).16 
                                      
16 For a sub-sample of 154 parents we verify that the parents’ digit ratio is not driving our 
result—i.e. the genetic component does not foreshadow the epigenetic effect We find no 
effect of parental digit ratios on the cooperation of children (see Appendix Table A6). 
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Table 3: Alternative mechanism 1: early life deprivation 
Public Good Contribution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) 
  
-0.078*** -0.081*** 
   
(0.026) (0.028) 
Height-for-age 0.027* 0.060*** 0.027* 0.056*** 
 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) 
BMI-for-age -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
IQ-for-age -0.010 -0.0012 -0.012 -0.005 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Child controls N Y N Y 
Caregiver controls N Y N Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N Y N Y 
Observations 438 433 438 433 
R2 0.006 0.038 0.029 0.062 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Education, Acholi. 
 
Table 4: Alternative mechanism 2: caregiver preferences 
  Public Good Contribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) 
  
-0.072*** -0.079*** 
   
(0.026) (0.026) 
Caregiver cooperation 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 
 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) 
Caregiver risk preferences 0.037 0.059 0.044 0.077 
 
(0.099) (0.010) (0.100) (0.098) 
Child controls N Y N Y 
Caregiver controls N Y N Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N Y N Y 
Observations 440 435 440 435 
R2 0.027 0.047 0.047 0.070 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Education, Acholi. 
Third, we look at the effect of postnatal conflict-related violence.17 The 
children in our sample were at most 8 years of age at the end of hostilities, 
                                      
17 Here we use the fraction of civilian fatalities after birth to weight the caregiver’s war 
exposure. Using the fraction of LRA-related violent events does not change the results. 
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but postnatal witnessing of conflict-related violence may still have affected 
their taste for cooperation. In our sample, however, postnatal war exposure 
does not significantly affect cooperation, and does not wash out the effect 
of prenatal trauma (Table 5).  
Result 2: The relationship between prenatal trauma and 
cooperation is stable and robust to controlling for early life 
deprivation markers, caregiver preferences and postnatal 
war exposure. 
Next, we address the causality mechanism by regressing caregiver PTSD 
on child digit ratios and by investigating mother fixed effects. We find that 
stronger symptoms of PTSD in caregivers are associated with lower child 
2D:4D digit ratios (Table 6).18 While this is reassuring, it is by no means 
conclusive evidence. First, out of 440 caregivers, our sample comprises only 
188 biological mothers. Second, we do not know for sure whether the 
caregiver’s traumatization took place before or after the birth of the child. 
Third, we measure PTSD symptoms 6 years after the end of the war, and 
an average of 11 years after the birth of the child. While literature shows 
that war related PTSD symptoms in Northern Uganda have persisted for 
such a long time period (Roberts et al., 2008; Pfeiffer and Elbert, 2011), it 
is plausible that post bellum events may have caused the observed PTSD. 
We thus complement the evidence with a mother fixed effects analysis, 
which involved a separate step of data collection (Table 7). We compare 
mean digit ratios of a sub-sample of the children with that of their 
biological mother through a paired t-test (Table 7, rows 1 and 2). 
Similarly, we compare the digit ratio with that of same-mother siblings 
born prior to the intensification of violence in Pader (Table 7, rows 3 and 
4). Children born during the conflict have significantly smaller digit ratios.  
                                      
18 Here we take the 4 observations that do not comply with the DSM4 requirements for 
clinical PTSD as negative. Including them as positive cases does not change the results. 
Also, the effect is quantitatively stable and robust to excluding caregivers that are not: 
blood-related, parents, mothers (although the latter result is statistically insignificant). 
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Table 5: Alternative mechanism 3: postnatal war exposure 
  Public Good Contribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) 
  
-0.076*** -0.082*** 
   
(0.025) (0.026) 
 Postnatal war exposure 0.122* 0.029 0.120 0.062 
 
(0.071) (0.110) (0.072) (0.110) 
Child controls N Y N Y 
Caregiver controls N Y N Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N Y N Y 
Observations 436 431 436 431 
R2 0.005 0.020 0.027 0.045 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Education, Acholi. 
 
Table 6: Caregiver trauma predicts lower digit ratios in children 
  2D:4D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PTSD -0.300*** -0.265** 
  
 
(0.108) (0.116) 
  
Trauma factor 
  
-0.116** -0.098* 
   
(0.050) (0.055) 
Child controls N Y N Y 
Caregiver controls N Y N Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N Y N Y 
Observations 440 435 440 435 
R2 0.023 0.041 0.014 0.033 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Education, Acholi. 
 
Table 7: Children born during the conflict exhibit significantly lower digit ratios 
 
Observations  2D:4D 
 Child Control  Child Cont. Diff. Std. Err.
Biological mothers 83 83  0.941 0.956 -0.015*** 0.005 
Biological mothers (female child) 43 43  0.940 0.953 -0.013** 0.006 
Same-mother sibling 42 42  0.935 0.948 -0.013* 0.008 
Same-mother sibling (same sex) 26 26  0.941 0.950 -0.009 0.008 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
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Result 3: Caregiver trauma predicts lower digit ratios in 
children. Also, children that are born during the conflict 
exhibit significantly lower digit ratios than their biological 
mothers and same-mother siblings. 
As is true for most observational studies, we cannot control for the bias 
due to unobserved selection. A certain type of mothers – with a certain 
preference for cooperation or risk before the war, for instance – may have 
self-selected into or out of traumatic events during pregnancy. Similarly, we 
are not able to verify the role of the behavior of armed groups or the 
influence of pre-war unobservable household characteristics. Our causal 
interpretation of the results may suffer from the potential bias due to the 
omission of such unobservables. Following Blattman and Annan (2010), we 
provide a graphical benchmark of the sensibility of our results to 
exogeneity assumptions (Imbens, 2003; Harada, 2012). The curve in Figure 
2 represents the locus of partial correlation points of a hypothetical 
pseudo-unobservable with our assignment and outcome variables, that 
would lead our estimated effect to be reduced by ¼. The selected contour 
is conservative, 19 and still yields a significant coefficient at the 5% level 
(t=2.16). Yet, the alternative mechanisms we identify and discuss in 
Section 5.2 lie far below the selected threshold. To rule out the effect of 
prenatal trauma, any unobserved covariate not considered in our analysis 
would require a partial correlation with both the treatment and the 
assignment well above the curve of Figure 2. 
                                      
19 Blattman and Annan (2010), for instance, plot a contour that decreases the effect of the 
assignment by ½. 
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  Figure 2: Sensitivity to the unconfoundedness assumption 
 Conclusions 2.7
‘The womb may be more important than the home’, wrote the late David 
J. Barker (1990: 1111) in his seminal work on the fetal origins of adult 
disease. Barker’s hypothesis has spawned a large volume of literature 
exploring its economic implications. This study builds upon the fetal 
origins literature, and tests the hypothesis that prenatal events may not 
only alter later-life individual abilities and health trajectories (Almond and 
Currie, 2011), but also other-regarding preferences. In particular, we look 
at the impact of prenatal trauma on the social preferences of children born 
during an armed conflict. We play a dichotomous one-shot public goods 
game in Pader, a district in Northern Uganda, with children born during 
the 1998-2006 period of intense fighting between government forces and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Our identification strategy exploits 
variations in the 2D:4D digit ratio––a marker of in utero hormone exposure 
negatively associated with high maternal distress during early fetal 
development. We find that a rise in our marker of prenatal distress 
robustly reduces the child’s probability of contribution to the public good. 
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The estimated effect is quantitatively large, stable, and robust to 
controlling for alternative mechanisms such as early life deprivation, 
caregiver public good contribution preferences, and war exposure after 
birth. 
Our results thus support three separate findings from previous studies. 
Firstly – and perhaps obviously – violent conflict exposure is traumatizing. 
Secondly, a mother’s traumatization during pregnancy affects the 
hormonal balance of the fetus. Thirdly, in utero hormonal balance affects 
later-life other-regarding preferences. By analyzing these three relationships 
concurrently in a post-conflict context – where violence has differentially 
impacted large portions of the population – we find evidence supporting 
the entire causal chain: from conflict in one generation to economic 
behavior in the next one. Prenatal trauma triggers adaptive mechanisms 
that go far beyond the well-established relationship between postnatal war 
exposure and preferences. The socio-economic consequences of conflict may 
thus be reaching much further than previously thought, and the womb 
may well be far more crucial than David Barker ever imagined. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: LRA related conflict events, Pader and Uganda 2006 
 
 
Figure A2: Private and group cards in the public goods game for children 
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Figure A3: Digit ratio quartiles and prevalence of public good contributions 
 
 
 
Table A1: Sensitivity of results to caregiver relationship to the child 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 All Blood-related Parents Mothers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.080** -0.091** 
 
(0.026) (0.040) (0.029) (0.037) 
Child controls Y Y Y Y 
Caregiver controls Y Y Y Y 
Sub-county fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 435 425 345 185 
R2 0.045 0.045 0.043 0.083 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade; Caregiver controls: Age, Female (excluding 
column 4), Age × Female (excluding column 4), Education, Acholi.   
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Table A2: Sensitivity of results to the exclusion of potentially biased measures 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 All ∆ < 5% ∆ < 3% ∆ < 1% 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.097*** -0.119*** -0.097* -0.189 
 
(0.033) (0.040) (0.052) (0.171) 
Child controls Y Y Y Y 
Caregiver controls Y Y Y Y 
Sub-county fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 258 186 129 39 
R2 0.045 0.054 0.040 0.153 
Notes: ∆ is the two-year inter-observer measurement difference. Standard errors corrected for village level 
clustering are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × 
Female, Grade; Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Education, Acholi. 
   
Table A3: War exposure predicts trauma in adults 
PTSD Trauma factor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Victimization index 0.082*** 0.099*** 0.182*** 0.226*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.051) 
Female  0.278***  0.569*** 
  (0.053)  (0.108) 
Caregiver controls N Y N Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N Y N Y 
Observations 436 431 436 431 
R2 0.029 0.098 0.034 0.127 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Caregiver controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Education, Acholi. 
 
Table A4: Robustness of the main result to alternative specifications 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 
Probit 
model 
Village  
f.e. 
Enumerator 
f.e. 
Two-way 
clustering 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.090*** -0.070*** -0.059** -0.088*** 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) 
Child controls Y Y Y Y 
Caregiver controls Y Y Y Y 
Sub-county fixed effects Y N Y Y 
Village level clustered s.e. 42 N 42 42 
Year of birth clustered s.e. N N N 9 
Observations 435 429 435 435 
R2 0.035 0.185 0.181 0.032 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade; Caregiver 
controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Education, Acholi. 
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Table A5: Prenatal trauma reduces cooperation (all coefficients) 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.085*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Child age  0.018 0.016 0.016 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Child female  -0.108 -0.126 -0.139 
  (0.264) (0.273) (0.274) 
Child age × female   0.010 0.012 0.013 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Child grade  -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Caregiver age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Caregiver female  -0.298 -0.297 -0.306* 
  (0.179) (0.178) (0.180) 
Caregiver age × female  0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Caregiver education  0.013 0.014 0.009 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) 
Caregiver Acholi  0.004 0.018 0.021 
  (0.116) (0.122) (0.129) 
Lira Palwo sub-county   0.014 0.009 
   (0.061) (0.064) 
Lukole sub-county   -0.037 -0.041 
   (0.073) (0.074) 
Parabongo sub-county   -0.008 -0.016 
   (0.090) (0.093) 
Patongo sub-county   0.033 0.029 
   (0.139) (0.137) 
Awere sub-county   -0.090 -0.097 
   (0.100) (0.100) 
Pajule sub-county   0.029 0.025 
   (0.096) (0.097) 
Puranga sub-county   0.005 0.002 
   (0.071) (0.074) 
Assets index    0.014 
    (0.020) 
Household size    0.004 
    (0.010) 
Child time-preferences    -0.002 
    (0.055) 
Child risk-preferences    0.001 
    (0.076) 
Observations 440 435 435 435 
R2 0.024 0.042 0.045 0.047 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for village level clustering (42) are in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. Atanga sub-county is taken as reference category, and thus omitted. 
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Table A6: Robustness of the main result to controlling for parental digit ratios 
 
Public Good Contribution 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized digit ratio (-) -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.142*** -0.120*** 
 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) 
Caregiver digit ratio  0.064 0.054 0.070* 
(biological parents only)  (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) 
Child controls N N Y Y 
Caregiver controls N N Y Y 
Sub-county fixed effects N N N Y 
Observations 154 153 153 153 
R2 0.045 0.061 0.094 0.145 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. Child controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Grade; Caregiver 
controls: Age, Female, Age × Female, Education, Acholi.  
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Variable Definitions: 
2D:4D. A child level measure of the relative length of the index finger of the right hand 
with respect to the ring finger (in cm). 
Standardized digit ratio (-). A child level variable derived by standardizing the 2D:4D (z-
score). The negative sign is added for ease of interpretation. 
Public good contribution (child and caregiver). An individual level dummy for both child 
and caregiver representing the individual choice in the public good game: “group card” or 
“private card”. The choice “group card” takes value 1, 0 otherwise. 
Age (child and caregiver). Age of respondent (child and caregiver) i in years, rounded 
down to the last birthday. 
Female (child and caregiver). Individual level dummy taking value of 1 if respondent 
(child and caregiver) is female, 0 otherwise. 
School grade.  A child level variable indicating the current school grade of child i. 
Height-for-age. The height of child i standardized for his age class (WHO, 2007).  
BMI-for-age. The body-mass-index of child i standardized for his age class (WHO, 2007). 
IQ-for-age The IQ of child i, measured using standard Raven’s matrixes and standardized 
for his age class (in sample). 
Time preferences. A child level dummy taking value of 1 if child prefers to receive two 
candies at the end of the survey rather than one half way, 0 otherwise. 
Risk preferences (child and caregiver). An individual level index (child and caregiver) 
spanning from 0 (i.e. never gamble) to one (i.e. always gamble), based on two dichotomous 
lottery choices. 
War exposure (child and caregiver). A caregiver level victimization index derived from 
answers to 23 war witnessing questions (see Macksoud, 1992). The postnatal war exposure 
of child i is proxied by the war exposure of the caregiver multiplied by the fraction of 
violent conflict events that took place after the birth of child i. 
Education level. A caregiver level variable indicating the number of completed years of 
education of respondent i. 
PTSD. A caregiver level measure of post-traumatic stress disorder, calculated using the 
PCL-civilian checklist. 
Christian. A dummy taking value of 1 if the caregiver is Christian by religion, 0 otherwise. 
Acholi. A dummy taking value of 1 if the caregiver is ethnically Acholi, 0 otherwise. 
Household size. The number of people sharing the same roof and sharing the same pot.  
Assets index. A principal factor (see Sahn and Stifel 2003) of assets possessed by the 
caregiver’s household (Radio, Phone, Bicycle, Motorbike, Television, Car, Generator). 
 
. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Conflict Exposure and Competitiveness  
Experimental Evidence from the Footbal l Field  
in Sierra Leone 
 
Abstract 
We use data from a street football tournament and a 
series of field experiments in post-conflict Sierra Leone to 
examine the impact of exposure to conflict violence on 
competitive behavior. We find that football players that 
experienced more intense exposure to violence are more 
likely to get a foul card during a game. In the lab we find 
that these individuals are significantly less risk averse on 
average, and more altruistic towards their in-group. We 
then isolate competitiveness from aggressiveness and find 
that conflict exposure increases the willingness to compete, 
but only towards the out-group. These results are in line 
with evolutionary theory, which highlights the role of 
inter-group conflict in increasing in-group cooperation 
while exacerbating out-group antagonism. Next to risk and 
other-regarding preferences, changes in individual 
preferences for competition may impact regional long-run 
development trajectories and post-conflict recovery. 
 
Publication status: Cecchi, F., Leuveld, K., & Voors M. J., 2014. Conflict Exposure and 
Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence from the Football Field in Sierra Leone. Under 
review at Economic Development and Cultural Change.  
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 Introduction 3.1
More than two-thirds of the African countries have experienced civil war 
during the past few decades (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). Research 
on the consequences of these conflicts documents the persistent effect of 
violence on education (Lai and Thyne, 2007; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 
2011), health and disability (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Iqbal, 2006; Iqbal and 
Zorn, 2010), food security and poverty (Gates et al., 2012). The impacts on 
institutions, individual behavior, and preferences, are less well understood 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). There is a small but growing body of 
literature examining these impacts, predominantly highlighting changes in 
social and political preferences, such as participation in local collective 
action, voting and sharing both within and across communities. 
Evolutionary theory highlights the role of inter-group conflict in shaping 
pro-egalitarian parochial preferences—increasing in-group cooperation 
while exacerbating out-group antagonism (Bernhard et al., 2006; Bowles, 
2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007). At shorter time-scales this theory has been 
corroborated with respect to increased in-group cooperation after civil war 
(Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014), and 
increased out-group antagonism (Miguel et al., 2011). 
Increased out-group antagonism may impact the aggressiveness of 
individuals (Miguel et al., 2011), but it may also affect their willingness to 
compete. Taste for competitiveness is an important non-cognitive 
determinant of human capital indicators, such as adult economic 
achievements and productivity (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). If less 
competitive people shy away from direct competition (Bartling et al., 
2012), non-first-best contenders have a higher chance of winning a 
contest—affecting allocative efficiency (see Eriksson et al., 2009). For this 
reason, ‘competitions and the right dose of competitiveness significantly 
determine not only the future of the individual but even the evolution of 
the whole species’ (Leibbrandt et al., 2013: p.9305). Yet, individual 
variations in competitiveness need not to be solely explained by long-run 
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evolution. They may result from exposure to different environments and 
pressures. Leibbrandt et al. (2013) find that fishermen from individualistic 
societies are far more competitive than those from neighboring collectivistic 
societies, and that this difference emerges with time. In conjunction with 
altered preferences for local collective action and trade-offs over risk and 
time, shifts in competitiveness may be a crucial determinant of regional 
post-war political and economic recovery and development.  
Using data from a football tournament in Sierra Leone, we assess the 
impact of war-related violence on preferences of local youth. We carefully 
record the details of each match and player. After the game, we invite 
players to participate in a series of lab-in-field experiments and a short 
survey. We measure preferences towards teammates and opponents, 
making use of the bi-lateral antagonism and group dynamics generated by 
the game itself (Weinstein et al., 1995; Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Garicano 
and Palacios-huerta, 2006; Miguel et al., 2011). We find that individuals 
that experienced more intense conflict-related violence during childhood 
are more likely to receive a foul card during a football game, are less risk 
averse and more altruistic towards their in-group, but not towards the out-
group. Next, we test willingness to compete through an effort game that 
disentangles competitiveness from aggressiveness. Violent conflict appears 
to exacerbate out-group competitiveness: conflict exposed subjects are on 
average 51% more likely to enter a competition than the non-exposed, 
whereas in-group competitive dynamics are not significantly altered.  
Obviously, it is challenging to identify the exact mechanisms via which 
conflict affects behavior. We argue that our results are consistent with a 
perspective on how conflict changes preferences and beliefs, and discuss 
several potential alternative mechanisms. In a sensitivity analysis, we show 
that the magnitude of the effect increases when focusing solely on the most 
relevant age sub-sample.  Also, we find little evidence of self-selection into 
violence, which is consistent with literature on the Sierra Leonean civil 
war. Our results are robust to the introduction of forced displacement as 
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an additional source of war-related trauma, as well as to clustering 
standard errors at the football team level, and to football match fixed 
effects. Finally, competitiveness may indirectly change in response to 
altered social and risk preferences, or aggressiveness, and not as an 
independent process of endogenous preference formation. We show that our 
results maintain when controlling for such endogenous covariates. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses literature on 
conflict and preferences and on the determinants of competitiveness, 
presenting our key hypothesis. Section 3.3 presents the context and 
background to the field and lab experimental data, and outlines the 
experimental design and data. Section 3.4 discusses our identification 
strategy and Section 3.5 contains our results. Section 3.6 offers a discussion 
and conclusion. 
 Conflict, preferences, and competition 3.2
This paper seeks to connect and contribute to two literatures: that on the 
determinants of competitiveness and that on the impact of civil war. 
Competitiveness is a key determinant of individual economic achievements 
and productivity (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). There are significant 
differences in willingness to compete both within and across societies 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2013). These differences can be attributed to variations 
in genetic endowments, abilities and preferences (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007; Gneezy et al., 2009), as well as individual exposure to various 
environmental pressures and life events (Roth and Erev, 1995). Most 
empirical studies on the origins and consequences of competitiveness use 
data from laboratory experiments. Using effort games, behavioral 
economists document that when the type of payment is exogenously 
imposed on subjects, competitive tournaments reveal a much larger 
variance of effort than equivalent piece-rate schemes (van Dijk et al., 2001; 
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003). This in turn reduces their overall efficiency 
(Eriksson et al., 2009). Such an unexpected finding may be driven by the 
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unwillingness of some people to enter competition. In fact, Eriksson et al. 
(2009) show that allowing for self-selection into a competitive tournament 
results in higher average effort rates and lower between-subject variance for 
subjects choosing to compete. Competitive environments are thus more 
efficient than non-competitive ones only if populated by a sufficient share 
of agents willing to compete.  
While a complete insight is lacking, literature has highlighted several 
individual and behavioral determinants of competitiveness. For example, 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find important differences with respect to 
gender and performance expectations. Bartling et al. (2009) find that 
overconfident, skilled and risk prone subjects are more likely to join a 
contest, while inequality-averse subjects less. Liebbrandt et al. (2013) 
compare individualistic and collectivistic societies, and show that life 
experiences may alter individual tastes for competition. Individuals develop 
their preferences mostly during childhood (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et 
al., 2008), learning from the society and environment surrounding them. 
Intense shocks during childhood should thus alter individual preferences for 
competition. Yet, the role of early life events such as exposure to conflict as 
a determinant of competitiveness is still ill-understood. 
Research into the conflict induced chances in behavior is equally limited 
but growing (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).20 A key research line focusses on 
the impacts on pro-social preferences. An emerging insight points to the 
fundamental role of the boundary between in-groups relative to the out-
groups in shaping post conflict preferences: intra community violence 
                                      
20 Psychological literature documents the relationship between war exposure and trauma, focusing 
mostly on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anger and anxiety. Macksoud & Aber (1996) find 
that the number of war-related traumatic events experienced by a child is positively related to Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms and differentially related to other behavioral outcomes. 
Similar attitudinal outcomes were found among conflict exposed children in Bosnia (Papageorgiou et 
al., 2000; Layne et al., 2010). Dyregrov et al. (2002) find highly time-persistent intrusive and 
avoidance reactions among Iraqi children exposed to a deadly aerial bombing. Other studies explore 
instead positive responses to trauma––often referred to as “post-traumatic growth” (Tedeschi and 
Calhoun, 1996; Powell et al., 2003; Staub and Vollhardt, 2008). 
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appears to decrease within community social cohesion whereas inter 
community conflict increases it. This mirrors contributions in evolutionary 
theory, which predicts how inter-group conflict shapes parochial preferences 
–increasing in-group cooperation while exacerbating out-group antagonism 
(Bernhard et al., 2006; Bowles, 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007). For 
example, Cassar et al (2013) find that intra-community violence in 
Tajikistan undermined social cohesion and within-village trust (see also 
Rohner et al., 2013). On the other hand, Bellows and Miguel (2009) find 
that individuals whose households directly experienced more intense 
violence by the RUF are more likely to attend community meetings, join 
local political and community groups, and vote. Blattman (2009) finds 
that experiencing abduction and violence increased political engagement, 
voting and community leadership among ex-combatants in Northern 
Uganda. Blattman and Miguel (2010) present a survey of literature on civil 
war and argue that the existing literature omits advances in behavioral 
economics, and advocate micro-level analysis and case studies as crucial to 
understand war’s causes, conduct, and consequences, in particular in the 
behavioral and institutional domain.   
In recent years, a number of studies have used lab-in-field experiments to 
gauge the consequences of civil wars. Voors et al. (2012) show that 
individuals exposed to violence display more altruistic behavior towards 
their neighbors, are more risk-seeking, and have higher discount rates. 
Gilligan et al. (2014) show that communities that suffered war-related 
violence during Nepal's ten-year civil war exhibit significantly greater levels 
of altruistic giving, public good contributions, investment in trust-based 
transactions, and willingness to reciprocate trust-based investments. Bauer 
et al. (2014) investigate how conflict experiences shape the beliefs and 
preferences of youth. They present two case studies – one in Georgia and 
one in Sierra Leone – indicating that experiencing inter-group conflict 
during childhood and adolescence increases egalitarian motivations toward 
the in-group, but not the out-group. Miguel et al. (2011) explicitly 
investigate behavioral changes in out-group antagonism. They examine the 
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consequences of civil war on aggressiveness of players in European football 
leagues. They find that the number of years the home country of a player 
has been in violent conflict before the player reaches the age of eighteen is 
strongly and positively related to the amount of foul cards received.  
We build upon the work of Miguel et al. (2011), by combining data from a 
field setting – the football tournament – and the lab-in-the-field 
experiments. After providing confirmatory evidence of increased 
aggressiveness, increased parochial altruism and risk propensity, we test 
willingness to compete through a competitiveness game that disentangles 
competitiveness from aggressiveness—through a game where players 
cannot affect another player’s payoffs. While the role of conflict exposure 
in shaping social preferences has been explored in several experimental 
settings, to our knowledge this is the first work attempting to investigate 
its effect on competitiveness. 
 Context, data and experimental design 3.3
Sierra Leone is amongst the poorest countries in the world and is 
recovering from an eleven years long civil war. In 1992, a small group of 
rebels entered the East of the country. They found fertile ground for 
popular grief and discontent towards ‘a decayed neo-patrimonial one-party 
regime’ (Richards, 1999: p.433), and were nurtured by Sierra Leone’s 
diamond wealth (Keen, 2005). It was the start of a country-wide civil war 
that cost over 50,000 lives, leaving many civilians amputated and abused, 
and hundreds of thousands temporarily displaced (Dufka, 1999; Doucet 
and Denov, 2012). At present violence and intimidation have disappeared 
from Sierra Leone and the country has now known several years of peace. 
In 2003, after a brief intervention by the British Army an internationally-
brokered peace agreement was signed, paving the way for a transition 
process that led to an integrated defense force, elections, the establishment 
of a new constitution, and opened the country to foreign aid. While the 
country still ranks low on close to all development indicators, the local 
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economy is improving each year – the 2012 growth rate was 16% – and 
locally business are developing.  
We use data collected during a youth street football tournament organized 
in Kenema, a regional town in Eastern Sierra Leone. The tournament 
spanned several weeks between November and December 2010. For this 
knockout tournament, streets within the city each assembled in a team. 
Matches were centrally organized and a substantial cash reward awaited 
the winner. Team identity was strong and the players took pride in 
defending their street. Referees oversaw adherence to rules and distributed 
yellow and red cards in response to minor and major faults. We carefully 
recorded details of the matches and players of the performance of 14 teams 
and 162 players.  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. A total of 47 
yellow and 3 red cards were given, involving 20% of the players. After each 
football match, we invited players to participate in a survey and a series of 
lab-in-field experiments. Our close collaboration with tournament 
organizers and team managers effectively cancelled attrition.  
Our respondents are young males, between 14 and 31 years old. They are 
predominantly Muslim, and of the Mende tribe and 50% are enrolled in 
senior secondary education. We identify a series of plausible non-
experimental proxies of athletic ability, which may influence the willingness 
to compete and to receive a foul card. Substitutes could enter and exit at 
any time of the match, with no limit with respect to the number of 
substitutions. Therefore, whether a player had not been substituted during 
the entire duration of the match (46%) may be seen as a good 
approximation of relatively greater football skills, most likely correlated to 
general athletic ability. In addition, we ask our respondents to rate their 
own level of skills compared with their teammates. We create an index 
ranging from 0 (self-declared least skilled) to 1 (self-declared most skilled). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual characteristics      
War Exposure 162 0.57 0.26 0 1 
Parents Fought in War 162 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Age 162 19.75 3.44 14 31 
Education Level 162 2.64 0.75 1 4 
Meals per Day 162 2.41 0.63 1 3 
Muslim Religion 162 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Mende Tribe 162 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Fula Tribe 162 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Mandingo Tribe 162 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Temne Tribe 162 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Football tournament      
Foul Card in Football Game 162 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Played the Whole Football Game 162 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Self-declared Football-skills 162 0.86 0.23 0 1 
Scored  162 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Won the Football game  162 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Left Footed 162 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Lab-in-Field experiments      
Risk Propensity 162 0 1.00 -1.6 1.2 
Sharing in Out-Group Dictator Game 162 0 1.00 -2.9 2.4 
Sharing in In-Group Dictator Game 162 0 1.00 -3.7 4.4 
Self-selection into Out-Group Competition 70 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Self-selection into In-Group Competition 92 0.41 0.50 0 1 
Notes: See Appendix for variable definitions.  
While we could not record the positioning of players on the football field 
due to the high fluidity of play, we also recorded which players scored a 
goal. Finally, we recorded which team won the football game and if the 
participant is predominantly left- or right-footed.21 To measure exposure to 
conflict-related violence we ask respondents about a range of war related 
events, covering information on personal injury, seeing one or more injured 
person, seeing and hearing combat. Following Bellows and Miguel (2009), 
                                      
21 Psychological literature highlights correlations between handedness (footedness) and several non-
cognitive dimensions (Goldberg et al., 1994), as well as cognitive skills (Sanders et al., 1982; Faurie et 
al., 2006). More recently, handedness has been placed in correlation with economic outcomes (Denny 
and O Sullivan, 2007), and competitiveness (Hoffman and Gneezy, 2010). 
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we create a victimization index using the average of positive responses to 
these violence related questions. 
We implement a range of lab-in-field experiments. We measure willingness 
to self-select into competitive environments using an effort game, based on 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Bartling et al. (2009). Respondents are 
invited to participate in a game where they throw a football into a 
standard sized basket secured to the floor, from a distance of four meters. 
They choose whether to play individually – at a piece rate payment 
scheme of 500 Leones per ball on target – or to enter a competition against 
an anonymous counterpart.22 In the competition, the respondent wins 1500 
Leones for every ball on target if the total number is higher than the 
counterpart—zero if lower. In case of a draw both respondents receive 500 
Leones per ball on target. This experiment disentangles willingness to 
compete from aggressiveness, as the decision of each participant can only 
affect their own private outcome, and not that of the counterpart. Even if 
deciding to compete, they would not alter their counterpart’s utility and 
earnings if the counterpart chooses not to compete. Similarly, even if 
choosing not to compete they may affect their counterpart’s utility and 
earning if the counterpart chooses to compete and does not win. In other 
words, aggressiveness should not determine willingness to compete in this 
experiment. Respondents are randomly divided into two groups: one group 
plays against an anonymous player of the opponent team (out-group) and 
another against an anonymous player of their own team (in-group). 42% of 
the respondents chose to participate in the tournament. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of shots and relative frequency across groups. On average, 
respondents scored 6.27/10, with a standard deviation of 1.82.  
 
                                      
22 4400 Leone s was about 1 USD at the time of the data collection. 
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A: Competitive out-group; B: Competitive in-group; C: Non-competitive out-group; D: Non-competitive in-group  
Figure 1: Balls on target across treatments and completion choice 
To measure risk preferences, we use a simple dichotomous choice game 
based on Harbaugh et al. (2002). In this risk game subjects are required to 
choose several times between receiving an amount of money for certain, 
and playing a simple gamble. Six choice sets are presented; each time we 
ask whether the respondent prefers (1) to toss a coin and make the chance 
of winning 3000 Leones or zero (if tails), or (2) not toss a coin and win an 
amount of money for certain, growing in each choice set, from 100 Leones 
to 2500 Leones. The expected value of the gamble is thus kept constant, 
while the certain option increases progressively: the point of switch from 
the gamble to the certain option is used to determine the risk preferences 
of the respondent—the later the switch, the less risk-averse (Table 2). 
Next, we standardize the resulting variable to improve interpretability. 
To gauge other-regarding preferences we use a simple non-strategic dictator 
game. Each participant made two random order choices on how to allocate 
an endowment, once paired with a teammate and once with an opponent.  
 
A             B 
C             D 
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Table 2: Risk propensity game choice sets 
Choice set 
Coin toss 
For certain 
If heads If tails 
(1) 3000 0 100 
(2) 3000 0 500 
(3) 3000 0 1000 
(4) 3000 0 1500 
(5) 3000 0 2000 
Players received 1000 Leones and were told these were theirs to keep at the 
end of the experiment. Alternatively, they could donate any 50 Leones 
portion of it to an anonymous counterpart. To avoid income effects 
potentially confounding our results, participants were notified that their 
final pay-off would be determined by the outcome of one randomly selected 
game they played, plus a possible donation from either a teammate or an 
opponent. Also in this case, we standardize out-group and in-group 
donations for the sake of interpretability. 
 Identification and empirical strategy 3.4
Our empirical strategy relies on local comparisons across war and non-war 
exposed subjects. The key identifying assumption is that exposure to 
violence was exogenous with respect to individual characteristics. This 
assumption may be violated in the presence of systematic targeting by 
belligerents along some individual dimension—i.e. religion, ethnic group, 
etc. While, undoubtedly some elements of violence were targeted, most 
violence in Sierra Leone was essentially a random process. It was not 
motivated by religious or ethnic cleavages (Bellows and Miguel, 2009), and 
no ethnic group was disproportionally targeted by rebels (Conibere et al., 
2004; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). To test these assumptions on our 
sample of respondents, below we regress war exposure on a set of variables 
capturing individual characteristics. We find no evidence of selective 
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violence, except for age (and age squared); responding to intuition, older 
participants had a higher probability of war exposure (Table 3).23  
Previous experimental evidence shows that children develop their 
preferences mostly between the age of three and eight (Benenson et al., 
2007; Fehr et al., 2008), reaching stability around the early twenties 
(Sutter, 2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). Our sample’s mean age at the 
beginning of the civil war was less than one-year-old, eleven by the end of 
it. They acquired the normative rules of the society surrounding them, and 
shaped their individual preferences, throughout the war period. This 
provides additional supporting ground for the causal relationship between 
exposure to violence during childhood, and the behavioral changes we 
observe. If anything, given the slightly wider age range, we are likely to 
underestimate the true impact of exposure to war violence. Nonetheless, 
the absence of base-line behavioral data – rarely available for this type of 
studies – makes it impossible to completely rule out potential correlations 
between pre-war parental behavioral characteristics and the degree of war 
exposure experienced by children.  
Results could be biased by selective migration. If displaced people are 
significantly different from people who did not migrate, selective migration 
might play a role in determining who experienced violence. Gilligan et al. 
(2014) identify two mechanisms through which war may impact social 
preferences: (1) a collective coping mechanism by which people band 
  
                                      
23 Our sample does not include traditional authority households – significantly more likely to 
experience violence during the civil war according to Bellows and Miguel (2009). We do have 
information on participation in civic defense forces (CDF). Individuals whose parents participated in 
CDFs or independently fought during the civil war may have experienced more violence. In 
particular, if those individuals were more competitive, and competitive behavior is correlated across 
generations, the main coefficient might reflect selection rather than the treatment effect of exposure 
to violence. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show no evidence of a significant self-selection effect into war 
related violence for the children of combatants. Also, column 4 shows that war exposure does not 
significantly correlate with any of the proxies for athletic ability identified during the football game. 
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Table 3: Age predicts conflict victimization 
 Exposure to conflict 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.196*** 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.158*** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.056) 
Age squared -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Muslim religion  0.001  0.018 
  (0.046)  (0.051) 
Mende tribe  0.025  0.034 
  (0.061)  (0.065) 
Fula tribe  -0.095  -0.069 
  (0.084)  (0.090) 
Mandingo tribe  -0.086  -0.063 
  (0.089)  (0.097) 
Temne tribe  -0.055  -0.066 
  (0.095)  (0.096) 
Parents fought in war   0.053 0.049 
   (0.058) (0.064) 
Left footed    0.045 
    (0.056) 
Play whole football match    -0.011 
    (0.040) 
Self-declared skills    0.105 
    (0.085) 
Scored    -0.006 
    (0.052) 
Won the football match    -0.022 
    (0.041) 
Education level    -0.000 
    (0.031) 
Meals per day    -0.047* 
    (0.029) 
Observations 162 162 162 162 
R2 0.151 0.188 0.156 0.215 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%.  
together to deal with threats, and (2) a purging mechanism by which less 
social individuals disproportionately flee communities. In our case, more 
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competitive people may have permanently migrated into Kenema, and less 
competitive people may have migrated out of Kenema and would therefore 
not be part of the investigation.24 Yet, our study focuses on comparisons 
across individuals that have experienced varying degrees of war exposure 
and are currently residing in Kenema. It does not attempt to draw 
conclusions on the overall intent-to-treat impact of the Sierra Leone civil 
war on the competitiveness and willingness to compete of Sierra Leoneans, 
nor does it expect to generalize the conclusions across countries.25 
The core of our analysis lies in a set of regressions that seek to explain 
differences in our outcome variables through a set of individual and 
football-related characteristics, and our measure of exposure to war 
violence. We set out by assessing the probability of receiving a foul card:  
 Pr	(CDEF 
 1	|	8 , ( , >() 
 	 + 	8 + ( + !>′ +	# (1)	
where CDEF is a dummy taking value of 1 if the player i received at 
least one foul card during the football game (where i=1,…,162), 8 is our 
victimization index, ( a vector of individual characteristics and >( is a 
vector of football match related controls.  
We continue by examining the impacts of violence in a series of field 
experiments:  
 
45 
 	 + 	8 + ( +	#  
 	 + 	8 + ( +	# (2)	(3)	
where 45 	refers to individual risk propensity,  to the portion of 
endowment donated in the dictator game, to an anonymous teammate or 
opponent, and other notations are the same as in (1). 
                                      
24 According to the UN, from April 2001 to November 2002, all the 223,000 registered IDPs were 
reintegrated within their original communities and many more unregistered refugees have been 
returning home ever since (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003). In our sample, 82% of respondents 
declared to have been temporarily displaced during the war—a slightly higher percentage than the 
national average (60%). This indicates that our dataset encompasses a large portion of returnees. 
25 For a cross-country perspective  see Adhvaryu and Fenske (2014) . 
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Finally, we empirically investigate the effect of war-related violence 
exposure on the willingness to compete: 
 Pr	(I 
 1	|	8 , ( , >() 
 	 + 	8 + ( + !>′ +	# (4)	
where I takes value of 1 if the participant has opted for the 
competitive choice, 0 if he opted for the piece-rate payment in the effort 
game. All other notations are the same as in (1). 
 Results 3.5
We start by analyzing our football field data. In Table 4, column (1) and 
(2) we find that individuals strongly exposed to conflict-related violence 
are 28% more likely to commit a card-deserving foul during the football 
game, significant at α = 0.05.26  
Next, we regress violence exposure on our standardized measure of risk 
propensity. We find that it increases the propensity to risk by around 2/3 
of a standard deviation (Table 4, columns 3 and 4). 
Result 1: Conflict exposure significantly increases 
aggressiveness on the football pitch, as well as risk-seeking 
behavior in the lab. 
In Table 5, we test the hypothesis that individual war exposure may foster 
parochial pro-egalitarian preferences. Indeed exposure to conflict-related 
violence increases in-group donations by over 4/5 of a standard deviation 
(columns 1 and 2). On the other hand, war exposure does not seem to 
significantly alter altruistic behavior towards out-groups (columns 3 and 
4).  
Result 2: Conflict exposure significantly increases 
altruistic motives towards the in-group, not the out-group. 
                                      
26 Also, a Pearson χ2 test on victimization strongly rejects the null hypothesis of independence 
between war exposure and receiving a foul card (p=0.02). 
SHOCKS, PREFERENCES, AND INSTITUTIONS 
59 
Table 4: Aggressiveness and risk propensity 
 Foul card Risk propensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure to conflict 0.266** 0.284** 0.580** 0.668** 
 (0.125) (0.133) (0.282) (0.332) 
Age  -0.031  0.081 
  (0.082)  (0.199) 
Age squared  0.000  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Education level  0.042  -0.081 
  (0.049)  (0.119) 
Meals per day  0.046  0.092 
  (0.049)  (0.136) 
Muslim religion  -0.082  0.118 
  (0.091)  (0.203) 
Mende tribe  0.081  -0.064 
  (0.061)  (0.170) 
Play whole football match  0.083   
  (0.064)   
Self-declared skills  -0.231*   
  (0.123)   
Scored   0.166*   
  (0.099)   
Won the football match   0.175**   
  (0.068)   
Left footed  -0.108**   
  (0.052)   
Observations 162 162 162 162 
Pseudo R2 and R2 0.025 0.157 0.022 0.036 
Notes: Probit marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Our main results on the relationship between civil war exposure and 
competiveness is presented in Figures 2A-D and Table 6. Figure 2A shows 
the percentage of football players receiving a foul card during the football 
tournament for each level of war exposure. None of the un-exposed players 
received a foul card. While indicative of increased out-group antagonism, 
this result per-se is not symptomatic of increased willingness to compete. 
We therefore proceed to look into our laboratory style competitiveness 
experiment. We find that the results parallel the field setting: across the  
two treatments, 18% of the completely war un-exposed respondents decide 
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Table 5: Dictator game donations 
 Donations (z-score) 
 In-group Out-group Pooled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exposure to conflict 0.443* 0.667** 0.293 0.218 0.368 
 (0.238) (0.282) (0.394) (0.416) (0.411) 
In-group     0.465* 
     (0.272) 
Exposure to conflict X in-group     0.150 
     (0.445) 
Age  -0.041  0.220 0.089 
  (0.150)  (0.184) (0.115) 
Age squared  -0.000  -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Education level  0.017  -0.058 -0.021 
  (0.092)  (0.111) (0.074) 
Meals per day  -0.019  0.291* 0.136 
  (0.107)  (0.166) (0.104) 
Muslim religion  -0.001  0.137 0.068 
  (0.157)  (0.219) (0.141) 
Mende tribe  -0.189  -0.066 -0.128 
  (0.131)  (0.165) (0.101) 
Observations 162 162 162 162 324 
R2 0.020 0.061 0.005 0.072 0.101 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 162 clustered s.e. in (5). Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
 
 
A: Foul card all; B: Competition all; C: Competition out-group; D: Competition in-group 
Figure 1: Balls on target across treatments and completion choice 
A             B 
C             D 
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to join the competition, compared to 64% of the fully war exposed 
respondents. (Figure 2B). Figure 2C and 2D show a breakdown for 
subjects playing against the out-group and in-group respectively. 
In Table 6 we analyze these patterns parametrically. At the median of all 
covariates, subjects most exposed to conflict-related violence are 51% more 
likely to join a competition against the out-group, significant at α = 0.05 
(columns 1 and 2).27 On the other hand, we find no evidence of an impact 
on in-group competitive behavior (columns 3 and 4). 
Result 3: Subjects most exposed to conflict violence are 
51% more likely to be willing to compete against the out-
group. The effect of conflict exposure on in-group 
competition is positive but not significant. 
Our results are robust to the introduction of forced displacement as an 
additional source of war-related trauma, as well as to clustering standard 
errors at the football team level, and to football match fixed effects (see 
Appendix Table A1 for details). The magnitude of the effect increases 
when focusing solely on the most relevant age sub-sample 28  Also, 
competitiveness may indirectly change in response to altered social and 
risk preferences, or aggressiveness, and not as an independent process of 
endogenous preference formation. We introduce foul cards, risk and 
dictator choices as endogenous controls into equation (4), first separately 
(Appendix Table A2, columns 1 and 2) and then jointly (Appendix Table 
A2, column 3). Our results remain significant and the coefficients maintain 
relative constancy. 
  
                                      
27 The coefficient on exposure to war-related violence increases when observable controls are included. 
Following Bellows and Miguel (2009), this suggests that omitted bias is unlikely to explain away the 
effect (see also Altonji et al., 2005).  
28 i.e. not older than eight at the start of the war and at least eight at the end of it (see Table A1 for 
details). 
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Table 6: Willingness to compete 
 Competition 
Out-group In-group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure to conflict 0.485** 0.510** 0.274 0.266 
 (0.222) (0.244) (0.227) (0.270) 
Age  0.104  -0.228 
  (0.183)  (0.160) 
Age squared  -0.002  0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Education level  0.171*  0.130 
  (0.099)  (0.083) 
Meals per day  -0.018  -0.137 
  (0.110)  (0.097) 
Muslim religion  0.305***  -0.079 
  (0.118)  (0.150) 
Mende tribe  -0.084  0.011 
  (0.148)  (0.116) 
Play whole football match  0.405***  0.191* 
  (0.136)  (0.111) 
Self-declared skills  0.021  -0.222 
  (0.254)  (0.299) 
Scored   -0.267*  -0.125 
  (0.147)  (0.138) 
Won the football match   0.123  -0.075 
  (0.135)  (0.114) 
Left footed  -0.178  -0.213* 
  (0.140)  (0.121) 
Observations 70 70 92 92 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.207 0.011 0.106 
Notes: Probit marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
 Conclusions 3.6
We explore whether exposure to war-related violence affects the 
competitiveness of youth participating in a local street football tournament 
and a series of lab-in field experiments in Sierra Leone. Previous economic 
literature on the consequences of civil war on preferences documents 
increases in-group cooperation, political activeness and altruism. The main 
contribution of this study is to provide insight into the determinants of 
competitive behavior and its relation with exposure to conflict. We bring 
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new evidence that increased parochial altruism is a two-fold process—
increasing in-group cooperation while exacerbating out-group antagonism.   
Increased antagonism matters for post-conflict development as it shapes 
aggressiveness and, perhaps more saliently, competitiveness. To study war 
induced out-group dynamics we look both at aggressiveness during a 
football game and competitive behavior in laboratory experiment. We find 
that subjects more exposed to war violence during early childhood and 
preadolescence are not only robustly more likely to commit fouls during a 
football game, but are also more likely to self-select into a competition 
against an out-group in our experiment. Civil war does not only seem to 
foster cooperation towards perceived in-groups, but curbs distaste for 
competition against perceived out-groups. Being more prone to cooperate 
and engage in public debates affects the community level provision of 
public goods, potentially promoting economic development (Bellows and 
Miguel, 2009). Similarly, accepting inequality-averse outcomes driven by a 
fair and regulated competition is a fundamental element of economic 
growth (Bartling et al., 2009).  
Our findings are tentative; different types of conflicts could have varying 
legacies, and the human cost of conflict may never be justified by its 
“externalities” (Cassar et al., 2013). Yet, a growing body of evidence about 
war violence victims’ profound changes in individual beliefs, values, and 
preferences poses new challenges to policy makers and post-conflict 
recovery strategists. Indisputably, it profoundly rejects the notion of 
conflict as development in reverse (Collier et al., 2003). Not only has war 
historically promoted state formation and nation building – ultimately 
strengthening institutional capacity (Tilly and Ardant, 1975) – it may also 
be at the core of inclusive and dynamic societal transformations. 
Policymakers responsible for post-war recovery should be aware of the 
extent of these transformations and recognize heterogeneity among 
communities and individuals, not overlooking the significance of 
autonomous responses.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Robustness of main result to alternative specifications  
 Competition (out-group) 
 
Exposure + 
displacement  
Cluster  
robust s.e. 
Match  
fixed effects 
Most relevant  
age sub-sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure to conflict 0.709** 0.510** 0.574** 0.615** 
 (0.292) (0.239) (0.255) (0.280) 
Age 0.095 0.104 0.156 -0.265 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.183) (0.568) 
Age squared -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) 
Education level 0.161 0.171** 0.139 0.184 
 (0.102) (0.077) (0.098) (0.115) 
Meals per day -0.039 -0.018 0.046 0.054 
 (0.112) (0.107) (0.120) (0.127) 
Muslim religion 0.304*** 0.305** 0.359*** 0.357** 
 (0.117) (0.148) (0.131) (0.149) 
Mende tribe -0.125 -0.084 -0.064 -0.013 
 (0.154) (0.150) (0.176) (0.165) 
Play whole football match 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.342** 0.487*** 
 (0.137) (0.074) (0.153) (0.149) 
Self-declared skills 0.046 0.021 -0.012 0.089 
 (0.260) (0.259) (0.259) (0.296) 
Scored  -0.288** -0.267** -0.189 -0.460*** 
 (0.141) (0.127) (0.185) (0.135) 
Won the football match  0.161 0.123 0.062 0.122 
 (0.143) (0.108) (0.152) (0.159) 
Left footed -0.201 -0.178** -0.186 -0.257 
 (0.136) (0.078) (0.149) (0.168) 
Observations 70 70 70 55 
Pseudo R2 0.218 0.207 0.258 0.213 
Notes: Probit marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
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Table A2: Robustness of main result to endogenous covariates 
 Competition (out-group) 
 Foul card 
Risk and 
dictator choices 
Foul card, risk and 
dictator choices 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exposure to conflict 0.481* 0.489** 0.449* 
 (0.258) (0.245) (0.258) 
Foul card 0.116  0.158 
 (0.182)  (0.191) 
Risk Preferences  0.034 0.038 
  (0.073) (0.073) 
Dictator Donation  0.050 0.061 
  (0.073) (0.078) 
Age 0.110 0.098 0.105 
 (0.185) (0.183) (0.185) 
Age squared -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Education level 0.168* 0.175* 0.175* 
 (0.101) (0.098) (0.100) 
Meals per day -0.019 -0.041 -0.048 
 (0.110) (0.112) (0.113) 
Muslim religion 0.327*** 0.307** 0.340*** 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.119) 
Mende tribe -0.085 -0.083 -0.087 
 (0.150) (0.153) (0.156) 
Play whole football match 0.402*** 0.388*** 0.382*** 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.144) 
Self-declared skills 0.054 0.035 0.079 
 (0.263) (0.252) (0.264) 
Scored  -0.270* -0.251 -0.250 
 (0.149) (0.156) (0.160) 
Won the football match  0.094 0.134 0.097 
 (0.149) (0.137) (0.152) 
Left footed -0.182 -0.187 -0.193 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.138) 
Observations 70 70 70 
Pseudo R2 0.210 0.214 0.218 
Notes: Probit marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
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Variable definitions: 
Exposure to conflict. An individual victimization index resulting from the average response 
to violence related questions: “during war time...” “did you ever witness combat, shooting 
and explosions?”, “did you ever see a person injured because of war-related violence?”, 
“did you personally suffer from physical injury because of war-related violence?”.  
Parents fought in war. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if any one of 
parents of respondent i have been active belligerents during the civil conflict. 
Age. Age of respondent i in years, rounded down to the last birthday. 
Education level. Individual level variable taking value 1 if the respondent was currently in 
primary school, 2 if the respondent was currently in junior secondary school, 3 if the 
respondent was currently in senior secondary school, 4 if respondent was enrolled or had 
completed tertiary education.  
Mende (Fula, Mandingo, Temne) tribe. Individual level dummy taking value of unity if 
the i-th respondent is ethically Mende (Fula, Mandingo, Temne), 0 if else. 
Muslim religion. Individual level dummy taking value of unity if the i-th respondent self-
declared to be Muslim by religion, 0 if else. 
Meals per day. Household level index representing the self-reported full meal consumption 
patterns of respondent i’s household. 
Left Footed. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the i-th respondent 
self-declared to be predominantly left-footed, 0 if else. 
Played whole football match. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the 
i-th respondent responds positively to the question “did you play the whole football 
game?”, 0 if else. The answer was crosschecked with the questions “how many minutes did 
you play in this game” and “How many minutes did the game last in total?”; the dummy 
would take a value of 0 if the ratio of their responses differed from unity. 
Self-declared skills. Individual level index constructed as the answer to the question 
“Compared to your team mates, how skillful would you say you are?”; on a scale of 1 
(least skilled) to 5 (most skilled), standardized between 0 and 1.  
Scored. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the i-th respondent had 
scored at least one goal during the football game, 0 if else. 
Won the football match. Team level dummy variable taking value of 1 if the team of 
respondent i has won the football game, 0 if else. Out of 14 games 1 ended up in a draw 
and the penalty kicks were postponed to the next day due to insufficient light. 
Foul card. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the i-th respondent 
had received at least one yellow/red card in the tournament. 
Risk propensity. Individual level variable based on the respondents’ six choices in the risk 
game, spanning from 0 (i.e. never gamble) to one (i.e. always gamble), and allowing for 
indifference by taking the last switch point. The resulting index is then standardized. 
Donations. The standardized value of the donation in the relevant dictator game. 
Competition. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the i-th subject 
decides to enter the competition in the effort game, 0 if else. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Market Experience and Rational Choice  
Experimental Evidence from Rural Ethiopia 
 
 
Abstract 
We organize a field experiment with sesame farmers and 
brokers in northern Ethiopia to explore whether market 
experience fosters rational behavior—proxied by fewer 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) 
violations. In the baseline study farmers and brokers 
perform equally well or badly, which is consistent with 
qualitative evidence that the prior “trading experience” of 
our brokers is not obtained in a competitive setting. 
Following random assignment to a competitive market 
setting – a one-day trading session in a sesame auction –
we find that treated farmers and brokers behave more 
rationally than their peers in the control group.  
 
 
 
 
Publication status: Cecchi, F., & Bulte, E. H., 2013. Does Market Experience Promote 
Rational Choice? Experimental Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 61(2), 407–429. This chapter is based upon the MSc Thesis work 
conducted at Wageningen University in 2010. 
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 Introduction 4.1
People make choices to satisfy their potentially endless needs and desires, 
given a finite set of resources. Scarcity requires choice, and economists use 
rational choice theory to predict “optimal” behavior of agents or infer 
underlying preferences by analyzing actual behavior. Rational choice is one 
of the cornerstones of economics. It is routinely assumed that respondents 
maximize a continuous, concave and monotonic utility function, which 
requires completeness, reflexivity and transitivity of preferences. The 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition to meet these requirements (Varian, 1982). A GARP 
violation occurs when a bundle x is chosen when a bundle y is available, 
where bundle y has at least as much of all goods and strictly more of at 
least one good than a third bundle z, and z has been directly or indirectly 
revealed to be preferred to x.  
Rational choice theory has been a powerful basis for the development of 
theories, policies and ideologies. Until fifteen years ago, consistency of 
choices of real agents was assumed, rather than measured. However, the 
assumption of rationality proved untenable. Experiments showed that 
between 10 and 75% of subjects violated the GARP predictions (e.g. 
Sippel, 1997; Harbaugh et al., 2001; Andreoni and Miller, 2002), acting 
more or less irrationally according to the neoclassical paradigm. Such 
studies were typically carried out in controlled environments with a non-
random sample of respondents (e.g., students), with limited effort to test 
the external validity of the findings. 
It has been hypothesized that rationality violations co-vary with the nature 
of the context and market experience. Specifically, evidence suggests 
rationality violations are less common in an environment that more closely 
resembles the market-type of setting that is the natural habitat of agents 
in neoclassical models (List and Millimet, 2008; List and Haigh, 2009; but 
see also the discussion below). Professional stock brokers may reveal more 
rational behavior in a choice experiment than a person who has rarely 
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engaged in competitive markets, and has exchanged goods according to 
other mechanisms. If so, rationality is not a hard-wired characteristic of 
humans. Rather, it is a trait that will be acquired through learning and 
exposure to markets, or, in the words of List and Millimet: ‘economic 
rationality is a social, not an individual construct’ (2008: p.36). Markets, 
then, are not simply mechanisms to allocate goods and services; by making 
participants feel the losses associated with irrational behavior, markets 
may help individuals learn to express their preferences in ways more 
consistent with a rational model.29  
We use a field experiment in Ethiopia to explore whether competitive 
trading experience affects rationality, and analyze which factors affect the 
“learning process” associated with reducing rationality violations. We 
developed a lab-in-field experiment that involved local farmers and brokers. 
The market treatment was designed to be closely related to the core of the 
livelihoods strategies of the respondents—selling and buying sesame. 
Initially, both farmers and brokers rarely satisfied the GARP 
requirements—rationality violations were common. However, after a 
randomly selected subsample of the respondents participated in a 
competitive real sesame market, we observe that treated farmers and 
brokers showed statistically and economically significant reductions in the 
number of GARP violations.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we discuss the existing 
literature on market experience and rationality. In section 4.3 we present 
                                      
29 Henrich et al. (2004) suggest that exposure to markets influences preferences, including 
social preferences and the propensity to trust others. The focus of this paper is on learning 
how to implement preferences, which extends the earlier work on endogenous preferences. 
Also see Cherry et al. (2003) for early evidence on “rationality spillovers”—they study 
preference reversals among undergraduate students in the context of (environmental) 
lotteries, and present evidence that “induced” market-like discipline extends to a non-
market setting (hypothetical choices and environmental lotteries). They conclude that 
arbitrage feedback can help respondents to formulate more consistent stated values for 
their environmental preferences. 
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the context and background to the field experiment. Section 4.4 outlines 
the experimental design and presents the data, and section 4.5 contains all 
the results. Finally the discussion and conclusions are presented.  
 Rationality and market experience 4.2
Since Becker (1962), authors have tried to capture apparently “irrational 
behavior” into economic theory to account for behavioral patterns that 
were seemingly at odds with prescriptions for Homo Economicus. For 
example, Simon (1984) explored relaxing certain assumptions (e.g. perfect 
information) in his models of bounded rationality. Rieskamp et al. believe 
that violations of the bounds of rationality might ‘reflect subtle, yet 
reasonable, dependencies on the environment’ (2006: p.631), suggesting 
that different market environments lead to different behavioral strategies. 
Several lab experiments show that, when placed in the “right 
environment”, agents tend to behave according to neoclassical theory. For 
example, List (2003) provides empirical evidence that certain market 
anomalies tend to vanish as market experience increases, confirming a 
hypothesis dating back to Koopmans (1964). Inspired by a famous 
experiment by Knetsch (1989), List (2003) investigates the strength of the 
endowment effect—the tendency of subjects to keep a randomly allocated 
gift, rather than swapping it for an equally valuable alternative good. He 
shows that this tendency is strongest among inexperienced non-traders, 
and that, as market experience intensifies, behavior converges to the 
neoclassical predictions (no endowment effect). While suggestive, such 
studies cannot address an important concern regarding self-selection: 
people who behave more rationality are perhaps more likely to self-select 
into occupations that involve trading. If so, the correlation between market 
experience and rationality does not necessarily imply a causal effect of 
market exposure on rationality and coherence of choice. 
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This challenge is addressed in an important follow-up study. List and 
Millimet (2008) designed a field experiment where randomly selected 
respondents (youths) are exposed to a market setting, and analyze how 
market experience influences the rationality of choices. They sample 
young sportscard traders and young subjects shopping at a mall. First, 
they test the pre-existing levels of rationality violations among these 
subjects, using a GARP test (see Harbaugh et al., 2001).30 This involves 
“gift bundles” of two goods: juice boxes and chips. Subjects were offered 
three to seven different gift bundles from which to select their preferred 
gift. The composition of the gift bundles varied with the relative price 
of the two goods in the choice sets and the budget (Figure 1). Once the 
choice sets had been evaluated and preferred gifts chosen, the 
experimenters randomly selected one of the sheets and offered the 
preferred gift to the subject.  
List and Millimet find that only a minority of the subjects made rational 
choices. Overall, some 70% of the subjects exhibited at least one GARP 
violation. Consistent with the evidence above, they also found that self-
selected traders are significantly more rational than their counterparts. But 
again, potential self-selection into the trading business implies this is not 
necessarily indicative of a causal effect. 
                                      
30 When an individual’s choices do not violate GARP, such choices are consonant with the 
individual maximizing a continuous, concave and monotonic utility function. Yet, Cox 
raises the concern that ‘finding low rates of violation of the one type of necessary condition 
(i.e. GARP) is an important result, but it does not support the conclusion that the 
subject’s behavior can be rationalized by a utility function’ (2010: p.27). In other words, 
we can test whether necessary conditions for utility maximization are satisfied, but not 
whether the same holds for sufficient conditions. Moreover, in addition to GARP 
violations there are alternative measures of rationality, and it is not evident that subjects 
who have many violations in one setting will also perform badly along other dimensions of 
rationality. Nevertheless, and reflecting the GARP’s special status in economics, we focus 
on this measure as a proxy for rationality. 
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Figure 1: Gift Bundles and possible choice sets (Harbaugh et al., 2001) 
Next, they induced a random subsample of the young shoppers, aged 6-18 
years, to participate in the sportscards’ market.31 Randomization at this 
stage allows the analysts to remove the potential bias due to self-selection. 
Upon comparing the learning rates of “non-treated” shoppers to the 
treated ones, List and Millimet again find that market experience and 
rational choice directly related. The key result is that treated shoppers 
have significantly less GARP violations than the control group.32 Thus, 
List and Millimet present robust empirical proof of endogenous rationality 
invited by participating in a real market. 
                                      
31 To induce the selected subsample to participate to the sportscards’ market, they offered 
them a “parting gift” worth approximately $25 of sportscards and memorabilia. Then they 
informed the subjects about the approximate value of the gifts and stated the dealers at 
the show were interested in the goods. Finally, the experimenters stressed that the gifts 
could be sold, swapped, or taken home.  
32 As a significant number of subjects did not return to the experiment, List and Millimet 
possibly faced a bias due to non-random attrition, i.e. the possibility that some subjects 
had self-selected out of the experiment had different characteristics from the participating 
subjects. The Heckman Selection model however yielded no statistically meaningful 
evidence of non-random attrition, whilst the significance of the market experience term 
remained robust. 
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Should such findings have implications for policymakers? That depends. 
While Akerlof and Yellen (1985) find that small amounts of non-
maximizing behavior have little impact on economic equilibria, and Gode 
and Sunder (1993) demonstrate that even zero-intelligence software reaches 
allocative efficiency at market level, the results with respect to endogenous 
rationality potentially have important implications for (economic) policy. 
For example, Goodhue et al. (1998) argue that liberalization policies in 
transition countries should take market “learning costs” into consideration 
when setting the target level of privatization. In addition, notwithstanding 
limited efficiency losses at the macro level, the distributional impacts of 
market experience and irrational choice can be a concern for policymakers, 
as it brings up problems of equality, rent allocation, competitiveness, and 
regional growth. This is certainly true in Ethiopia, where an actual policy 
change is intended to enhance competitiveness across the value chain of 
various primary commodities (see below). 
Our experiment builds on List and Millimet (2008), and among other 
things allows us to test the external validity (generalizability) of their main 
findings. Rather than teenagers, we focus on adults (18 to 74 years old) 
with considerable experience in life (including market transactions, albeit 
in a non-competitive context). While local farmers mainly produce sesame, 
a cash crop, their “competitive market experience” is limited as local trade 
practices are often related to personal relations and interlinked 
transactions. The design resembles List and Millimet, but differs in several 
ways and makes a unique contribution. First, we vary the trading 
institution that forms the treatment condition, contributing to evidence 
that competitive market experience per se improves rationality. Second, we 
implement a treatment that should be of first-order salience to 
respondents. Subjects are asked to engage in transactions involving their 
main source of income, sesame, and that involve an institutional innovation 
that should be salient to them in light of policies with respect to the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). Apart from the novelty of the 
context, other differences have to do with the income level (our 
MARKET EXPERIENCE AND RATIONAL CHOICE 
74 
respondents are poor, with an average income level of 1-2 US$ a day for 
the farmers and 6-7 US$ for the brokers), culture and policy relevance. In 
fact the treatment and its implied opportunities were very significant to 
the participants—we ensured that the income from participating in the 
experiment would exceed the local opportunity cost of their time. These 
differences broaden the scope of the research beyond merely assessing the 
external validity of List and Millimet’s results, upgrading it to a distinctive 
field experiment with unique features and relevant policy implications. 
Since the concept was introduced by Varian (1982), GARP violations have 
been studied in different contexts. Among others, Sippel (1997), and 
Andreoni and Miller (2002), analyzed GARP violations by college 
students. Harbaugh et al. (2001) “exported” the experiment outside 
“campus” by studying GARP violations on kids, whilst List and Millimet 
(2008) set their experiment in the field—a sportscards fair. To the best of 
our knowledge, however, this is the first paper to document the effect of 
market experience on rationality in a developing country context.  
 Context and background 4.3
To test rationality effects from market experience amongst “real agents” 
we organize an experiment involving sesame smallholder farmers and 
brokers from the village Baeker, near the town of Humera. At the border 
with Eritrea and Sudan, in the Ethiopian lowlands, Humera has 
experienced a period of stable economic growth since sesame was 
introduced as a cash crop in the late 1990s. Smallholder farmers, however, 
have benefitted little from this innovation, locked up by credit constraints 
and ineffective trade practices. The farmers used for this study were 
selected from the village of Baeker, separated from the main town by 57 
km of dirt road, and living in a rather isolated environment. They typically 
deliver their produce to the village cooperative, which then sells it on their 
behalf, or directly sell the sesame locally. Local traders sometimes work in 
interlinked markets, serving also as moneylenders. Smallholder farmers are 
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therefore restricted in their selling choices, and tend to trade with the same 
trader over time. 
Two types of traders exist: first, and not the subject of this paper, there is 
a group of traders that lives off trading margins—the difference between 
purchase and sale prices; second, there are so-called “brokers”—who 
mediate in the exchange of sesame. Such brokers often have peasant origins 
and limited formal education. Unlike other traders, they normally receive a 
fixed commission from each trading partner (usually 2 Birr, or USD 0.16 
per quintal), and live off a percentage on quantities traded. Brokers assist 
the flow of various tons of sesame per year, and therefore could be 
considered more experienced traders than smallholder farmers. However, 
they do not work in a conventional competitive market environment. 
Instead, to outperform their colleagues, long-standing relations, trust, and 
reputation are important. They spend time and money to “court” sellers 
and buyers: sticking banknotes into pockets, offering beers and motor 
rides, going to weddings, and so on. Besides, as mentioned, they sometimes 
engage in money-lending activities. Bargaining over prices is therefore 
much less important for this end of the sesame value chain. All traders 
that participated in the experiment belong to this category, and all are 
members of the only brokers’ cooperative of Humera. 
Sesame trading in Ethiopia will soon be in a state of flux. A major 
institutional innovation has been introduced by the central government—
the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). Brokers, and others, might 
see changes in their position in the value chain during the next few years. 
The philosophy behind the ECX is that a central and transparent market 
for key export crops will lower transaction costs in the value chain, and 
will address issues about asymmetric information. The idea is to link 
farmers directly to international markets, and the mechanism chosen is an 
open outcry double auction trade floor, in the capital city Addis Ababa. 
This study does not aim to assess the consequences of a change in the 
market “environment” on the livelihood or well-being of agents. This would 
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be quite difficult to predict.33 Rather, it looks at the effects of the pending 
institutional change on the behavior of key agents. Like Plott (1994) and 
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) do for other markets, we test-bed the 
hypothesis that institutional innovations can affect economic decisions in a 
market that will soon be reshaped by a major institutional overhaul. At 
the village level, we introduce key elements of the ECX – the competitive 
market environment characterized by public bidding – and allow a random 
sample of farmers and brokers to engage in competitive selling and buying 
of their main cash crop.  
 Experimental design and data 4.4
We randomly selected 68 smallholder farmers from Baeker – which had 
already agreed to sell sesame collectively for a given price through their 
cooperative – to participate in the field experiment. We also invited all 
members of the only local broker association to participate in the 
experiment (22 individuals)—all brokers accepted. In other words, there is 
no selection bias due to self-selection in the first stage of the experiment. 
After filling out a brief survey, including age, level of formal education 
attained, hectares of land owned, amount of money borrowed from 
informal moneylenders, and a self-evaluation parameter expressing their 
“market experience”, farmers and brokers where kindly asked to select 
their preferred gift—the standard approach to measuring GARP 
violations. They were shown 8 separate sheets of paper on which 6 to 10 
                                      
33 Note that we study the effect of market experience on behavior in an unrelated choice 
experiment. The potential range of settings where behavior may be affected is large, which 
is one of the reasons why predicting the “net impact” of the ECX on well-being of farmers 
and brokers (and others) is difficult. For example, it is not clear that more rational 
behavior will make brokers better off given the nature of the other markets they face. If 
some fraction of total trading goes through ECX in the future while the rest is 
implemented through traditional, relational transactions, then the overall implications may 
be mixed for the individual. Other, non-competitive markets may become less functional 
as a result of increased “rationality” caused by the ECX. 
SHOCKS, PREFERENCES, AND INSTITUTIONS 
77 
distinct gift possibilities were depicted. Gifts included raw coffee beans, 
sugar and mango juice. All items were familiar, similar in price, and 
commonly consumed by the farmers and brokers. By showing drawings of 
possible gifts, rather than giving a budget and relative prices, it was made 
certain that the subjects did not need to ‘do the math to stay within a 
budget constraint’ (Harbaugh et al., 2001: p.1545). To ensure 
comprehension, several trial runs were done. Moreover, it was clearly 
stated that each agent would receive only one of the eight selected gifts. A 
transparent lottery process was used to determine which choice would be 
selected. Table 1 shows the relative prices that determined the composition 
of the gift bundles in each choice set (an example of the choice sheets 
shown to participants can be found in the Appendix, Figure A1).34 GARP 
violations were counted with the GARP software hosted on the EconPort 
digital library (see Cox and Swarthout, 2006).  
After the GARP experiment, brokers and farmers were randomly divided 
into four groups—two treatment groups (one for farmers and one for 
brokers), and two controls groups. Treatment groups were asked to 
participate in a trading session mimicking the new sesame auction process 
at the ECX, the following Sunday. Control groups, instead, were invited to 
simply re-do the same GARP game after 7 days. The randomness of the 
partition is confirmed by the descriptive statistics of Table 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
                                      
34 In choice set 2, for example, with a budget of 4 units the subjects could receive: 1. two 
bags of coffee (200g); 2. one bag of coffee (100g) and two bags of sugar (1000g); 3. one bag 
of coffee (100g) and one bottle of mango juice (300ml); 4. four bags of sugar (2000g); 5. 
two bags of sugar (1000g) and one bottle of mango juice (300ml); or 6. two bottles of 
mango juice (600ml).  
MARKET EXPERIENCE AND RATIONAL CHOICE 
78 
Table 1: Choice sets, budgets and relative prices 
Choice set Available budget 
Price 
Choices 
Coffee Sugar Mango Juice 
(1) 4 2 2 2 6 
(2) 4 2 1 2 6 
(3) 3 1 1 2 6 
(4) 4 1 2 2 6 
(5) 3 1 2 1 6 
(6) 3 2 1 1 6 
(7) 4 2 2 1 6 
(8) 3 1 1 1 10 
Notes: One unit represents 1 bag of 100g of raw coffee beans, one unit of sugar represents 1 bag of 500g of sugar, 
and one unit of mango juice represents 1 bottle of 300 ml of mango juice. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (brokers) 
Variable Group Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Pr>|t| 
GARP0 control 10 12.2 7.54 0 24 0.925 
treatment 12 11.8 10.07 0 28 
Education control 10 5.6 3.84 0 10 0.865 
treatment 12 5.8 2.48 2 10 
Experience control 10 4.5 0.70 3 5 0.249 
treatment 12 4.0 0.90 2 5 
Age control 10 35.3 5.42 29 48 0.947 
treatment 12 35.1 8.81 28 59 
Notes: See Appendix for variable definitions.  
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (farmers) 
Variable Group Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Pr>F 
GARP0 control 21 11.1 5.94 0 20 0.720 
treatment 26 12.8 5.27 1 21  
drop-out 21 11.7 6.37 1 22  
Education control 21 3.5 3.09 0 9 0.313 
treatment 26 3.9 3.46 0 10  
drop-out 21 3.6 3.09 0 10  
Experience control 21 3.7 1.35 1 5 0.407 
treatment 26 3.8 0.98 2 5  
drop-out 21 3.6 1.16 1 5  
Age control 21 39.4 14.42 18 74 0.861 
treatment 26 46.6 14.16 20 68  
drop-out 21 41.4 13.99 18 70  
Notes: See Appendix for variable definitions.  
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As is evident from the top rows of Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the average number 
of GARP violations during the baseline round (GARP0) did not vary 
significantly across subgroups. The same is true for any other variable 
reflecting “personal characteristics,” suggesting the random assignment 
into treatment was successful. In the fourth column we report the results of 
simple mean comparison tests for treated and control groups. Since there 
was considerable attrition among the farmers (see below), we also compare 
participant farmers and drop outs. There are also no significant differences 
(details not reported but available on request). Importantly, GARP 
violation levels also did not vary significantly across “types”—farmers or 
brokers (p=0.964). On the other hand, and not unexpected, we document 
some significant differences between brokers and farmers (see Figure A2 in 
the Appendix). Education, age and experience are all significantly different 
(at a 5% level). Brokers tend to have attained a slightly higher average 
education level (+2.05 years) and self-declare higher trading experience 
(+0.55). Farmers instead are on average older than brokers (7.61 years), 
and present a wider age range. 
Next, we turn to the details of the treatment. The market treatment 
was inspired by Smith (1976), and consisted of an open outcry double 
auction similar to the trading floor of the ECX. Farmers and brokers 
were told that a given quantity of sesame sold previously by their 
cooperative had to be re-bargained that day, and that market 
participants could make extra-profits in accordance with the 
selling/buying prices that eventuated in the auction. The cost 
associated with the auction where thus modest (we only paid for the 
difference between the “market prices” and the formerly agreed price). 
The sesame had been sold collectively by the cooperative (circa 500 
members), not by the farmers themselves. Farmers and brokers faced 
normal incentives to bargain, as their payoff depended on deviations 
(trading margins) from threshold values. The trading margin for 
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farmers was simply the bargained price minus 1.540 Birr (which was the 
price struck earlier by the cooperative).35  The participating farmers 
were only allowed to sell 1 quintal per round, and were paid at the end 
of the experiment only the sum of the margins over the 6 rounds. The 
rest, as promised, would be paid through their cooperative. The 
participating brokers were told to buy 2 quintals per round, at the 
lowest price possible. For each round they would receive the difference 
between the buying price, and the threshold value of 1.565 Birr. 
Participating brokers were also offered a 300 Birr award, to cut 
opportunity costs, and had their bus trip fully organized and paid, to 
reduce transaction costs.  
During this “fictitious real market” 144 quintals of sesame were sold, 
moving 222,437 Birr (US$ 17,794) to a modest cost for the experiment’s 
finances. The average selling price was 1,545 Birr per quintal (US$ 123). 
Farmers sold on average 5,5 bags of 1 quintal of sesame, earning 8,555 
Birr (US$ 684). Of this, only 26 Birr (US$ 2) per quintal was paid by 
the experimenters. Treated brokers earned 244 Birr (US$ 19) on 
average. No feedback was given to participants before, between or after 
the “market experiment” rounds. We therefore view learning as market-
induced. After the treatment, brokers and farmers were asked to re-
perform the GARP choice experiment, and again were handed the 
selected gift. Two days later the “control” group re-performed the 
GARP test. This ended the data collection process.36  
                                      
35 In addition, farmers were offered a 20 Birr fee to reward cooperation. 
36 Note there was a 5-day delay between the two rounds of GARP violations for the 
treated group and a 7-day delay for the control group. Insofar as there was learning in the 
first round of the experiment combined with a gradual “decay” of this knowledge over 
time, it is possible that these results conflate the effect of the treatment and more limited 
decay of knowledge due to the shorter time lag. However, we view the latter effect as 
relatively unimportant. 
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There is no relationship between the goods used to measure rationality 
violations (coffee, sugar and juice) and the good used in the market 
experiment (sesame). This approach follows Slonim (1999) and List and 
Millimet (2008), and aims to minimize the so-called “Learning by Rules 
of Thumb” (LRT) effect, enabling clean identification of the “Learning 
to be More Rational” (LMR) effect (Slonim, 1999). In artefactual field 
experiments it is important to discriminate between LRT and LMR if 
participants may learn to act more rational by applying a set of “rules 
of thumb” valid only for that particular context. It may be wrong to 
claim that applying such rules also produces a behavioral response in 
another – non-experimental – environment. Measuring the behavioral 
effects of exogenously induced market experience in a distinct market 
therefore represents a ‘particularly demanding test of the impact of 
market experience on learning’ (List and Millimet, 2008: p.2). 
The core of our analysis is a set of regression models where we seek to 
explain (differences in) GARP violations by personal characteristics and 
the market treatment. We follow List and Millimet and will present the 
results of a series of models, nested in the following general equation: 
 KL7 
 	  + = + ′ + M[O(+Φ(+)Q + 	) (1)	
where KL7	represents the number of GARP violations for subject  
 1,… , S in round  
 0,1.	= is a dummy representing whether or 
not a subject participated in the market session; ′  is a vector of 
personal characteristics including type (farmer or broker), age, 
education and self-assessed market experience level; O represents the 
standard normal density function; Φ is the cumulative density function; 
+T 
 !UT , where (Pr(KL7T 	4	V42F) 
 	Φ(!UT); and )T 
	 #T +	6  is the 
error term composed by the idiosyncratic shock and the individual-
specific terms. Imposing M 
 0 and W? 
 0 (where W? is the variance of 
the random effects), equation (1) reduces to an OLS model. Imposing 
M 
 0 reduces (1) to a GLS random effects (GLS-re) model, or a fixed 
effects (FE) model. Imposing W? 
 0 reduces (1) to the standard 
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Heckman selection model. Finally, [O(+Φ(+)Q  is the inverse Mills’ 
ratio, used to test and control for non-random attrition. In fact, while 
there was no attrition for the sample of brokers, 21 farmers failed to 
show up after the first round of GARP experiments (restricting the 
sample to 47 farmers for the panel). The Heckman model allows 
exploring whether non-random attrition of farmers might bias the 
results. We exclude farm size from vector ′  and include it in the 
selection equation to ensure that the model is nonparametrically 
identified.37 
Furthermore, we estimate some additional models to probe the 
robustness of our findings.38 First, and exploiting the count nature of 
GARP violations data, we estimate a Poisson regression model, based 
on the assumption that the number of rationality violations is drawn 
from a Poisson distribution with parameter 3T, so that: 
 Pr	(KL7,T 
 	T) 
 exp[3T\ 3T]T!T  (2)	
whereT 
 0,1,2, … , and ln(3T 
	 + =T + ′)  as above. Second, to 
account for the fact that there are many more outcomes with zero 
rationality violations than predicted by the Poisson model (see Figure 2 
and Figure A2 in the Appendix), we also estimate a zero-inflated 
Poisson (ZIP), which extends (2). Finally, since random assignment 
may not necessarily create a credible counterfactual in case of small 
sample size, we also estimate a propensity score matching (PSM) model 
to estimate the “treatment effect on the treated”.  
                                      
37  Farm size arguably captures an opportunity cost of time and thereby explains 
participation in the 2nd stage. In none of the models we have estimated do we find that 
farm size is (directly) correlated with behavior in the choice experiment. 
38 This empirical strategy closely follows List and Millimet and deviates in only a single 
aspect. Since our analysis does not suffer from non-compliance (or partial compliance) we 
do not estimate an instrumental variable model. 
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The small size of my sample implies the analysis has low power. To be 
precise and using my data for an ex-post assessment of the power: the 
pooled panel (brokers and farmers) has a power of only 0.7.39  This 
implies treatment effects will have to be large to be picked up. 
Fortunately we were able to measure GARP violations and treatment 
participation without any error. Small sample size also casts doubts on 
the representativeness of the sample. However, we focus on two 
narrowly defined activities (sesame production and trade) in a specific 
region characterized by fairly homogeneous conditions. As always, the 
generalizability of field experimental data to other settings is hazardous, 
but we believe the current analysis nicely complements the data 
collected in North America by List and Millimet.  
 Results 4.5
We used a three-goods GARP violations test to determine the consistency 
of choices. Compared to two-good tests, this approach invites more 
frequent GARP violations. Indeed, compared to List and Millimet (2008) 
we find that a greater share of the farmers and brokers revealed at least 
one GARP violation during the first round. 
Result 1: 98.5% of the farmers and 81.8% of the brokers 
revealed at least one GARP violation in the first round of 
the experiment. 
Upon computing sample means and standard deviations we find that the 
difference in GARP violations between farmers and brokers disappears. Of 
course this may also reflect the low power of the test due to the small 
sample size. 
                                      
39 Power calculations were performed using STATA. Comparable results were achieved 
using the GPower 3.1 software. 
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Result 2: farmers and brokers did not show significant 
differences in the number of GARP violation levels in the 
first round of the experiment (t=-0.05; p=0.964). 
Importantly, we find no evidence that the 21 drop-out farmers are 
systematically different than their participating peers (recall that attrition 
cannot bias the results for brokers as there was zero attrition in that 
sample). For example, a simple t-test detects no significant difference in 
the number of GARP0 violations for returning and drop-out farmers (P-
value = 0.388). To probe further, we have also estimated probit models 
predicting the return of farmers, using the number of GARP violations in 
the first round as an explanatory variable. As it should be, this initial 
number of GARP violations does not enter significantly, neither when 
regressed alone (P-value = 0.385), nor as part of a multivariate model that 
includes a vector with “personal characteristics” (indeed; no variable was 
significant at a 5% level). Early analysis thus causes me to reject the 
hypothesis of non-random self-selection in the 2nd part of the experiment. 
We return to this in a more formal analysis below.   
On average subjects exhibited 11.9 GARP violations during the first 
round. This number fell in the second round, both for the treated and 
control group. For the control group, this could suggest a learning effect 
from playing the experiment for the second time, but the reduction is not 
statistically significant (at 5%) and therefore may be attributed to random 
variation. For the treated group, instead, we pick up a significant 
treatment effect. During the second round the pooled average decreased to 
10.4 for the non-treated and 6.8 for the treated subjects (Table 3). The 
difference between the reductions in GARP violations is statistically 
significant, implying that the pooled data picks up a treatment effect, 
despite the low power caused by the small sample. Subjects who have been 
exposed to the auction make significantly less rationality violations than 
their peers in the control group (Figure 3). 
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Table 3: Average GARP violations over time, per treatment and type 
 
 
Figure 2: GARP violations of control and treatment groups at time 1 
 
Next we report my main results; the estimation outcomes for the various 
regression models outlined above. These results are summarized in Table 4. 
The Treatment variable enters with a negative sign and is significant at the 
5% level. This is true for random and fixed effects models (a Hausman test 
suggests the random effects model is preferred), the Poisson models, the 
Heckman selection model, and the propensity score matching model. Note 
that, consistent with the discussion above, there is no evidence to suspect 
that my analysis suffers from non-random attrition—the coefficient on the 
inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant. Taken together, we interpret 
this as robust evidence that exposure to a market treatment invites more 
rational behavior (as measured by the number of GARP violations). 
Interestingly, none of the personal characteristics significantly affects the 
number of GARP violations. 
 
 
Type  Group Observations 
GARP violations 
t=0 t=1 Change 
Farmers treatment 26 12.81 7.69     -5.12** 
 control 21 11.10 9.95 -1.15 
 drop-out 21 11.67   
Brokers treatment 12 11.83 4.42     -7.41** 
 control 10 12.20 11.20 -1.00 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Control    Treatment 
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Table 4: GARP violations decrease after exogenous market experience  
 
GARP violations 
 
OLS OLS GLS-re Poisson ZIP Heckman PSM 
 All All All All Brokers Farmers All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treatment -4.913*** -4.913*** -5.298*** -0.553*** -0.625*** -4.077*** -4.13** 
 
(1.224) (1.130) (1.084) (0.152) (0.149) (1.351) (1.74) 
Farmer 0.596 0.596 0.478 0.060    
 
(1.236) (1.603) (1.425) (0.159)    
Age 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.002 -0.004 0.074  
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (0.005) (0.007) (0.073)  
Education -0.018 -0.018 -0.030 -0.002 -0.016 0.538*  
 (0.193) (0.233) (0.219) (0.022) (0.016) (0.295)  
Experience 0.358 0.358 0.265 0.034 -0.061 0.079  
 (0.493) (0.583) (0.560) (0.055) (0.087) (0.555)  
Mills Lambda 
     2.500  
     (7.738)  
Clustered s.e. N 90 N N N N N 
Observations 159 159 159 159 44 136 57 
R2 0.103 0.103 0.102    0.103 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. In (3) a Hausman test suggests that the random effects model is preferred to 
fixed effects (most efficient specification). The Vuong test for the Zero-Inflated-Poisson (5) resulted significant at 
the p < 0.05 level. The Heckman selection model (6) uses land size (ha), age, education and experience as 
exclusion restrictions in the first-stage selection equation. Propensity score matching (PSM) imposes the common 
support (12 observations dropped) and is estimated via probit; the propensity score includes type, age, education, 
experience and GARP violations at time 0; the standard errors of the PSM are obtained by bootstrap, using 
Epanechnikov Kernel matching. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Result 3: market experience and rational choice behavior 
are directly related: engaging in a competitive market 
reduced pooled GARP violations by 4.91 (OLS), or ¾ of a 
Standard Deviation.  
The magnitude of the treatment coefficient is larger than in the List and 
Millimet study. We speculate this may be due to two factors: first, our 
market treatment was more intense and salient—a full day of trading, in 
which US$ 17,794 worth of sesame was exchanged;40  and second, the 
                                      
40 List and Millimet find that the treatment effect varies with the intensity of the 
treatment: those youths who fully complied with their treatment (i.e. started trading 
sports cards memorabilia beyond the parting gift provided by List and Millimet) had 
larger rationality gains than youths who only complied partially (sold their cards and 
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endline measurement was immediately after the treatment (rather than up 
to 7 months later). There is no reason to believe that the effect is due to 
discussions about the first round of the experiment by the respondents 
during the treatment. We carefully monitored the interaction of 
respondents during the treatment, and there is also no evidence to suggest 
that people talked about the choice experiment in the previous week. 
Next, we report the results of a non-parametric permutation test to probe 
the robustness of the results. To obtain consistent standard errors we 
follow Bloom et al. (2011) and compute the Wei-Lachin test statistic: 
 = 
 	aa"(1  "b)cbdbe<
d
e<
 (3)	
Where S is the total number of respondents, subscripts  and f refer to 
specific respondents  ≠ f; " 
 1 denotes that respondent  was assigned to 
the market treatment (so that " 
 0	indicates assignment to the control 
group), and the following holds: 
 cb 
 	h+1	i	KL7 >	KL7b1	i	KL7 <	KL7b			0	i	KL7 
 	KL7b  (4)	
This approach allows us to evaluate whether the difference in the number 
of GARP violations between the treated and control group respondents at 
 
 1 is greater than may be expected based on chance: under the null 
hypothesis of no treatment effect the treatment outcomes should not be 
systematically larger than the control outcomes. However, the associated p-
value for post-market treatment is 0.0067, implying we can reject the null 
                                                                                                
never entered a sports cards show again). We speculate that the salience of the market 
treatment may have a similar effect as the intensity of trading. 
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hypothesis of no effect. The non-parametric findings are thus consistent 
with the parametric estimates.41 
We proceed by considering farmers and brokers separately. To formally test 
whether there are statistically different models for farmers and brokers we 
interacted the farmer dummy with all regressors and did an F-tests. No 
interaction term entered significantly. The results from regressing the 
number of GARP violations on the treatment dummy and personal 
characteristics are summarized in Table 5. They are consistent with the 
findings derived from the pooled dataset. 
Result 4: Both farmers and brokers separately reveal 
significant reductions in GARP violations after the 
market experience. Subjects revealing at least one GARP 
violation drop to 73.1% and 58.3%, respectively. 
The treatment coefficient is greater for traders than for farmers. Does this 
imply that traders learned more from participating in the experiment than 
the farmers? To further assess whether there is a difference in “learning 
rates” between farmers and traders, we ran an additional OLS regression 
for treated and non-treated subjects separately, controlling for type, age, 
education and experience (results not shown but available on request). The 
farmer type dummy entered significantly for the treated sample, but not 
for the control group. This is perhaps suggestive of a difference in learning 
rates across types, but in light of the low power due to small sample size 
we treat the lack of a significant effect for the control group as tentative 
and indicative only. In addition, while both brokers and farmers had to 
bargain on a competitive market, they played different roles in the market 
experiment (buying and selling sesame, respectively) and were confined by 
 
                                      
41 We have also computed the Wei-Lachin test statistic for the baseline dataset. Consistent 
with the earlier parametric results, here we cannot reject the null hypothesis (p=0.6521). 
Similar results are obtained when estimating a log-rank model. 
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Table 5: Market experience reduces GARP violations for farmers and brokers separately  
 
GARP violations 
 
OLS GLS-re OLS GLS-re 
 Farmers Farmers Brokers Brokers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -4.052*** -4.406*** -6.675*** -7.083*** 
 
(1.268) (1.259) (2.191) (2.049) 
Age 0.049 0.051 0.049 0.049 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.134) (0.198) 
Education 0.318 0.292 -0.632 -0.632 
 (0.216) (0.242) (0.551) (0.470) 
Experience -0.241 -0.300 2.148 2.116 
 (0.578) (0.561) (1.358) (1.689) 
Clustered s.e. 68 N 22 N 
Observations 115 115 44 44 
R2 0.084 0.084 0.289 0.288 
Notes: Robust standard Errors are in parenthesis. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
 
different “rules.”  It is of course possible that any behavioral difference for 
the two groups is caused by these factors.  
Finally, we test whether better “bargainers” experienced a greater drop in 
GARP violations. We find tentative support for this hypothesis. In a 
model that explains changes in GARP violations, we insert the subset of 
brokers and farmers earning above median profits as a separate regressor. 
The associated coefficients are of the expected sign, but not robustly 
significant. Specifically, due to small sample size we don’t detect a 
significant effect for brokers, but we do for farmers. This suggests some 
weak support for the hypothesis that subjects more actively engaged in the 
competitive market setting are characterized by higher learning rates. 
 Conclusions 4.6
In this study, we explore whether market experience affects the rationality 
of choices made by a sample of sesame farmers and brokers. Following 
earlier work by List and Millimet (2008), we provide new evidence of such 
endogenous rationality. Markets are not only neutral institutions to 
efficiently allocate resources among participants. They also improve the 
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rationality of the decision-making process of participants, introducing the 
possibility of dynamic efficiency gains associated with market expansion in 
developing countries. Compared to the earlier study by List and Millimet, 
our study was carried out in a radically different context (a different 
country and continent, culture and respondent pool, and institutions), with 
very different subjects, and with a treatment that was much more salient 
to the participants (involving sesame trading, which is at the core of their 
livelihood strategy, and introducing a trading institution that arguably will 
reshape the sesame market in the coming years). The fact that the results 
are quite consistent across studies provides support for the external validity 
of the notion of endogenous rationality.  
Our first result is that behavior of the vast majority of the subjects in the 
baseline study (prior to the treatment) is not consistent with assumptions 
regarding the straw man Homo Economicus. The main result is that our 
subjects respond to a single-day trading session, where they were engaged 
in competitive market behavior, by reducing the number of GARP 
violations by three- fourths of a standard deviation. Somewhat surprisingly, 
given the difference in trading experiences across these groups, farmers and 
brokers performed similarly on the baseline choice consistency test. We 
conjecture that brokers seemingly do not outperform farmers – as observed 
in the domain of sports card trading, for example – by the fact that sesame 
trading in the Ethiopian countryside does not take place in a setting 
resembling a competitive market. Personal relations matter more than 
responding quickly to price margins.  
Our data do not allow us to examine the (evolution of) efficiency of the 
double cry auction market (this requires the provision of induced values to 
farmers and brokers, resulting in well-defined upward-sloping supply curves 
and downward-sloping demand curves). However, it is possible to say 
something about the distribution of rents across our groups of farmers and 
brokers. Figure 4 provides the bargained price over the six trading rounds, 
 
SHOCKS, PREFERENCES, AND INSTITUTIONS 
91 
 
Figure 4: Trading rounds and bargained prices 
and after three rounds, the median price has been bargained down to the 
reservation price of the farmers (1,540 birr). This suggests that, over time, 
buyers were able to secure most of the rents associated with the trading.  
In an era of rapid market liberalizations, an expanding role of the market 
in the life of people might lead to efficiency gains, reducing deadweight 
losses due to noncompetitive exchanges. While Akerlof and Yellen (1985), 
among others, found that deviations from rational behavior may have little 
impact on general economic equilibria, there may be significant effects at 
the micro level. In a competitive environment, different levels of rationality 
across groups in society, may affect the distribution of wealth. This 
phenomenon could have an impact also at a micro as well as regional level, 
affecting regional growth rates. For example, while the ECX was initiated 
to improve the performance of the commodity value chain, an unexpected 
side effect may be a shift in the distribution of rents from one group of 
actors to another in response to differential ability to respond to incentives 
and margins. Obviously, these statements should be interpreted as 
speculative at this point; since market-induced rationality may affect many 
spheres of decision making, including ones not explored in this study, it is 
difficult to predict how market exposure will affect well-being. 
Round 
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Differentiated endogenous rationality poses new challenges to policy 
makers in terms of economic policy and reforms, requiring more attention 
to the dynamic effects of partial equilibria and rent distribution. In 
general, if the (trading) context determines the rationality of choice, 
affecting the behavior of agents, then the dynamic effects of policies aimed 
at accelerating or decelerating market expansion are very difficult to assess, 
ex ante. If so, the welfare effects of many policies aimed at stimulating 
development may be difficult to gauge. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Choice set example (sheet 2) 
 
 
 
A: Control farmers B: Control brokers; C: Farmers to be treated; D: Brokers to be treated 
Figure A2: GARP violation levels across types and treatment selection at T=0 
A              B 
C              D 
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Variable definitions: 
GARP violations. The number of GARP violations that responded i made in a simple 
choice experiment with 3 goods. 
Education. The number of completed years of education of respondent i. 
Age. Age of respondent i in years, rounded down to the last birthday. 
Experience. Individual level self-evaluation index expressing the “market experience” of 
respondent i on a scale from 1 (no experience) to 5 (most experienced).  
Land. Land owned by farmer in Hectares (ha). Ownership here does not imply property 
rights/land titles. 
Farmer. Individual level dummy variable taking value of unity if the i-th respondent was 
a farmer, 0 if he was a broker. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Formal Insurance and the Dynamics 
of Social Capital  
Experimental Evidence from Uganda 
 
Abstract 
We explore how the introduction of formal insurance 
affects the within-village dynamics of social capital in 
south-western Uganda. Consistent with existing evidence, 
our data suggests formal insurance crowds-out social 
capital—proxied by contributions in a public goods game. 
However, it is not those adopting the formal insurance 
who reduce their contributions. Instead, social capital 
erodes because of the uninsured. This is consistent with 
“weapons of the weak” theories, emphasizing social 
embeddedness. As informal sharing networks start to 
unravel, those unable to benefit from formal insurance fear 
they will lose out, and use the public goods game to signal 
their dismay.  
 
 
 
Publication status: Cecchi, F., Duchoslav J., & Bulte, E. H., 2014. Formal Insurance and 
the Dynamics of Social Capital: Experimental Evidence from Uganda. Working paper. 
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 Introduction 5.1
Institutions are constraints devised by humans to shape human interaction 
(North, 1990). This broad definition captures both formal and informal 
institutions, where the former are often treated as exogenous constraints, 
enforced by an outside party (possibly “the state”), and the latter are 
endogenous constraints—self-enforcing rules representing the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium of a repeated game (Greif, 1993; Aoki, 2001a, 2001b). 
While recent empirical work has identified institutions as a key 
determinant of economic performance (Rodrik et al., 2004), much remains 
unknown about how institutions evolve over time, or about the interaction 
between different (types of) institutions.  
In this paper we ask how formal institutions affect informal ones. This 
topic is gaining importance as, globally, systems of formal institutions are 
expanding. For example, global value chains are penetrating further into 
societies heretofore oriented towards subsistence activities; the 
formalization of land rights increasingly affects customary institutional 
tenure arrangements; and the expanding reach of the state and formal 
court system is altering informal judicial institutions. The current wave of 
experimentation with (index) insurance products in environments 
characterized by informal sharing arrangements represents another 
example. While some theoretical work exists to analyze how (exogenous) 
changes in formal institutions affect the equilibrium of repeated games (for 
example, Aoki 2001b), empirical work in this domain remains very scarce. 
Roland (2004) describes the interaction between slow- and fast-moving 
institutions and argues that, depending on the context, specific institutions 
may be complements or substitutes. Institutional innovations in one 
domain may therefore crowd out, or solidify, existing institutional 
arrangements.42  
                                      
42 For recent experimental work along these lines, refer to Chandrasekhar et al. (2014). 
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In this paper we seek to enhance our understanding of the impact of a 
specific formal institutional innovation on local cooperation (“social 
capital”) using experimental methods. We focus on the provision of 
insurance—a domain relatively well-studied by economists. Rural 
producers in developing countries are exposed to various shocks, and 
typically are better off when pooling their risks (in particular when the co-
variation of risks across individuals is modest or absent). Since, until 
recently, prohibitive transaction costs typically precluded the writing of 
formal insurance contracts, rural producers by and large depended on 
informal insurance arrangements to secure their livelihoods (Townsend, 
1994; Udry, 1994; De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011). Such sharing could 
take various forms, including redistribution within friendship or kinship 
networks (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Alger and Weibull, 2010), or 
transfers in patron-client relationships (Richards, 1996). In recent years, 
however, various agencies have experimented with the provision of formal 
insurance for rural households, based on written contracts and possibly 
outside enforcement. This development was facilitated by improvements in 
communication technology, lowering transaction costs, but also by the 
creation of “new” insurance products such as index insurance.  
Insofar as formal and informal insurance are “substitutes”, one might 
expect that expansion of formal insurance possibilities will crowd out 
informal insurance arrangements. A small literature seeks to empirically 
test this hypothesis, providing some support for it. Dercon and Krishnan 
(2003) find that public transfers in the form of food aid crowd out informal 
sharing in rural Ethiopia.43 Landmann et al. (2012) use data from the 
Philippines to show that formal insurance lowers voluntary transfers 
among members in social networks. Klohn and Strupat (2013) examine the 
link between the provision of formal health insurance and informal 
                                      
43 Also see Bahre (2011), who examines the relation between formal financial arrangements 
and personal networks in post-apartheid South Africa, finding that increasing 
redistribution created frictions within networks.  
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transfers in Ghana, and find that formal insurance reduces both the 
probability of making transfers as well as amounts transferred. Lin et al. 
(2014) confirm the crowding out thesis in a laboratory setting.44  
The main objective of this paper is to empirically explore how the 
introduction of formal health insurance affects within-village social capital 
dynamics in a sample of Ugandan villages. We seek to extend evidence 
reported by Klohn and Strupat (2013), the only other paper considering 
the implications of formal health insurance for informal institutions. To 
this end, we first compare the behavior of villagers with and without access 
to formal health insurance (i.e. an intention-to-treat effect at the village 
level). We proceed by disentangling behavior of adopters and non-adopters. 
Unlike existing work, we consider a voluntary insurance program with 
imperfect uptake—allowing us to probe intra-village implications. 
Moreover, we do not use informal transfers as our measure of social capital. 
Instead, our main dependent variable is based on behavior in public good 
(PG) games. The PG game captures the ability of communities to 
coordinate on first-best outcomes, and represents a well-known measure of 
social capital at the village level (e.g. Fearon et al., 2009). Following Klohn 
and Strupat (2013) and Morten (2013), one may hypothesize that formally 
insured village members depend less on their fellow villagers to sustain 
their livelihoods and, as a consequence, invest less in social relations.45 If 
so, the result will be erosion of social capital, translating into lower 
contributions to the local public good.  
                                      
44 A related literature concerns the effects of migration (remittances) as a mechanism to 
provide insurance. For example, Morten (2013) establishes that temporary migration 
decreases informal risk sharing. 
45 Of course there are other reasons why the introduction of formal insurance (or storage) 
possibilities may cause adopters to opt out of informal institutions or networks. Klohn and 
Strupat (2013) discuss that formal institutions may crowd out altruistic behavior (see 
Bowles, 2008), or may reduce (the bite of) social sanctions associated with exit (see Grimm 
et al., 2013). 
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In areas with access to formal insurance, we find that uptake is far from 
uniform, and skewed towards the sub-sample of wealthier villagers. We also 
find that average contributions to the public good are indeed lower in areas 
with a formal insurance system in place. These results corroborate 
predictions of the game theoretical paradigm (outlined below), as well as 
the empirical findings mentioned above. Next, we zoom in on within-village 
social capital dynamics, documenting patterns in the data that are harder 
to explain. We find that lower aggregate contributions to the public good 
in areas with access to the formal insurance are not due to the withdrawal 
of insurance adopters. Instead, reduced average contributions are explained 
by declining contributions of non-adopters. We speculate this behavior 
serves as a signal of their displeasure of being left behind, after the wealthy 
threaten to opt out of informal sharing networks. If formal insurance is 
only available to a (wealthy) sub-sample of the population, who could then 
choose to exit informal insurance networks, the villagers left behind may 
lose. They would unambiguously be worse off if their informal insurance 
options deteriorate while they cannot benefit from formal insurance. 
The interpretation about reduced contributions as a signal, or warning, is 
consistent with insights of the sociologist Mark Granovetter (1985), who 
emphasizes the importance of “social embeddedness” (i.e. social interaction 
beyond economic exchange), and supports insights of the anthropologist 
James Scott (1985), who studied the consequences of mechanization for 
social relations in a rice producing village in Malaysia. Scott coined the 
phrase “weapons of the weak” to describe how the poor resisted their 
degradation in the village hierarchy and culture. We return to these models 
below. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we outline and illustrate 
the conventional economic perspective on the evolution of informal 
institutions (in response to changes in the broader environment). We then 
complement this perspective with the “weapons of the weak” argument 
advanced by Scott (1985). In section 5.3 we provide context regarding the 
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case study, and describe the insurance intervention as implemented by a 
local NGO. In section 5.4 we summarize our data, outline our 
identification strategy, and formulate four research questions. Section 5.5 
contains our empirical results, and the conclusions ensue.  
 Formal and informal institutions  5.2
We first outline a simple economic perspective on the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions, which focuses on consequences in a 
specific domain of interest (typically related to some form of exchange). 
This perspective lends itself naturally to game-theoretic analysis, and 
economists have developed a coherent framework in which informal 
institutions are seen as the equilibrium outcomes of repeated interactions—
outcomes that are persistent over time, shaping expectations and gradually 
evolving into norms of appropriate behavior. See, for example, Aoki 
(2001b) for a treatment of institutions as endogenous and self-enforcing 
equilibrium outcomes of a repeated game. 
Economists have studied the evolution of informal insurance arrangements 
as alternative insurance opportunities emerge. Informal insurance via gifts 
and transfers occur within networks of family members (or friends) because 
of altruism, and may involve support to deal with persistent shocks 
(chronic illness or disability—see De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011). 
Informal insurance may also be motivated by expected reciprocity among 
individuals (or households) in a context of repeated interaction (Kimball, 
1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon et al., 2002; De Weerdt and 
Fafchamps, 2011). The theoretical literature has emphasized that such 
non-altruistic sharing arrangements should be self-enforcing; individuals 
are willing to help others facing a temporary shock because of the credible 
promise of reciprocity in the future (so that participation constraints 
automatically limit the extent of risk sharing that is possible). The 
voluntary participation constraint for individual i may be written as: 
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DT(kT  ℎT)  DTmkT + =b  ℎTnT ≤ pT|qT,qbTr∑ 	tDT(kTu		+	=bTu		ℎTu	n v	e<																															DT(kTu	  ℎTu	)\w + Lb  (1)	
where DT  denotes concave utility of individual   at time  ; kT  denotes 
consumption; =bis a positive or negative transfer from 	to f;46 ℎ denotes the 
value of a health shock; p is the expectations operator;  is the (common) 
discount factor; and Lb is a measure of altruism, or the utility obtained by 
individual  from helping individual f. The left hand side of (1) captures 
the temptation from reneging on a sharing obligation, or the immediate 
gain in utility from not transferring the transfer =b to individual f. This 
short-term benefit should be balanced against the loss of foregoing the 
(expected) potential benefits from sharing in the future (in all periods 4 
that follow).  
How does the emergence of formal insurance affect the participation 
constraint?  An individual who is expelled from the insurance network now 
has the option to adopt formal insurance – paying a fixed fee x every 
period and receiving payment C	 in case of a health shock. This implies we 
can rewrite (1) as: 
DT(kT  ℎT)  DTmkT + =bT  ℎTnT ≤ pT|qT,qbTr∑ 	tDT(kTu	+	=bTu		ℎTu	n v	e<																																																				DT(kTu	  x + C	  ℎTu	)\w + Lb  (2)	
Since an actuarially fair insurance product improves the autarky outcome 
of adopters in the future by facilitating consumption smoothing, it 
decreases the right-hand side of (2) with respect to (1). This implies the set 
of self-enforcing informal insurance transfers decreases (which may be 
inconsequential for sufficiently large values of A, or if the self-enforcement 
constraint does not “bind”). Intuitively, since individuals have access to a 
substitute insurance product tomorrow (other than transfers from peers), it 
is more tempting to renege on obligations today and opt out of the 
                                      
46  =b  represents a specific transfer from a menu, depending on the realization of 
idiosyncratic health shocks to individuals 	and f. Here we consider the case of =b < 0 in 
the present period. 
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network, so that only a menu of small transfers can now be supported as 
an equilibrium. As a result, insurance options for non-adopters deteriorate.  
The main message is that substitute insurance mechanisms lower the value 
attached to informal sharing arrangements (for those able to adopt the 
substitute). Substitutes could be formal insurance, as above, but 
alternatives exist. For example, Ligon et al. (2002) focus on the 
implications of self-insurance via storage, which strictly increases the value 
of autarky. As above, individuals who were previously (almost) indifferent 
between participating in the sharing network and autarky will now renege 
when they have the option to store, and subsequently opt out of the 
network. While their welfare improves as a result, the utility of individuals 
remaining in the network decreases unambiguously. They are worse off 
because the network shrinks and loses part of its ability to absorb shocks. 
Ligon et al. (2002) demonstrate that introducing the possibility of storage 
may even reduce overall welfare. Migration (remittances) may provide yet 
an alternative substitute mechanism to protect households from health 
shocks, and Morten (2013) demonstrates that migration tends to decrease 
insurance provided via informal networks. 
The economic perspective thus proposes that the expansion of formal 
institutions, insofar as they provide a substitute for informal institutions, 
may undermine these informal institutions. The economic system shifts 
from one sub-game perfect equilibrium to another, reflecting the new 
choice sets for economic agents. In particular, “adopters” of the formal 
institution may opt out of pre-existing arrangements. In the process, 
distributional issues emerge and net welfare may decrease as a result. Is 
this a complete characterization of the evolution of societies? 
A broader perspective emerges if we recognize that economic agents are 
social creatures that also interact in other domains than the economic one. 
In the words of sociologist Granovetter (1985), economic transactions are 
“socially embedded”. Aoki writes that ‘the economic transaction domain is 
embedded in a social exchange domain in which the same members 
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repeatedly interact socially and invest in, and enjoy returns from, social 
capital’ (2001a: p.98).  This perspective can be worked out formally using 
game theory, by linking multiple games and expanding the payoff 
structure. For example, Aoki (2001a) demonstrates that linking an 
economic exchange and social interaction game may expand the set of 
equilibria that can be supported in the exchange game.  
There are alternative approaches to study social embeddedness. For 
example, the anthropologist Scott (1985) uses a descriptive approach to 
study the consequences of mechanization in rice farming in a Malay 
village—a process inviting consolidation of farms (for example, by inviting 
landowners to start reneging on long-term tenure arrangements) and 
dramatically reducing demand for hired labor. The result was 
“proletarianization” of small farmers and landless laborers—the creation of 
an underclass of society members whose well-being was increasingly 
inconsequential for upper strata of society (and whose interests were 
increasingly ignored). This is the unraveling of social networks caused by 
selective exit of the privileged (that is, the adopters), more or less along 
the lines discussed above. However, the story does not stop here. Scott 
demonstrates that “losers” in one sphere of interaction (for example, the 
labor market) are fully aware of their situation, resent it, and seek to 
remind the adopters of their historical responsibilities and social 
obligations by retaliation in other spheres of interaction—including 
everyday social life.  
Scott (1985) investigates such strategies in detail. Peasants recognize their 
limited (economic, political and symbolic) power, and typically prefer non-
rebellious and non-revolutionary acts of resistance. Typical “weapons of 
the weak” consist of low-key recalcitrance, foot dragging, dissimulation, 
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, chicanery, slander, arson, and 
acts of minor sabotage. Resistance strategies range from gossip and 
character assassination to strikes (such as when machines break down and 
landowners suddenly need labor to harvest their fields) and boycotts of 
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social activities such as weddings and political rallies organized by those 
well-off. More in general, resistance signals a reduced overall tendency to 
cooperate. This indicates a deterioration of local levels of social capital, 
undermining the ability of communities to coordinate on first-best 
outcomes.  
Do these insights extend from the context of Malaysia to Africa, and from 
the context of mechanization to insurance? In what follows we test whether 
formal insurance affects voluntary contributions of villagers to the local 
public good—distinguishing between those adopting insurance and those 
not adopting insurance, faced with a potentially shrinking informal 
network. To empirically probe this issue we organized behavioral games in 
a sample of rural Ugandan communities.  
 The case study: health insurance in Uganda 5.3
Approximately half the population in Uganda is below 14 years of age, and 
this population is expected to double in size in the next twenty years 
(UNESA, 2012). To help sustain strong post-war economic recovery during 
the last decade, Uganda is increasingly focusing on health interventions 
and the accumulation of human capital (World Bank, 2011). 
We focus on Kitagata sub-county, located in the South-Western Sub-region 
of Uganda. A local not-for-profit organization called Save for Health 
Uganda (SHU) has recently implemented a health micro-insurance project 
across four parishes in Kitagata, with the ultimate mid-term goal of 
covering the entire sub-county.47  In what follows, we refer to households 
from these parishes as having “access” to formal health insurance—in these 
parishes households actively decided whether to adopt insurance, or not. 
Each village in the covered parishes is encouraged and facilitated to create 
                                      
47  Since then, Kitagata Sub-county has been administratively divided into two sub-
counties: Kitagata and Kasaana. SHU however keeps working in both sub-counties with a 
single program. 
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a so-called Community Health Financing (CHF) scheme, which provides 
health insurance to member families. Members receive an insurance card, 
allowing access to all services provided by the contracted facilities.48 These 
services include transport to the hospital in case of delivery, antenatal care, 
outpatient services, admission services and surgery.  
Although there was slight variation with respect to the starting date of 
village level schemes, SHU required villages within the same parish to 
begin simultaneously, ensuring relatively homogeneous uptake rates. When 
we collected our data, in August 2012, all the randomly selected villages 
from areas with access to the insurance had a running scheme, to which 
approximately 53% of the families had subscribed. The great majority of 
the villagers in access areas (some 95%) indicated to be familiar with CHF 
schemes, while in parishes without access to the formal insurance around 
56% of the people interviewed had heard about the schemes, but were 
aware that it was not yet available to them (yet).49  On average, member 
households were expected to pay just above 26,000 USh (or $10) to cover 
the yearly insurance premium, with some variation depending on village 
and family size. Premiums were not sufficient to cover insurance costs, 
which are subsidized by international donors and sponsors. Nonetheless, 
only 18% of the participating families had been able to pay the full yearly 
premium to that date, with average payment rates hovering around 34%.50  
Families that have not fully paid the premium do not yet qualify for 
compensation; so many families currently have one foot in the formal 
system but also need to continue investing in informal arrangements.  
                                      
48 One private hospital and two public healthcare facilities. 
49 Notably, SHU had already undertaken informational and sensitization meetings in 2 
parishes in no access areas, at the time of our fieldwork and, while the scheme was neither 
active nor running, the insurance was scheduled to start there in the near future. 
50 Dekker and Wilms (2010) find that participants to a similar private health-insurance 
scheme in five rural and two urban communities in Uganda face comparable difficulties in 
paying the premium: only 37% of participating households were able to pay. 
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We believe there is considerable demand for formal health insurance 
schemes, but that paying for the premium remains a challenge for many 
families. The latter is confirmed by many open-ended exit interviews. 
While we did not collect hard evidence on the pre-existence of informal 
social arrangements of mutual insurance, anecdotes complement the 
(qualitative) literature on informal arrangements in Uganda (e.g. Taylor et 
al., 1996; McDonald et al., 1999), stressing the importance of relatives, 
neighbors and friends in providing financial support in times of hardship.51  
We interpret this context as one of being in institutional flux, in which a 
considerable share of the local population appears “in limbo” between 
alternative insurance modalities, as one in which “signaling” by discontent 
fellow villagers may be effective.  
 Experimental identification, data, and design 5.4
The health insurance scheme was implemented according to a pipeline 
approach: while the ultimate aim is to establish a running CHF in every 
parish, logistical constraints forced the implementing agency to gradually 
roll out their intervention. Some parishes are therefore treated earlier than 
others, and we refer to households living in parishes where the intervention 
had not taken place yet as not having access to formal insurance. Strictly 
speaking, the selection of (early) access parishes was arbitrary and did not 
follow an explicit randomization procedure, but not surprisingly access and 
no-access households are very similar across almost all dimensions we 
measured. Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests access parishes are 
comparable to no-access parishes, and that there are more differences 
between villages within the same parish, than between parishes. Moreover, 
                                      
51 An open-ended questionnaire highlighted that people help each other in times of illness, 
contributing to hospital bills and helping the family financially though donations of food 
and money, or by transporting sick persons to the hospital. In the words of one 
respondent, ‘here the story is that people help each other […] when they are sick, and in 
case of unlucky events.’ 
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villages with access are not significantly different from their counterparts in 
terms of total number of households, distance and time from a major road, 
and from the Sub-County headquarters (see Table 1).52  
We randomly selected 21 villages from three access parishes, and another 
23 villages from five neighboring parishes (in what follows: no-access 
villages). Four of these parishes are located in the same sub-county as the 
access parishes (Kitagata), and one parish containing five villages is 
located in neighboring Mitooma sub-county, bordering the largest parish 
with an active insurance scheme. In each village we first constructed a 
census of all households, and then randomly selected 10 households per 
village. After an extensive household survey, we randomly selected one 
adult family member to participate in our lab-in-field experiments.53  We 
have no relation with the NGO offering the insurance product, and to 
avoid gift exchange and demand effects we did not emphasize the 
insurance program in our sessions. 
Table 1 summarizes the household data, split out between the access and 
no-access households. We first establish that access and no-access 
respondents are indistinguishable according to most socio-economic 
dimensions—the two groups appear balanced. This is consistent with 
information given to us by the implementing NGO—they did not use a 
specific targeting rule when prioritizing villages to enroll in the program.  
 
                                      
52 Both distance (Km) and time (minutes) where measured following the route most 
commonly used by locals. We used a motorbike taxi as reference for time, as it represents 
the most commonly used motorized vehicle by locals, as well as the means of transport 
typically used by SHU extension agents. 
53 Enumerators made a list of each eligible family member before randomly selecting one 
name through a transparent ballot. Households were informed that the selected participant 
would be the only accepted household representative in the experiment, and that failure to 
comply with the rule would result in the exclusion of the household from the study. 44,5% 
of selected participants where female (see Table 1) and compliance averaged 93%. The 
plausible non-random attrition bias is discussed in section 5.  
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Table 1: Group means of socio-economic variables   
Variable 
No-access Access 
Diff. Std. Err. 
N Mean N Mean 
Village size (households) 23 65.13 21 58.05 -7.08 4.27 
Time to main road 23 6.13 21 7.24 1.11 1.56 
Distance from main road 23 2.33 21 2.47 0.14 0.66 
Time to sub-county town 23 15.70 21 14.67 -1.03 3.18 
Distance from sub-county town 23 5.50 21 4.31 -1.19 0.89 
Female participant 230 0.47 210 0.42 -0.05 0.05 
Single 216 0.05 207 0.03 -0.02 0.02 
Married/Engaged 216 0.79 207 0.79 0.00 0.04 
Widowed 216 0.15 207 0.16 0.01 0.02 
Male household head 230 0.75 210 0.76 -0.01 0.04 
Age household head 216 46.61 199 50.23 3.61** 1.54 
Education household head 230 5.31 209 4.95 -0.36 0.41 
Household size 230 6.13 210 6.05 -0.08 0.23 
Mothers in house 230 0.74 210 0.79 0.05 0.41 
Watch TV weekly 230 0.87 210 0.88 0.01 0.03 
Read newspaper weekly 230 0.24 210 0.24 0.00 0.04 
Radio 230 0.91 210 0.91 0.00 0.03 
Phone 230 0.84 210 0.78 -0.06 0.04 
Bicycle 230 0.45 210 0.42 -0.03 0.05 
Motorbike 230 0.15 210 0.11 -0.04 0.03 
Television 230 0.04 210 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Car 230 0.04 210 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Generator 230 0.02 210 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Wealth factor 230 0.04 210 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 
House features index 230 1.40 210 1.35 0.05 0.08 
Common assets index 230 2.20 210 2.11 0.05 0.08 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Age of the household head is the only variable that differs, but this 
difference is small and presumably caused by chance. A key variable for 
our purposes is the so-called wealth factor. This variable is constructed by 
factoring out a wealth index from a series of dummy variables related to 
asset ownership (that is, phone, radio, television, generator, bicycle, 
motorbike and car) and house features (iron roofing, brick walls and 
cement floors) locally perceived as primary indicators of wealth. The 
average asset index score is not significantly different in access and no-
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access villages. Also, for the full range of socio-economic variables, bias-
corrected variance estimates within parishes are greater than those across 
parishes. 
In terms of analysis, we first seek to explain variation in adoption of health 
insurance in access villages. Exit surveys identified lack of financial 
resources as the most frequent reason for opting-out of the insurance 
scheme. We therefore expect wealthy households to be more likely to join 
the scheme, creating the sort of within-village divide described by Scott 
(1985)—non-random adoption of the new technology based on income or 
wealth. On the other hand, since health status is also likely to vary with 
wealth, demand for insurance may also be greater among the non-wealthy. 
Ultimately the distribution of effective demand for formal insurance across 
social groups is an empirical question and using the sub-sample of treated 
parishes (villages), we estimate the following probit models: 
 Pr	(.4DF 
 1|	8Eℎ) 
 	 + <8Eℎ + <8Eℎ? +	#		 Pr	(.4DF 
 1|	7) 
 	 + 7 + ( +	#	 
(3)			(4)	
where .4DF is a dummy for insurance uptake by household ; 8Eℎ is 
a factor of wealth (based on a range of assets, discussed above), 7 is a 
poverty dummy, and (  is a vector of individual and household 
characteristics. The poverty dummy takes a value of one when a household 
does not own more than one of the three most common assets (phone, 
radio, bicycle) and not more than one improved house features (iron roof, 
brick wall, cement floor). In words, we explain adoption status by variables 
measuring wealth or poverty. Our first research question reads as follows: 
RQ1: Are wealthy households more likely to pick up 
health insurance than poor ones? 
Next, we are interested in explaining the effect of (non-random) adoption 
of formal insurance on village-level social capital. To construct a measure 
of social capital, we follow Fearon et al (2009) and organized a lab-in-field 
experiment, or a standard public goods (PG) game with five participants. 
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A PG game captures the ability of groups of respondents to overcome free 
riding incentives. It likely also picks up altruism and trust (as respondents 
want to avoid outcomes where they feel others have taken advantage of 
them), as well as the extent to which norms of sharing and cooperation are 
internalized by villagers. These issues speak to different dimensions of 
(cognitive) social capital. 
We randomly divided our 10 participants from each village into two groups 
of 5 individuals, carefully explained the rules of the game, and played a 
trial round. We gave five tokens to each participant, who could then 
anonymously contribute any integer amount into the common pot. After 
participants made their contributions, we doubled the amount in the pot 
and split this amount equally across all group members. As is well-known, 
the joint surplus is maximized when all participants contribute the full 
amount to the pot, but the privately optimal contribution (the Nash 
equilibrium) is to give nothing. After the trial round, participants were 
informed that they would play the game an unknown number of times (up 
to a maximum of 5), and that their pay-out at the end of the game would 
be based on a randomly selected round (determined by a simple lottery).54  
Payoffs for all participants were based on that same round, and averaged 
around USD 2.20—or about 2/3 of daily rural household incomes in the 
Western region, as estimated by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics.55 On 
average, participants without access to formal insurance shared 2.89 
tokens, against the 2.60 tokens shared by adopters, and 2.39 by non-
adopters with access. Similarly, only 25.5% of the participants with access 
                                      
54 In the absence of group reshuffling, game dynamics of reputation, retaliation and 
learning are expected to drive contribution decisions in repeated games (Rand et al., 2009). 
Our intent, however, is to proxy real life dynamics. For this reason our analysis is based 
solely on the choices performed during the first round of each game version. Successive 
iterations were performed so that defection is not necessarily the only Nash equilibrium 
present: players may cooperate on an equilibrium path, provided they are sufficiently 
interested in future outcomes (Dal Bó, 2005). For the same reason, the exact number of 
repetitions was not revealed to participants.  
55 http://www.ubos.org/UNHS0910/chapter7.Average%20Monthly%20Household%20Income.html  
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made a “high contribution” to the common pot (4 or 5 tokens) against 
34.8% of those without access (see Figure 1). 
If formal insurance crowds out informal insurance and reduces cooperation 
at the local level, then we would expect aggregate (or average) 
contributions to the common pot to be lower for respondents with access 
to the formal insurance scheme. Thus, we seek to pick up something 
resembling an intention-to-treat effect (as did Klohn and Strupat, 2013) 
and estimate the following two models: 
>ℎF 
 	 + Lkk44 + M[O(+Φ(+)Q +	#		Pr	(>ℎ*|	.4Dk 
 1) 
 	 + Lkk44 +	#	 
(5)			(6)	
where >ℎF represents the number of tokens shared in the common pot, Lkk44 is a dummy taking value 1 for respondents living in access villages, O represents the standard normal density function; Φ is the cumulative 
density function, and + 
 !U , where Pr	(>ℎF 	4	V42F) 
 	Φ(!U)—a 
standard Heckman Selection Model that can control for plausible non-
random attrition in the experimental sample. In (5),   measures an 
intention to treat effect. In (6), >ℎ* is a dummy for having shared a 
high amount (that is: 4 or 5 tokens), so this model is estimated using a 
Probit specification. In words, by estimating (5) and (6) we ask: 
RQ 2: Is the possibility to access a formal insurance 
associated with lower average contributions to the public 
good in a PG game?  
We now analyze contributions to the common pot more closely. The 
conventional economic perspective on the evolution of informal insurance 
suggests that formal insurance provides a substitute mechanism for the 
wealthy, who could subsequently choose to opt out of existing informal 
arrangements and cease cooperation with fellow villagers. The “weapons of 
 
FORMAL INSURANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
112 
 
Figure 1: Sharing decisions of participants with and without access 
the weak” thesis proposes that disgruntled non-adopters signal their 
dismay at the newly-created dichotomy in the village, which threatens 
their ability to pool future risks. In other words, both adopters and non-
adopters may reduce their contributions to the public good. We estimate 
the following ‘naïve’ models, which resemble (5) and (6) above but 
distinguish between adopters and non-adopters: 
>ℎF
	 + <LF 	+	?SF +	#		Pr	(>ℎ* 
 1|	LF , SF)
 	 + <LF 	+	?SF +	#	 
(7)			(8)	
To probe differences in behavior between adopters and non-adopters, A is 
a dummy taking value 1 for actual adopters (among those with access), 
and NA is a dummy taking value 1 for non-adopters (among those with 
access; respondents with no-access are always the omitted category). In 
words, our third research question is: 
RQ3: Assuming that the introduction of formal insurance 
is associated with reduced aggregate contributions to the 
common pot in a PG game, who is responsible for these 
lower contributions: adopters, non-adopters, or both? 
While it is easy to explain variation in common pool contributions by 
adoption status, it is likely that adoption status is correlated with other 
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relevant variables driving contributions. In that case, correlations obtained 
in our regression framework might be spurious. As a robustness test we 
therefore do a slightly more elaborate analysis. We first explain adoption 
status (based on observations in access parishes only) and, based on the 
resulting regression coefficients of (4), predict the probability of non-
adoption for all households (including in the no access villages). This 
regression analysis enables us to compare public good contributions for 
(predicted) adopters and non-adopters across villages with and without 
access to insurance. We are interested in establishing whether predicted 
non-adopters without access behave similarly to predicted non-adopters 
with access. We estimate: 
Pr	(>ℎ*|	Pr(SL)) 
 	 +  Pr(SL) +	#			Pr	(>ℎ*|	Pr(SL)) 
 	 + < Pr(SL) 	+?Access 		+~[7	(SL)  Lkk44Q +	#	 
(9)			(10)	
where 0 ≤ Pr(SL) ≤ 1, is the predicted probability of non-adoption, and Pr	(NA)  Lkk44 is the interaction term.  
To complement the analysis we also estimate a propensity score matching 
(PSM) model, matching respondents from access and no-access areas. To 
probe whether contributions by predicted non-adopters are similar, or not, 
we then compare contributions of non-adopters, with credibly similar 
respondents in no access-areas, based on nearest neighbor matching. 
RQ4: Do predicted non-adopters with access to formal 
insurance behave the same as predicted non-adopters 
without access—is behavior of non-adopters driven by 
population characteristics or by insurance? 
 Results  5.5
We first test the prediction that wealthier households are more likely to 
purchase formal health insurance than relatively poor households. In Table 
2, we focus on those parishes where insurance was offered, and explain 
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Table 2: Wealth and the adoption of health insurance 
 Insurance Adoption 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Wealth 0.146** 0.140**   
 (0.061) (0.061)   
Wealth2 -0.056** -0.035   
 (0.023) (0.030)   
Poor   -0.226*** -0.197** 
   (0.082) (0.095) 
Additional Controls N N N Y 
Observations 210 208 210 185 
Correct predictions at P=0.5 63% 63% 62% 68% 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (4). Wealth Factor based on vector of 
household level asset dummies. Model (2) removes the highest outlier from the sample. Probit marginal effects for 
Model (3); Poverty Dummy takes value of unity when household owns not more than one of the three most 
common assets (phone, radio, bicycle) and not more than one improved house feature (iron roof, brick wall, 
cement floor). Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. Additional controls include Age household head, Male 
household head, Education household head, Single, Household size, Female participant, Mothers in house, Watch 
TV weekly, Read newspaper weekly.  
 
variation in adoption across households. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate a 
positive correlation between wealth and adoption. This relation may 
possibly be non-linear (column 1), but a linear relation ensues when we 
omit two outlier from the sample (see column 2). The finding that 
relatively wealthy households are more likely to adopt formal insurance is 
confirmed in columns (3) and (4), where we replace the wealth variables 
with a poverty dummy. We report probit marginal effects, so poor 
households are 20% less likely to adopt health insurance than non-poor 
households in access villages.56 
We next explain how the introduction or formal insurance affects play in 
the PG game. We first use the number of tokens shared as the dependent 
variable, and examine how this quantity varies with access status. Our 
access dummy captures whether or not a respondent’s household resides in 
                                      
56 This finding is confirmed by abundant anecdotal evidence. Many respondents cite 
‘financial problems’ as the main reason for not purchasing the insurance. They claim that 
their income is too low in comparison to the fee, and would have joined the scheme ‘if only 
they had more money.’ Others state that they would join if there was a ‘reduction on the 
fee that SHU asks from them’, or stress that they ‘joined but paid half of the money’, and 
thus could not benefit from the insurance coverage. 
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a village that has an active CHF scheme, regardless of its own adoption 
status. Results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) shows the results of 
the Heckman selection model, which controls for possible non-random 
attrition. Of 440 households interviewed, only 409 correct household 
representatives showed up for the afternoon PG game session. The other 
31 participants were substituted by a random villager that was not a 
member of any of the interviewed households. While some observed 
characteristics affect the likelihood of showing up (that is, if the household 
head is male, or if the randomly selected respondent is female), the 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant. In other 
words, there is no detectable self-selection bias into the experiment, and it 
is therefore safe to estimate the model using OLS and Probit. Respondents 
with access to the formal insurance share on average fewer tokens than 
their counterparts, consistent with findings by Klohn and Strupat (2013). 
Using a Poisson model yields similarly significant results (details available 
on request).  
In columns (2-4) we attempt to go further and identify who is responsible 
for the lower PG contributions—adopters or non-adopters. While one may 
expect that adopters will reduce their contribution to the PG—as they 
have less use for social capital in the future—our empirical results are 
different. Lower public good contributions are driven by relatively lower 
contributions of non-adopters. On average, non-adopters with access to the 
formal insurance contribute about 0.4 tokens less than respondents without 
access, or over ¼ of a standard deviation. In column (3) we cluster 
standard errors at the village level, which only slightly increases the 
standard errors. In column (4) we distinguish between households that 
have paid their premium (eligible to benefit from the insurance) and those 
that have only paid in part. Again, non-participants drive the reduction in 
contributions. 
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Table 3: Sharing in the public goods game 
 Shared ShareHi=1 
 Heckman OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Access -0.307**    -0.093**   
 (0.148)    (0.045)   
Adopter  -0.188 -0.188   0.082  
  (0.170) (0.185)   (0.057)  
Full payment    0.008   0.049 
    (0.352)   (0.132) 
Partial payment    -0.234   -0.112* 
    (0.192)   (0.054) 
Nonadopter  -0.402** -0.402* -0.402*  -0.101** -0.101** 
  (0.186) (0.226) (0.226)  (0.046) (0.046) 
Mills Lambda  
-0.798 
(0.819) 
      
Cluster robust 
s.e. 
N N 44 44 44 44 44 
Observations 440 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Pseudo R2 and R2  0.012 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.013 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (5-7). Two-stage Heckman Selection 
Model is used in (1) to assess non-random attrition in the experimental sample. Excluded instruments in the 
selection stage include: Insurance adopter, Poverty dummy, Male household head, Education household head, 
Household size, Female participant, Watch TV weekly, Read newspaper weekly. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 
95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Similarly, when we try to explain the incidence of high contributions (that 
is, the contribution of 4 or 5 tokens), the finding that there are fewer high 
contributors in access areas (column 5) is driven by non-adopters (columns 
6 and 7). They are 33% less likely to be high contributors, again 
representing about ¼ of a standard deviation. 
Other factors may explain both adoption and contribution rates. Table 2, 
for instance, shows that non-adoption is primarily explained by wealth—
poor households are significantly less likely to adopt insurance. If poorer 
households systematically contribute less to the common pot, the 
correlations in Table 3 may be spurious. To attenuate this concern we next 
use information about the propensity to be a non-adopter (based on the 
regression results in column (4) in Table 2). This enables us to compare 
“predicted non-adopters” in access areas to “predicted non-adopters” in 
no-access areas.  
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The results of the follow-up step are reported in Table 4. In column (1) we 
zoom in on access areas, and demonstrate that predicted non-adopters are 
less likely to share a high fraction of their tokens in the PG game. These 
results, of course, echo those in Table 3. However, when estimating the 
same model for the sub-sample of respondents with no-access, we find that 
the sign of the coefficient of interest changes–from negative to positive 
(column 2). Predicted non-adopters without access are more likely to 
contribute 4 or 5 tokens to the common pot. This may reflect the greater 
importance attached to social capital by relatively poor households. Upon 
pooling the data and including an interaction term (predicted non-
adoption probability multiplied by insurance access), we can capture these 
results in one specification. According to results in columns (3) and (5), 
predicted non-adopters in no-access areas are more likely to contribute 
more to the common pot, but this is not true for predicted non-adopters 
living in parishes with an active formal insurance scheme—the interaction 
effect dominates the level effect of predicted non-adoption. Results in (3) 
are robust to clustering at the parish level (8) instead of the village level 
(44), using wild bootstrap inference to correct for the small number of 
clusters (Cameron et al., 2008).  
As an alternative approach, in columns (4) and (6) we use Propensity 
Score Matching to compare non-adopters to credibly similar counterparts 
in no-access areas, thus excluding the 106 adopters from the analysis. The 
average treatment effect obtained through nearest neighbor matching is 
consistent with previous findings. Matching is based on the same variables 
of column (2), Table 4. A logit model is used to calculate propensity 
scores. Balancing properties are satisfied for all matching variables, in each 
of the 5 blocks of equal score range. Also, the mean propensity score in 
each block is not different for non-adopters (in this setting, the ‘treated’) 
and no-access participants (‘controls’). The predicted scores range between 
0.044 and 0.688 for non-treated and between 0.045 and 0.602 for controls, 
so the common support region ranges between 0.045 and 0.602 (suggesting  
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Table 4: Predicted non-adoption and sharing in the public goods game 
 ShareHi=1 Shared 
 Probit Probit Probit PSM OLS PSM 
 Access No-access Pooled PSM Pooled Pooled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pr(NA) -0.381** 0.328* 0.323*  0.837  
 (0.193) (0.189) (0.184)  (0.569)  
Access   0.259**  0.451  
   (0.115)  (0.373)  
Access x Pr(NA)   -0.710***  -1.344*  
   (0.267)  (0.729)  
Nonadopter    -0.105         -0.402** 
    (0.058)  (0.186) 
Cluster Robust s.e. 21 23 44 N 44 N 
Observations 185 184 369 185 369 303 
Pseudo R2 and R2 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.006  
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; probit marginal effects in (1-3). Average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) using nearest neighbor matching with random draw. The propensity score in (4) and (6) is 
calculated on: Poverty dummy, Age household head, Male household head, Education household head, Single, 
Household size, Female participant, Mothers in house, Watch TV weekly, Read newspaper weekly (see Table 2, 
column 4); the same variables are used to predict Non-adoption in columns (1-3) and (5). Clustering at the Parish 
level in (3), and correcting for the small number of clusters following Cameron et al. (2008), yields a P-value of 
0.020 for the interaction term, significant at the 5% level. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
adequate overlap between groups). Restricting the analysis to the common 
support region (N=265, 70 treated and 195 controls) yields an ATT of -
0.063 in (4), insignificant, and -0.349 in (6), significant at the 10% level. 
Kernel matching with bootstrapped standard errors yields similar results 
to Table 4. 
We interpret these findings as tentative evidence that the results in Table 3 
are not driven by spurious correlation. Non-adopters do not contribute less 
in public good games because they are poor, but because of the interaction 
between poverty and formal insurance availability. This is fully consistent 
with the perspective on insurance-related arrangements embedded in a 
broader social structure. Those villagers left behind after the relatively 
wealthy have adopted insurance signal their discontent by foregoing 
cooperation in other domains of social interaction. 
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 Conclusions 5.6
Social capital is a key determinant of the ability of communities to 
overcome social dilemmas, and fostering social capital has become a policy 
goal in and of itself. For example, Fearon et al. (2010) demonstrate that 
outside innovations may facilitate investments in social capital. However, 
not all interventions have such benign effects. Specifically, interventions 
which benefit a subsample of the population may weaken mutual 
dependencies and erode social capital. Our study provides evidence to 
support this latter interpretation—our data are consistent with a broad 
perspective on social interactions, where reduced inter-dependencies in one 
domain (informal insurance) invite behavioral changes in other domains 
(public good contributions).  
Formal insurance provides a substitute for informal insurance, crowding 
out social capital. Anecdotally, we find evidence of such dynamics in our 
open-ended questionnaire. Respondents lament that, since the introduction 
of the formal insurance, some of the informal risk sharing mechanisms have 
deteriorated. A non-adopter states that, in contrast to insurance holders, 
when she fell sick she had to ‘totally cater for herself.’ Another respondent 
claims that someone ‘had joined SHU, and therefore refused to help a 
neighbor who had a sick son.’ In the words of other respondents, the 
insurance scheme ‘spoils care for those who can’t pay for the scheme,’ and 
‘if you are not a member you are not catered for.’  But the deterioration of 
mutual assistance works both ways. Various respondents emphasize that 
(non-adopting) neighbors refuse to take insurance holders to the hospital 
(even if transport costs are typically not part of the insurance package). 
Another respondent mentions the case of a pregnant woman whom ‘people 
refused to help, because she is in the insurance.’  Apparently the non-
adopters are not passively undergoing their plight—they take action and 
signal their discontent by ceasing cooperation in other domains, in an 
effort to “discipline” adopters. 
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Indeed, one important new finding of our study is that the erosion of social 
capital is not primarily caused by adopting community members – those 
respondents who may opt out of the insurance network. Instead, the 
deterioration of social capital in our field experiments is fully explained by 
a behavioral response of non-adopters.  
In light of the widely-recognized importance of social capital (and informal 
institutions more generally) as a determinant of economic outcomes, we 
speculate that a “weapons of the weak perspective” on outside 
interventions may be relevant. Indeed, there may be cases where welfare 
analysis (based on CGE models or otherwise) should be augmented to 
explicitly consider social embeddedness—private cost-benefit ratios 
associated with specific innovations may fail to accurately predict patterns 
of adoption. Similarly, policy makers should not underestimate the power 
of the weapons of the weak in shaping policy outcomes—welfare 
externalities might be far reaching and tough to predict. 
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Appendix 
Variable definitions: 
Female participant. Takes value of 1 if selected game participant is female, 0 otherwise. 
Single. Marital status household head single = 1, 0 otherwise 
Married/Engaged. Marital status household head married or engaged = 1, 0 otherwise. 
Widowed. Marital status household head widowed = 1, 0 otherwise 
Age household head. Age of the household head in years, rounded down to the last 
birthday. 
Male household head. Takes value 1 if household head is male, 0 otherwise 
Education household head: takes value 1 if household head has completed primary school. 
Household size: number of people that usually eat at least one daily meal together with 
the household head, acknowledging its authority and living with the rest of the household. 
Mothers in house: takes value of 1 if the household comprises at least one pregnant 
woman or mother taking care of a child at present time, 0 otherwise 
Watch TV weekly: takes value of 1 if the household head declares to watch TV at least 
once a week, 0 otherwise. 
Read newspaper weekly: takes value of 1 if the household head declares to read the 
newspaper at least once a week, 0 otherwise 
Radio. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of radio, 0 otherwise 
Phone. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of phone, 0 otherwise 
Bicycle. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of bicycle, 0 otherwise 
Motorbike. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of motorbike, 0 otherwise. 
Television. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of television, 0 otherwise. 
Car. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of car, 0 otherwise 
Generator. Takes value of 1 if the household possesses any type of electricity generator, 0 
otherwise. 
Wealth. A principal factor obtained by factor analysis following Sahn and Stifel (2003), 
from the abovementioned asset list (radio to generator) possessed by the household  
House features index. Is the sum of three dummy variables representing improved house 
features, i.e. iron roof, brick wall, cement floor 
Common assets index. Is the sum of three dummy variables representing the three most 
common assets, i.e. radio, phone and bicycle 
Poor. Takes value of 1 if the household scores 1 or less in the House Features Index and 
scores 1 or less in the Common assets index, 0 otherwise 
Adopter. Takes value 1 if a household is residing in a parish (village) with an active and 
running CHF insurance scheme, and adopted the insurance; 0 otherwise 
Non-adopter. Takes value 1 if a household is residing in a parish (village) with an active 
and running CHF insurance scheme, and knowingly renounced participation; 0 otherwise. 
Full payment. Takes value of 1 if a household that adopted the CHF insurance scheme has 
fully paid the due premium, 0 otherwise. 
Partial payment. Takes value of 1 if a household that adopted the CHF insurance scheme 
has only partially paid the due premium, 0 otherwise. 
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Access. The sum of Adopter and Non-adopter. It takes value 1 if the household has access 
to the formal insurance, regardless of its adoption status; 0 otherwise . 
Shared. Is the number of tokens contributed to the common pot of the public goods game 
by a given participant, minimum is 0 and maximum is 5. 
ShareHi. Takes value 1 if the participant has contributed 4 or 5 tokens to the common pot 
of the PG game—i.e. one standard deviation or more above the average –, 0 otherwise. 
Pr(NA). The probability of adoption as predicted for respondents from access areas, based 
on the individual and household level characteristics of column (4), Table 2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Statutory Law and Customary Change  
a Lab-in-Field Experiment in Ethiopia 
 
 
Abstract 
Through a lab-in-field experiment with villagers and real 
customary judges in Ethiopia, we test the hypothesis that 
customary courts strategically adapt arbitration outcomes 
if they face increased competition by the formal law. We 
show that introducing a costly legal fallback reduces 
arbitration biases and draws the decisions of customary 
judges significantly closer to the formal law. At the same 
time, agents disfavored by the custom do not take 
advantage of their increased bargaining power. Our results 
suggest that local customary dispute resolution institutions 
may have a role to play in shifting preexisting customs 
towards a desired outcome. In areas where formal legal 
institutions have limited outreach, most effects of 
increased competition between formal law and customary 
legal institutions may rise from changes in the latter, 
rather than from plaintiffs seeking justice under the rule 
of law. 
 
Publication status: Cecchi, F., and M. B. Melesse, 2014. Statutory Law and Customary 
Change: a Lab-in-Field Experiment in Ethiopia. Working paper.  
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 Introduction 6.1
Formal laws play a marginal role in governing the lives of many African 
citizens, particularly those residing in rural areas (Chirayath et al., 2006). 
Instead, customary legal systems provide prompt, accessible and culturally 
coherent justice services (Wojkowska, 2006). Customary courts oversee and 
enforce customs and informal rules of behavior, typically taking into 
account local egalitarian and redistributive norms (Platteau, 2000). Their 
adherence to minimum standards of justice and human rights remains 
nevertheless disputed. Customary courts may persistently discriminate 
against the underprivileged, entrenching mechanisms that perpetuate local 
power structures (e.g. Ordioni, 2005; Asfaw and Satterfield, 2010; 
Pimentel, 2010). Local gender biases, for instance, may affect the 
distributional decisions of customary dispute resolution institutions (Asfaw 
and Satterfield, 2010). Understanding the effects of increased 
competitiveness of formal law in predominantly customary institutional 
environments is therefore central to achieving fair and functional legal 
systems—a primary driver of economic development (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). Yet, data on extrajudicial and customary 
disputes are rarely available (Landeo et al., 2007), and the interaction 
between customary legal institutions and formal law has been subjected to 
little rigorous empirical analysis so far.  
The work of Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013) in Liberia is a notable exception. 
They find that the demand for mediation by paralegals trained in formal 
law are greater for plaintiffs disadvantaged by the customary system, and 
that direct access to the formal law results in strong socioeconomic gains 
for the underprivileged. Increased competition of formal law may 
nonetheless also foster indirect changes to the norms enforced by 
customary dispute resolution institutions. These indirect effects are 
particularly salient if agents face strong disincentives to appeal to formal 
legal institutions—e.g. if customary norms are backed by credible social 
sanctioning against defection and appeal to alternative forums. If those 
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disadvantaged by the customary system fear that overruling its decisions 
may be costly, thus complying with preexisting customs even when the law 
is individually preferred, much of the direct socioeconomic gains may be 
dissipated. Aldashev et al. (2012a, 2012b) provide clear theoretical 
predictions on the evolution of customary legal outcomes induced by the 
introduction or empowerment of formal laws. If customary authorities fear 
jurisdictional and reputational erosion, 57  they may strategically adapt 
arbitration outcomes in response to the introduction of a competing formal 
law.   
In this paper we empirically investigate the hypothesis by Aldashev et al. 
(2012a, 2012b). Through a lab-in-field experiment in rural Ethiopia – 
where controversies are habitually settled through customary courts – we 
study the effects of introducing a costly legal fallback, on the arbitration 
decisions of local customary judges and the behavior of plaintiffs. In West 
Gojjam, we randomly select 60 customary judges, known among the local 
Amhara people as Shimagelle, to rule over controversies born from an 
ultimatum game with outside option, played by 532 villagers. For a 
random subsample, we allow participants to further appeal the arbitration 
through a costly fixed law. While some studies have looked at the influence 
of extraneous factors on formal judicial rulings (e.g. Danziger et al., 2011), 
the relative scarcity of naturally occurring data on customary rulings has 
limited their analysis. By bringing the lab into the field (see List, 2007), 
this work is the first to bridge this gap, studying the arbitration decisions 
of real Ethiopian customary judges. 
In line with previous literature, we find evidence of significant arbitration 
bias against female participants, and in favor of plaintiffs known by the 
                                      
57 Jurisdiction erodes as plaintiffs begin to use formal courts instead of customary forums. 
In so far as customary judges face a positive utility in ruling over a controversy, 
jurisdictional erosion will reduce their utility. Moreover, customary judges may face an 
intrinsic disutility in seeing their decision overruled. Reputation thus erodes when plaintiffs 
reject the customary arbitration decision and appeal to formal legislation.  
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customary judge and advantaged by the egalitarian custom. Our main 
finding is that introducing a legal fallback reduces such biases, and that 
customary arbitration outcomes are drawn significantly closer to the 
formal law. Furthermore, we find that agents disfavored by the custom do 
not take direct advantage of the increased bargaining power offered by the 
legal fallback. In equilibrium, only a fraction of them make direct use of 
the formal law. These results complement the work of Sandefur and Siddiqi 
(2013), and highlight the importance of indirect customary responses to 
the increased competitiveness of the formal law. The “threat of law” may 
induce significant gains for those disfavored by the custom, even if they do 
not actively seek justice under the rule of law. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the 
literature on formal law and customary institutions. Section 6.3 provides a 
brief account of the Ethiopian institutional context and legal system. 
Section 6.4 outlines the experimental design. Section 6.5 discusses the 
empirical strategy. Section 6.6 illustrates the results, and Section 6.7 
concludes. 
 Customs, legal institutions, and the law 6.2
Legal institutions encompass both formal and informal structures, and are 
central to enforcing the “rules of the game” that govern everyday life 
(North, 1990). Formal legal institutions typically preside over written 
constraints, such as statutory laws and constitutions—prescribed and 
enforced by exogenous legislative authorities. Customary legal institutions, 
instead, oversee the ‘codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions’ 
that take form in a particular social setting (North, 1990: 36). Yet, formal 
and informal legal systems are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
often coexist and overlap to a considerable extent. Legal pluralism is thus 
prevalent in numerous countries and regions worldwide, including large 
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portions of sub-Saharan Africa (Merry, 1988; Bennett, 2006; Tamanaha, 
2008).58 
The norms upheld by customary legal institution typically represent 
fairness standards intended at maintaining peace and social cohesion, but 
may also result in systematic discrimination against certain disadvantaged 
categories. In either case, they may have substantial consequences on 
investment decisions and long-run growth (Platteau, 2009; Baland et al., 
2011).59 However, replacing undesired customary norms with the rule of 
law has proven to be a complex and daunting exercise (e.g. Andre and 
Platteau, 1998; Kuyu, 2005; Sacco, 2008). Formal legal institutions will not 
successfully replace incompatible or unwanted customary norms, unless 
they become a “focal point” of convergence in the expectations of agents 
(Basu, 2000; Aoki, 2001b; Greif, 2006). In the presence of preexisting 
customary focal points, the fear of social punishment inhibits the 
consolidation of formal laws that contradict such customs. In fact, norms 
influence behavior not only through internal incentives (e.g. guilt aversion, 
or a taste for moral virtuousness), but also through external ones (Polinsky 
and Shavell, 2007). People may be willing to punish non-compliers even if 
the punishment is costly and doesn’t yield direct private benefits (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). As a result, agents find it harder to deviate from norm-
compliant behavior even when the law is individually preferred. This is 
especially true for rural communities, where social pressure and sanctioning 
are more pervasive, and the cost of social exclusion is greater (e.g. Crook, 
2004; Gedzi, 2012). 
                                      
58 In what follows, we use the terms “customary” and “informal” as synonyms. “Statutory 
law” and “formal law” are also used interchangeably. 
59 Customary norms may also add to the uncertainty over property rights, in turn 
affecting the investment decisions of individuals. Goldstein and Udry (2008), for instance, 
find that competing claims and higher insecurity of tenure over specific plots cultivated by 
a given individual correspond to lower intensity of investments on those plots. 
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While certainly a source of institutional “stickiness”, customary legal 
institutions need not to necessarily discourage institutional change (see 
Boettke et al., 2008). Instead, they are often crucial to the functioning of 
formal institutions—such as the legal system (Platteau, 2000; Aoki, 
2001b). Their interaction with statutory law has thus surfaced as a pivotal 
issue to effectively reach the objectives sought by legislators (Richman, 
2012). Several theoretical studies have examined this interaction (Greif and 
Laitin, 2004; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Dixit, 2007; Dhillon and Rigolini, 
2011; Aldashev et al., 2012a, 2012b). Typically, these studies focus on the 
behavior of agents, not institutions. Formal laws alter the net benefit of 
adhesion to prevailing norms – affecting the bargaining power and fallback 
position of economic agents – such that established patterns of behavior 
may evolve. Studies empirically investigating the empowerment of formal 
laws are somewhat less prevalent. Banerjee et al. (2002), for instance, 
study the effects of a land tenancy reform in West Bengal. They find that 
the increased bargaining power that the tenants acquire, once a legal 
fallback is introduced, has positive effects on productivity, whilst arbitrary 
evictions by landlords all but disappear.60  
Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013) propose a “forum shopping” model in which 
plaintiffs choose between the customary and formal systems based on 
rational tradeoffs. If plaintiffs face high entry costs to the formal legal 
system, they will bring their cases to customary forums even when these 
are systematically biased against them. After providing evidence of such 
barriers to access in Liberia, they investigate the outcomes of a randomized 
intervention that increases the competition between formal and customary 
law by offering complimentary mediation and advocacy services through 
community paralegals trained in the formal law. They find that female and 
                                      
60 The theoretical model underpinning these findings, however, assumes that the legal 
innovation replaces a sort of institutional vacuum, in which “landlords wielded a lot of 
power within the village and were therefore able to intimidate tenants” (Banerjee et al., 
2002: p. 242).  
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ethnic minority plaintiffs – facing poor odds in the customary system – are 
more likely to adopt and to be satisfied with the paralegal service, and 
that the program increases average household wellbeing. Nonetheless, less 
than 10% of the recorded cases where brought to the attention of 
paralegals. The relatively low pick-up of complimentary paralegal services, 
even among self-selected paralegal clients,61 may be an indication of social 
sanctioning dynamics that create strong disincentives to appeal to any 
authority alternative to customary ones. Under such constraints much of 
the socioeconomic gains of increased outreach may be dissipated, unless 
increased competition of formal law produces indirect changes in 
customary arbitrations. 
Aldashev et al. (2012a, 2012b) provide clear theoretical predictions on the 
evolution of customary legal outcomes induced by the introduction or 
empowerment of formal laws. Central to their argument is that not only 
agents, but also customary institutions respond to incentive structures. In 
fact, if customary judges insist on imposing custom-compliant outcomes 
once the legal fallback is introduced, they do not only increase the 
likelihood of appeal to the formal law by unsatisfied plaintiffs, but also the 
distance between the expected outcome and the custom. Provided the 
formal law is not too radical – i.e. it is not excessively costly for customary 
judges to deviate from the preferred arbitration outcome – increasing its 
competitiveness will thus shift the conflicting custom in the direction 
intended by the legislator. The law, therefore, does not only provide a 
direct alternative to customary dispute resolution institutions; it also 
changes the custom—indirectly improving the welfare of the disadvantaged 
sections of the population (Aldashev et al., 2012a, 2012b). In this paper we 
empirically investigate this hypothesis by observing the arbitration 
                                      
61  Their sample stems from a sub-category of villagers that had self-selected into 
contacting the paralegals before the baseline. It represents a “snapshot of potential 
paralegal clients, and therefore not representative of Liberians as a whole” (Sandefur and 
Siddiqi, 2013: p. 28). 
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outcomes stemming from real customary judges in rural Ethiopia, half of 
which face the risk of seeing their decisions overruled by a fixed law. To 
this end, we formulate the following research questions: 
RQ1: Are post-arbitration payouts to agents disfavored by 
custom downwardly biased?  
RQ2: Are biases against agents disfavored by the custom 
reduced by the legal fallback? 
RQ3: Does increased competition by the formal law draw 
customary arbitration decisions closer to the law itself? 
RQ4: Do disfavored agents take advantage of the 
increased bargaining power created by the legal fallback? 
 Legal institutions in Ethiopia 6.3
Ethiopia is home to more than sixty customary legal systems (Donovan 
and Assefa, 2003). Statutory law was first introduced in the 1950s, and 
customary institutions remain very vibrant. The formal legal system is far 
from penetrating and, since the mid-nineties, the government is committed 
to recognize and preserve local customary dispute resolution authorities. 
Most Ethiopian ethnic groups have their own customary systems for 
dispute settlement and conflict resolution. Famous examples include the 
Shimagelle system of the Amhara, the Gadaa system of the Oromo and 
Sharia courts of Muslim communities. In this paper, we investigate 
Amhara’s Shimagelle system, which contains elements of customary law 
practices that are very much in use across the whole country. This 
traditional institution can best be viewed in line with principles of 
arbitration, where the arbitrators are mostly religious leaders and village 
elders who review existing evidence and arguments from both sides and 
issue a verdict to settle the case based on customary norms. The fact that 
customary judges are local elders and religious leaders ensures that 
arbitration outcomes are strongly embedded into community dynamics. 
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This in turn favors the enforcement of deliberations, but also provides 
strong disincentives to use alternative forums, such as formal courts. 
Typically, the adjudication proceeds focusing on narrowing of differences 
through negotiations, rather than through adversarial procedures. The 
verdict may vary depending on the nature and gravity of the dispute, 
ranging from a simple apology for petty disputes, to blood money for 
homicide crimes. At the end of the dispute resolution, the restoration of 
prior relationships is marked through customary rituals or ceremonies to 
which both parties take part. Once the arbitrators have held their verdict, 
they closely monitor its enforcement. Nominally, arbitrators lack the 
coercive powers of the formal law to ensure compliance; however, they rely 
effectively on the presence of social pressure and sanctions to enforce their 
decisions. A party failing to abide by the outcomes will be considered as 
insulting the arbitrators and will be shunned by the community. Social 
sanctions – including ostracism by neighbors and friends – and loss of 
reputation soon follow. 
Shimagelle are expected to provide their services without an explicit fee. 
Yet, there are several individualistic as well as altruistic reasons for the 
engagement of customary judges in dispute settlement. First, they are 
motivated by social recognition. Among the Amhara, there is a tradition of 
holding a special funeral ceremony for those who are believed to have 
played an important role for their community. Elders often serve their 
community hoping that they will be mourned accordingly. Second, in such 
strictly hierarchal communities, arbitration is an age-ascribed role, that 
provides a mix of status and responsibility. Third, arbitrators are expected 
to ensure the welfare of both parties and, through that, the wellbeing of 
the community. Fourth, the vast majority of Shimagelle serve some sort of 
religious function too, and being recognized as a Shimagelle is a signal of 
piousness and righteousness. While accounting for religious scriptures, local 
norms and customs, deliberations will therefore reflect the need of 
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customary judges to maintain their reputation, reaffirm their social and 
moral standing, and minimize potential jurisdictional erosion. 
The official status of Ethiopia’s customary courts has not been unequivocal 
in the legal history of the country. Both the Imperial and Derg regimes 
opted for a centralized legal approach that did not embrace legal pluralism. 
Only since 1995 does the state recognize customary legal systems (Gopal 
and Salim, 1998).62 The jurisdiction of customary courts is accepted as long 
as both parties to the dispute give their consent to be heard at customary 
forums, and the verdicts thereof are in conformity with human rights 
provisions. The Constitution preserves the mandate to adjudicate criminal 
matters solely through the formal law, but customary courts enjoy de facto 
wider jurisdictions—spanning from petty offences, land tenure and 
inheritance issues, to violent crimes and homicide. In many respects, 
Ethiopian customary institutions stand out as more functional and 
powerful than statutory law. The political stalemate that followed the 
country’s 2005 general election, for example, was ultimately settled 
through the arbitration of selected Shimagelle.  
The relative dominance of Ethiopian customary institutions is in fact 
related to the problems encountered by the formal legal system. First 
instance courts are available in every Woreda (district), averaging 
approximately 100,000 people per tribunal (Guttman et al., 2004). 
However, as is true for much of Africa, the formal legal system in Ethiopia 
is regularly reproached as dysfunctional and inaccessible to ordinary people 
(Gowak, 2008; Asfaw and Satterfield, 2010). Moreover, the formal legal 
system is limited by the overload generated by the lack of physical 
resources, personnel, infrastructure and inadequate information systems 
(B. Baker, 2013): access to formal justice can be a daunting task for the 
average Ethiopian. Statutory law is often perceived as costly to access and 
                                      
62 The provisions of the Constitution embracing legal pluralism are provided under Articles 
34(5) and 78(5). 
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punitive – rather than conciliatory – and regularly fails to deliver proper 
redress to aggrieved parties (Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2013). In contrast, 
customary courts provide prompt and accessible dispute resolution 
mechanisms. However, their capacity to produce unbiased sentencing is 
contested. Asfaw and Satterfield (2010) study land and property dispute 
settlements by Shimagelle in the Zeghie Peninsula, in the Amhara region. 
They find that the formal justice system is both inaccessible and 
dysfunctional, while customary arbitration outcomes are largely 
unfavorable to women. This in turn reinforces gender inequality and 
entrenches local power relations. 
 Experimental design 6.4
6.4.1 Sample and setting 
We develop a multi-stage laboratory experiment involving 532 villagers and 
60 real local Shimagelle. Participants belong to 18 Kebele (municipalities) 
of West Gojjam, in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. At each of the fifteen 
game-sessions, 4 customary judges were randomly selected from a pool of 
well-established local Shimagelle. The villagers belong to a list of randomly 
selected farmers responding to an agriculture-productivity related survey, 
administered in the same area in the previous year. Respondents are the 
main income earners (household heads), 92% are male, they average 43 
years of age, and have slightly more than two completed years of formal 
education. Households are comprised of about 6 family members, and 
almost the entire sample is orthodox Christian. 82% of respondents take 
part in at least one informal safety net mechanism. Table 1 reports balance 
statistics for individual and experimental characteristics by treatment. No 
variable differs significantly at the 5% level, indicating a successful 
treatment randomization. The slight difference in sample size across  
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Table 1: Balance and summary statistics for the experimental samples 
Variable 
Customary only 
(N=252) 
Customary + Law 
(N=280) 
Diff. Std. Err. 
Male (%) 93.7 89.6 4.1 (2.40)* 
Age 43.1 43.9 -0.8 (0.97) 
Married (%) 92.5 91.1 1.4 (2.40) 
Orthodox (%) 98.8 97.1 1.7 (1.24) 
Education 2.6 2.3 0.3 (0.16) 
Household size 6.4 6.2 0.2 (0.18) 
Non-farm income 0.2 0.2 0.0 (0.03) 
Informal safety nets (%) 81.3 84.3 3.0 (3.33) 
First risk game (selected ball) 26.4 24.0 2.4 (2.31) 
Second risk game (invested %) 46.4 46.6 0.2 (0.22) 
Private Endowment 118.9 125.8 -6.7 (4.88) 
Joint venture endowment 276.5 289.8 -13.3 (10.22) 
Notes: Group means; t-test. Confidence:  *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
treatments is due to the randomization at game-session level. This ensured 
that villagers and judges participating in the same game-session were all 
instructed on the same treatment, minimizing potential spill-overs and 
confusion.63  
The experiment was comprised of four stages: (1) private investment; (2) 
joint venture; (3) ultimatum game with arbitration by a customary judge 
as outside option; and (4) the application of the formal law treatment.  
6.4.2 Private investments and joint venture  
The first two stages only involved villagers (from here onwards called 
agents), not the judges. In our setting, ultimatum offer rejections are a 
necessary premise to arbitration by customary judges. We make use of 
previous findings in economic literature to increase the likelihood of 
litigation in each anonymous pair, without biasing the randomness of 
                                      
63 We randomly selected participants from a list of 612 farmers that had responded to an 
agriculture-productivity related survey the previous year. Sampling halted once at least 
250 villagers had participated in each treatment. Random re-sampling ensured 
insignificant attrition bias: participants and non-participants show no significant 
differences (see Appendix A1). 
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relative endowment assignments. Agents were randomly allotted an 
endowment of either 80 or 120 tokens,64 and made two individual risky 
investment decisions that could increase or decrease the endowment. By 
having each agent make private investment choices, we made use of the so-
called “earned endowment effect”: people exhibit more self-interested 
behavior in bargaining and sharing games when relative wealth is earned in 
some way rather than obtained through a pure windfall gain (e.g. Gantner 
et al., 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Frohlich et al., 2004; Oxoby and Spraggon, 
2008). The first risk game combined the design of Eckel and Grossman 
(2002) with that of Holt and Laury (2002).65 The resulting endowment was 
then used in the second game, which followed Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
Agents decided how much of their endowment to invest in a lottery with 
50% probability of doubling and 50% probability of halving the invested 
amount. To further strengthen a sense of ownership with respect to the 
endowment (see Kahneman et al., 1990), at the end of this stage agents 
were given a sleek and colorful endowment card, reporting private earnings. 
The second stage of the experiment involved paired anonymous decisions, 
and took place the following day. Agents were assigned to a randomly 
selected anonymous partner with higher or lower private endowment. They 
merged their individual endowments and jointly decided about the same 
risky investments mentioned above.66 On average “higher investors” (i.e. 
participants contributing a higher share in the joint venture) contributed 
two thirds of the joint capital, while “lower investors” contributed the 
                                      
64  Each token was worth 0.5 Birr, resulting in endowments of USD 2.2 and 3.3 
respectively, or around twice the average daily income in the area. 
65 Agents selected one out of eight balls, with exponentially increasing value from 1 to 128, 
as their winning prize. They then drew one ball from a bag containing all eight balls: if the 
extracted ball was worth at least as much as the selected ball, they won the value on the 
selected ball; if the extracted ball was worth less than the selected ball, they would lose 
the amount specified on the extracted ball (see Appendix Table A2). 
66 The rationale of repeating choices in a paired setting follows that of intra-household 
bargaining literature (e.g. Bateman and Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2012; He et al., 
2012). 
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remaining third.67 In other words, one agent typically invested twice as 
many stakes as their partner.68 We expect such endowment heterogeneity 
to lower ultimatum offers in the next stage (Cherry et al., 2005). 
Particularly, we expect high endowment agents to prefer offers proportional 
to investment shares, and low endowment individuals to prefer egalitarian 
redistributions (Rutström and Williams, 2000). Pairs could bargain on 
their investment choices for up to eighteen rounds, through oral messages 
collected and delivered by experimenters. On average, 4.5 counteroffers 
were made across the two games, with a maximum of fourteen bargaining 
rounds before reaching an investment agreement. Once the joint 
investments were completed, the next task was to split the final outcome 
through an ultimatum game––the source of our experimentally induced 
litigations.  
6.4.3 Ultimatum and arbitration 
In the third stage, pairs play an ultimatum game with outside option (see 
Güth et al., 1982; Schmitt, 2004). One agent was randomly selected to 
become an ultimatum sender, the other one becoming the receiver. The 
sender was asked to make a split offer, which the receiver could either 
accept or reject. In case the offer was rejected, a randomly assigned local 
Shimagelle would mediate a resolution to the litigation. The customary 
judge independently studied the game history of each player and made an 
independent arbitration verdict. The verdict overruled the ultimatum offer, 
                                      
67 “Higher investors” had an average private endowment of 165 tokens, “lower investors” 
80. 
68 By design the risk propensity of each agent should not significantly influence the 
likelihood of being paired with a higher or a lower endowed partner (because of the 
random assignment of initial endowments). We test such assumption through a Pearson’s 
Chi-squared test and find no evidence of significant correlation, with p=0.611 and p=0.303 
for the first and second game respectively. Individual risk preferences are thus not 
correlated with the relative size of the investment in the joint venture. 
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and imposed a new division of the joint venture capital.69 Before the 
ultimatum decision, experimenters exposed the name of the assigned 
customary judge, and stressed that in case of arbitration the judge would 
be informed about the players’ names. While joint venture partners 
remained anonymous to each other throughout the game, the arbitration 
process was thus non-anonymous (although strictly confidential).  
The non-anonymity of arbitration ensured that decisions of agents and 
customary judges were rooted into local reputational dynamics. We expect 
the experiment to reproduce disincentives to deviate from norm-compliant 
behavior, closely related to those faced by agents in their daily life.70 
Similarly, we expect systematic biases in arbitration decisions to reflect the 
customary favoritisms present in our setting (e.g. biases against women 
and in favor of well-known plaintiffs). On top of this, random relative 
endowment heterogeneity offers an experimentally generated source of 
discrimination. In the absence of a legal fallback, we expect arbitration 
decisions to mimic local egalitarian norms (Henrich et al., 2006), 
exogenously disfavoring those who invested a higher share of the capital.  
6.4.4 The legal fallback 
For about half of the game sessions, the game ended with the decision of 
the customary judge. The remaining sessions also included a fourth stage, 
consisting in the application of the formal law treatment. Agents could 
reject the arbitration outcome by appealing to a costly fixed law. At the 
cost of 10% of the final joint capital – a fictional measure of the costs 
                                      
69 Throughout the first and second stage of the experiment, customary judges where 
trained on understanding the game process and implications. The training only halted 
once each customary judge was able to individually explain the game procedure without 
external assistance. 
70 Henrich et al. (2006) show that ultimatum bargaining behavior mirrors local egalitarian 
and redistributive norms. They observe that laboratory behavior is consistent with 
economic patterns of everyday life in several small-scale societies, and that community 
characteristics explain experimental patterns better than individual level variation. 
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related to formal legal litigation – the law divided the joint venture capital 
according to initial investment shares. This rule, known as liquidating 
dividend policy, dates back to sixteenth century maritime trade 
expeditions, if not Hellenistic and Roman merchants (Benrud, 2009). It 
reflects a standard practice for joint-venture dissolution in several national 
legal systems, including that of Ethiopia.71 It represents an alternative idea 
of fairness that may appeal higher investors that feel entitled to a higher 
portion of the joint capital. But it is also in sharp contrast with the 
concepts of distributive justice and egalitarianism that typically 
characterize rural communities (see Platteau, 2000). In other words, it 
allows us to study the effect of introducing a proportional split rule – also 
known as “liberal egalitarianism” (Cappelen et al., 2003) – in a context of 
“strictly egalitarian” norms (with biases), enforced by the customary 
judge.72 
 Empirical strategy 6.5
We investigate the research questions outlined at the end of section 2. 
First, we verify the presence of systematic bias against customarily 
disfavored agents and in favor of privileged ones, without a legal fallback 
(RQ1). Second, we look at these potential biases in the presence of a costly 
fixed law, expecting them to attenuate (RQ2). Third, we make use of the 
strictly egalitarian discrimination against (exogenously determined) higher 
investors, to verify that the competing formal law draws the arbitration 
                                      
71  The provisions of the Ethiopian Commercial Code referring to the dissolution of 
partnerships and joint ventures are provided under Articles 258(1) to 279(3). 
72 Strict egalitarianism requires that ‘all inequalities should be equalized’ (Cappelen et al., 
2003: 818). In our context, it means that each partner in the joint venture would receive 
an equal share of the joint capital (in the absence of a legal fallback, this was the case in 
over 50% of the arbitrations). Instead, liberal egalitarianism accepts inequality as long as it 
stems from choices under individual control. In our context, it is closely represented by the 
fixed law, in which each partner receives a portion of joint capital proportional to their 
initial investment share. 
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decisions of customary judges closer to the law itself (RQ3). And fourth, 
we investigate the behavioral changes of agents, in terms of ultimatum 
offers and rejection probability, with and without legal fallback (RQ4). 
In the absence of the legal fallback, we expect customary judges to 
discriminate against less “powerful” agents (e.g. women), and in favor of 
more “embedded” agents (e.g. known plaintiffs). Also, we expect these 
biases to decrease once a non-discriminatory legal alternative is introduced. 
We test RQ1 and RQ2 by observing the arbitration outcomes relative to 
individual characteristics of agents, through the following regressions 
estimated under the two separate treatments: 
7D 
	 + CIE + 	L + !pFDk		++*ℎ.24 + 1 +	#			7D 
	 + CIE + 	L + !pFDk		++*ℎ.24 + 1 + 3( 		 	*ℎ.24) + 	#	 
(1)				(2)	
Where 7D refers to the post-arbitration payout of individual , as a 
fraction of the overall mean payout,  is a dummy taking value of 1 if 
the agent is known to the customary judge assigned to the 
arbitration,CIE , L	and 	pFDk  indicate respectively the gender, 
age, and education level of the respondent, and *ℎ.24 takes value of 1 
if the agent is the higher investor in the joint venture. Standard errors are 
clustered at the customary judge level. In the absence of a legal fallback, 
we expect biases in favor of known plaintiffs (1 > 0), especially if they are 
favored by the strictly egalitarian custom (i.e. known lower investors), and 
against women ( < 0). Once the formal law is introduced, we expect such 
biases to attenuate. 
The experimental design exogenously imposes customary discrimination on 
half the agents—the higher investors in the joint venture. We proceed to 
assess the robustness of the previous finding by testing whether the 
exogenously imposed customary discrimination is reduced by the 
introduction of the legal fallback (RQ3). Assuming that the legal fallback 
is a credible threat in the eyes of arbitrators, the optimal strategy in our 
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experiment would be to reallocate to lower investors the “legal cost” that 
higher investors would lose by applying the law, therefore redistributing in 
the direction of the strict egalitarian norm, but not beyond reserve utility 
of higher investors. We estimate a specification with only the law dummy 
as a regressor (OLS), and gradually include other individual level variables 
to reach the following full specification: 
LF2	 
 	 + 	 + 	*ℎ.24	 + 3(	 		 	*ℎ.24	) + !			++cF2	 +	 /	′	 + #	 	(3)	
where LF2	  represents the deviation of each arbitration   from a 
proportional split in percentage points (i.e. the rule of law) for each 
arbitration,73 	 is a dummy taking value of 1 if the session included the 
formal law option, *ℎ.24	  is a dummy taking value of 1 if the 
ultimatum game sender is the higher investor in the joint venture, 	 
is the deviation of joint venture investment shares from 50-50 in percentage 
points, cF2	 represents the ultimatum offer deviation from a proportional 
split in percentage points, and  ′	 is a vector of other individual and game 
characteristics. Other notations have the same meaning as in (1). We 
expect   < 0. 
Finally, we look at the effect of introducing the legal fallback on the 
behavior of agents. Higher investors should benefit from the introduction of 
a law that imposes splits according to initial investment shares (RQ4). 
Whether they are willing to use the increased bargaining power deriving 
from the legal fallback depends, however, on the expected social cost of 
such action. Higher investors may forego the benefits of formal legislation 
in the presence of reputational concerns or expected social sanctioning. We 
measure such shift through the following fully specified equation: 
                                      
73 We regress arbitrations (129), rather than participant (258), as otherwise the same 
ruling would appear twice, for each individual in the pair. 
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where cF2	  represents again the deviation of the ultimatum offer of 
sender  (N=266) form a proportional split in percentage points, and all 
other notations have the same meaning as before. If social sanctioning or 
the threat of it is not stringent, we expect  < 0	and particularly 3 < 0. Yet, 
a sufficiently high social cost of deviation from the norm may reverse these 
expectations. In our setting, the identity of everyone’s’ joint venture 
partner is kept anonymous, but the identity of agents is revealed to 
customary judges if the ultimatum offer is rejected—actions are observed 
by customary judges. If agents have reputational concerns particularly at 
heart, they may wish to signal their distaste for the law, and indicate their 
intention not to make use of it by making more strictly egalitarian 
ultimatum offers once the law is introduced. These concerns would only be 
expected from agents that stand to gain from the law, i.e. higher investors, 
and not from those that would lose from it. In such case,  
 0	 and 3 > 0. 
As additional control to RQ4, we investigate the probability of ultimatum 
offer rejection. If agents favored by the custom anticipate a shift in 
arbitration outcomes once the law is introduced, their willingness to accept 
an ultimatum offer may increase. On the other hand, it is plausible that 
the legal fallback increases the prevalence of disputes, particularly if agents 
previously disfavored by the custom take advantage of their increased 
bargaining power (H4). We estimate a linear probability model with only 
the law dummy as a regressor, and gradually include other variables to 
reach the following full specification: 
STATUTORY LAW AND CUSTOMARY CHANGE 
142 
4D	 
 	 + 	 + 	*ℎ.24	 + 3(	 		 	*ℎ.24	)	++cF2	 + !		 +	/	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where 4D	 is a dummy taking value of 1 if the joint venture  resulted 
in an arbitration,74 and other notations have the same meaning as in (1) 
and (2). We expect  < 0 and 3 > 0 once the interaction term is introduced, 
and  ≠ 0, where the sign of the coefficients depends on the dominating 
effect. 
 Results 6.6
In total our experimental setup induced 129 pairwise disputes arising from 
rejected ultimatum offers, involving 258 out of 532 villagers. 144 agents 
entered a controversy in the treatment with only the customary 
arbitration, the remaining 114 being from the one with the additional 
possibility of appealing to a fixed law. First, we test the assumption that 
customary courts may disfavor less powerful agents (RQ1) (Asfaw and 
Satterfield, 2010; Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2013), and that biases against 
them may be reduced by the introduction of a formal legal fallback (RQ2) 
(Aldashev et al., 2012a, 2012b). We regress the 258 payouts resulting from 
arbitration by a customary judge, on the individual characteristics of 
agents (Table 2). In the absence of law, we find that post-arbitration 
payouts are more than 31% lower for female players (Table 2, column 1). 
Also, arbitration outcomes are significantly higher for known lower 
investors—favored by the strictly egalitarian customary norm (Table 2, 
column 2).  
Result 1: Arbitration outcomes result in lower payout to 
women and higher payout to known plaintiffs with lower 
initial investment shares.  
 
                                      
74 Again, regressing at the joint venture level (266), instead of the individual level (532), 
avoids double counting outcomes. 
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Table 2: Skewed sentencing against the underprivileged 
 Payout: relative to mean payout (=1) 
 Customary only Customary + Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female  -0.313** -0.289** 0.146 0.142 
 (0.138) (0.126) (0.119) (0.122) 
Age 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Education -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) 
Higher investor 0.234*** 0.701 0.557*** 0.516*** 
 (0.053) (0.424) (0.055) (0.132) 
Known -0.062 0.169** -0.009 -0.038 
 (0.172) (0.079) (0.073) (0.055) 
Higher investor × Known  -0.539  0.063 
  (0.454)  (0.202) 
Observations 144 144 114 114 
R2 0.098 0.132 0.348 0.349 
Notes: OLS, standard errors clustered at the judge level (in parentheses). Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 
90%. 
Most importantly, these statistical differences disappear once the legal 
fallback is introduced. The post-arbitration payouts for agents 
participating to the treatment with the legal fallback are not lower for 
women and not higher for known plaintiffs (Table 2, columns 3 and 4).  
Result 2: Arbitration biases disappear once the legal 
fallback is introduced. 
Result 1 had been documented by previous literature both within and 
outside Ethiopia (Asfaw and Satterfield, 2010; Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2013). 
Result 2, instead, represents a novel finding. It indicates that customary 
dispute resolution institutions are susceptible to increases in 
competitiveness of formal laws. In response to the introduction of a legal 
fallback, customary judges change their verdicts, reducing discrimination 
against agents disfavored by the custom. On the other hand, their capacity 
to enforce strict egalitarian norms is weakened by the liberal egalitarian 
law—payouts of lower investors are on average almost 56% lower, instead 
of 23%. 
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Result 2 is all the more salient as in our experiment agents disfavored by 
customary outcomes make limited direct use of the formal law. In fact, 
only 12 plaintiffs ultimately appealed to the rule of law. In other words, 
over 91% of the agents settled for a share of capital below that enforceable 
through the rule of law. Aldashev et al. (2012a, 2012b) predict that, at 
least partially, this is the consequence of customary change in the direction 
of the law. As they put it, ‘the “magnet” effect of the law is triggered by 
the preoccupation of village elders to maintain their authority and to 
retain enough potential claimants within the purview of their informal 
jurisdiction’ (Aldashev et al., 2012b: 193). Next, we explicitly test if the 
legal fallback draws the decisions of customary judges significantly closer to 
the formal law (RQ3). To verify this, we take the deviation of arbitration 
outcomes from a split proportional to investment shares (i.e. the law), as a 
dependent variable. We find that arbitration outcomes are on average 10 
percentage points closer to initial investment shares when the formal law is 
introduced (Table 3, column 1). This “magnet effect” is robust to 
introducing experimental and individual controls (Table 3, columns 2 to 4). 
Importantly, arbitration outcomes are still significantly different from the 
proportional split rule imposed by the law (p=0.000): on average, lower 
investors receive 36% of the joint capital (instead of 45%), against an 
initial investment of only 33%.  
Result 3: Customary judges (partially) adapt arbitration 
outcomes in response to the formal law. 
Next, we proceed to investigate the behavior of agents across the two 
treatments (RQ4). Higher investors acquire bargaining power once the 
legal fallback is introduced, as the law grants them a portion of joint 
venture capital equivalent to the initial investment share. As a result, we 
could expect higher investors to make less egalitarian ultimatum offers. 
Yet, if they fear reputational loss and social sanctioning, they may not be 
willing to use their improved bargaining position, especially if their actions 
are observable. In our experiment, joint venture partners are unknown to 
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Table 3: Law shifts arbitration outcomes closer to the law 
 Arbitration: deviation from proportional split 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Law treatment -0.102*** -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.104*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Higher investor sender  0.047** 0.047** 0.043* 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Law × Higher investor sender  0.011 0.011 0.011 
  (2.103) (2.103) (2.329) 
Ultimatum offer deviation from law  0.316*** 0.316*** 0.274*** 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.094) 
Joint venture inequality   -0.025 -0.081 
   (0.149) (0.126) 
Additional controls No No No Yes 
Observations 129 129 129 129 
R2 0.475 0.560 0.560 0.591 
Notes: OLS, standard errors clustered at the judge level (in parentheses). Additional controls in (4): Age, 
Education, Female, Joint venture capital, Joint venture profit, Number of counteroffers, Win risk game 1, Win risk 
game 2. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
each other, but the arbitration process is non-anonymous, and customary 
judges play the role of community “observers” of the actions of senders. In 
the presence of egalitarian customary norms that counter the law, those 
who stand to benefit from the law may wish to signal their intention not to 
make use of it, by making more egalitarian ultimatum offers once the law 
is introduced. Table 4 shows that the legal fallback does not significantly 
change the deviation of ultimatum offers from the law (Table 4, column 1). 
In fact, higher investors seem to make more egalitarian offers in the 
presence of it (Table 4, columns 2 to 4). Higher investors make ultimatum 
offers that are on average 10 percentage points closer to initial investment 
shares compared to lower investors, but once the law is introduced they 
increase the relative distance from the law by 3 percentage points. 
Likewise, the legal fallback increases the probability that higher investors 
make an equal split offer from 13.3% to 27.8% (p=0.039).  
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Table 4. Higher investor senders do not take advantage of the law 
 Ultimatum: deviation from proportional split 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Law treatment -0.007 -0.022 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) 
Higher investor sender  -0.097*** -0.103*** -0.099*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Law × Higher investor sender  0.039** 0.037** 0.032* 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Joint venture inequality   0.783*** 0.793*** 
   (0.099) (0.095) 
Additional controls No No No Yes 
Observations 266 266 266 266 
R2 0.002 0.208 0.333 0.352 
Notes: OLS, standard errors clustered at the judge level (in parentheses). Additional controls in (4): Age, 
Education, Female, Joint venture capital, Joint venture profit, Number of counteroffers, Win risk game 1, Win risk 
game 2. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
Finally, we look at the behavior of ultimatum receivers. If ultimatum 
receivers anticipate the shift in arbitration outcomes, their willingness to 
accept such offers may change even if senders do not take direct advantage 
of the legal fallback. Particularly, lower investors may not want to frustrate 
higher investors by refusing partially redistributive offers, motivating them 
to apply the costly law. We find that receivers reject significantly less 
ultimatum offers in the presence of the formal law: 40.7% against 57.1%. 
This result is driven entirely by reduced rejection rates of lower investors (-
28 percentage points), previously favored by the pro-egalitarian custom, 
with no significant variation in rejection rates attributable to higher 
investor receivers (Table 5, columns 1 and 2). This result is robust to 
controlling for the investment share inequality between the higher and 
lower investor, and to other potential confounds (Table 5, columns 3 and 
4). 
Result 4: The formal law does not alter ultimatum 
offers. Disfavored senders (higher investors) actually 
make offers less advantageous to themselves. The 
likelihood of offer rejection is reduced, but only for 
customarily favored agents (lower investors). 
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Table 5: The law reduces rejections by lower investor receivers 
 Ultimatum: rejections (=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Law treatment -0.164** -0.280*** -0.258*** -0.263*** 
 (0.064) (0.086) (0.080) (0.081) 
Higher investor receiver  -0.023 -0.006 0.003 
  (0.078) (0.076) (0.080) 
Law × Higher investor receiver  0.260** 0.267** 0.261** 
  (0.119) (0.118) (0.120) 
Joint venture inequality   0.022*** 0.021*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Additional Controls No No No Yes 
Observations 266 266 266 266 
R2 0.027 0.056 0.085 0.106 
Notes: LPM, standard errors clustered at the judge level (in parentheses). Additional controls in (4): Age, 
Education, Female, Joint venture capital, Joint venture profit, Number of counteroffers, Win risk game 1, Win risk 
game 2. Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
 Conclusions 6.7
This paper builds upon the work of Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013), and 
explicitly investigates the indirect effects that increased competitiveness of 
formal law may have on customary arbitration outcomes. Similar to them, 
we find that customary arbitration outcomes systematically discriminate 
against women, and favor well-embedded agents. We contribute to the 
literature on the interaction between customary institutions and formal 
law, by showing that not only agents, but also customary judges may 
respond to incentive structures. We do so by observing the ultimatum 
game decision of local villagers in rural Ethiopia, as well as the arbitration 
choices of real local customary judges, ruling over controversies born from 
the ultimatum game itself.  
Introducing a costly legal fallback reduces arbitration biases and draws the 
decisions of customary judges significantly closer to the formal law. Agents 
disfavored by the custom, instead, do not take advantage of their increased 
bargaining power. If the formal legislation does not depart too radically 
from the custom (Aldashev et al., 2012a), customary dispute resolution 
institutions may have a role to play in shifting preexisting norms towards 
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the desired outcome: in areas where formal legal institutions have limited 
outreach, most socioeconomic gains of increased competition between 
statutory law and customary institutions may rise from changes in the 
latter, and not from plaintiffs seeking justice under the rule of law. On the 
other hand, formal legislation may limit the redistributive functions of 
customary legal institutions that enforce local pro-egalitarian norms. This 
is especially true when, as in our setting, the formal law provides an 
alternative rule of fairness (liberal egalitarianism vs. strict egalitarianism). 
Legislators should not overlook the potential contribution of customary 
legal institutions in changing the custom. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Attrition analysis 
Variable 
Non-participants 
(N=80) 
Participants 
(N=532) 
Diff. Std. Err. 
Male (%) 92.5 91.5 1.0 (3.32) 
Age 41.8 43.5 -1.7 (1.36) 
Married (%) 90.0 91.7 -1.7 (3.43) 
Orthodox (%) 96.3 97.9 -1.6 (1.79) 
Education 2.4 2.4 -0.0 (0.22) 
Household size 6.2 6.3 -0.1 (0.25) 
Non-farm income 0.2 0.2 0.0 (0.05) 
Informal safety nets (%) 80.0 82.9 2.9 (4.56) 
Notes: Confidence: *** ↔ 99%, ** ↔ 95%, * ↔ 90%. 
 
Table A2: First risk game lottery choices 
Selected ball 
value 
Winning 
probability 
Highest 
possible loss 
Standard 
deviation 
Expected 
value 
N 
1 8/8 0 0.0 1.0 9 
2 7/8 1 1.0 1.6 15 
4 6/8 2 2.4 2.6 39 
8 5/8 4 5.1 4.1 130 
16 4/8 8 10.1 6.1 143 
32 3/8 16 19.0 8.1 125 
64 2/8 32 33.6 8.1 51 
128 1/8 64 52.3 0.1 20 
Notes: Winning values are in tokens. Each lottery comprises 8 balls with value Bn= 2n-1. Agents select the desired 
winning ball value Bs. If the ball extracted Be ≥ Bs, players win Bs, if Be < Bs, they lose Be. 
 
Table A3: Experimental procedure 
Stage 0 
0.1 Each participant is assigned a random endowment of either 80 or 120 tokens. 
Stage 1 
1.1 Each participant is brought to a private location within the premises of the 
experimental field by an enumerator. Enumerators explain the first risk game to their 
participant, handing in the endowment of either 80 or 120 tokens. 
1.2 The enumerator explains the rule of the risk game until the respondent is able to 
convey them back correctly. Then a trial round is performed. 
1.3 After the trial round, the respondent is asked to explain the outcome of the 
‘investment’. If the explanation is correct, the actual game can take place, otherwise the 
enumerator explains the rules again until full understanding. 
1.4 Once the first risk game is completed, the enumerator states the new endowment 
and proceeds with the second risk game. Steps 1.2 and 1.3 are thus repeated. 
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1.5 Once the second risk game is completed, the enumerator states the final private 
endowment of the participant. Each enumerator writes the amount on a ‘private 
endowment card’, signs it and hands it to the participant. The enumerator explains that 
that card represents the tokens obtained by the participant during the experiment, and 
states the value of the endowment in local currency. Once the participant has understood 
the value of the card, the enumerator seals it into a closed envelop. 
1.6 At the end of the first stage, participants are reminded that their choices and 
earning are anonymous and that their participation to the next stages is tied to the 
redelivery of their sealed envelope the next day. Participants can go home. 
Stage 2 
2.1 The next day, each participant is randomly paired with another participant with 
higher or lower endowment. Participants within each pair are not known to each other 
and are brought to separate private locations by different enumerators. Once there, 
enumerators explain the rules of the joint-venture stage, separately to both participants. 
2.2 Participants are told that they will merge their private endowment with an 
anonymous partner, and perform the same risk games as the previous time. This time, 
however, they will need to compromise on the investment choice. Enumerators state the 
value of the joint endowment and remind each participant about their private share within 
the joint venture. 
2.3 Pairs bargain over the same risk games of step 1.1 to 1.4. For each risk game, 
enumerators record and deliver messages between the joint-venture partners, to reach a 
consensus over the investment choice. If a consensus is not reached by bargaining round 9 
of each game, the enumerator may take the average of the two proposals, rounded down 
to the nearest available option, as investment choice. 
2.4 After the two risk games are completed, the enumerator states the final joint-
venture endowment of the pair. Each enumerator writes the amount on two ‘joint 
endowment cards’, signs them and hands them in to each participant in the pair. The 
enumerator explains that that card represents the total tokens obtained by the pair during 
the experiment. 
Stage 3 
3.1 Each enumerator randomly assigns one participant to be the sender, and one to 
be the receiver in an ultimatum game. Enumerators explain the rules of the game, and 
state that the game will determine which portion of the joint endowment will be theirs to 
take home. They state that if the receiver does not accept the offer of the sender, the 
litigation will be sent to a local customary judge. 
3.2 Prior to making the ultimatum offer, both participants are informed about the 
name of the customary judge that would rule over the controversy in case the ultimatum 
offer is rejected. They are asked to state whether they know that customary judge, and are 
told that in case an arbitrage is required, the judge will be informed of their name and 
game history. 
3.3 Throughout Stage 2, four customary judges have been instructed on the rules of 
the game. Each judge is asked to explain the rules of the two risk games, as well as the 
joint venture stage. If the explanation is not correct, the enumerator explains the rules 
again until full understanding. Before presiding an ultimatum game arbitrage, customary 
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judges are asked to sign an informed consent and confidentiality notice, requiring them to 
maintain the anonymity of game participants. 
3.4 If the ultimatum offer is accepted by the receiver, the game terminates. 
Otherwise, the selected customary judge receives a game information sheet containing the 
names and game history of both participants, and independently reaches a final verdict.  
Stage 4 (only for the ‘Customary + Law’ treatment) 
4.1 Participants to the ‘+ Law’ treatment are informed of the legal fallback during 
step 3.1. Similarly, judges are informed during step 3.3. Enumerators explain that the 
arbitration verdict can be overruled by a costly fixed law: at the expense of 10% of the 
joint endowment, the law imposes a split according to initial investment shares. 
4.2 After the customary judge has emitted the verdict, each participant to the ‘+ 
Law’ treatment is asked whether they accept or reject the verdict. If at least one pair 
member rejects the verdict, the costly fixed law is applied. 
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Variable definitions: 
Female. A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise. 
Age. Age of respondent i in years, rounded down to the last birthday. 
Married. A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the respondent is currently married, 0 if 
otherwise. 
Orthodox. A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the respondent is Orthodox Christian, 0 
if otherwise. 
Education. A variable indicating the number of completed years of education of 
respondent i. 
Household size. The number of people sharing the same roof and sharing the same pot. 
Non-farm income. The estimated percentage of yearly household income not deriving from 
farm activities. 
Informal safety nets. A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the participant belongs to at 
least one informal institution between Debo, Eqqub, and Iddir. Debo is a local labor 
exchange arrangement; Eqqub is a rotating savings and credit association, and Iddir is a 
funeral association functioning as informal insurance arrangement. 0 otherwise. 
First risk game. The value of the selected ball in the first risk game. 
Second risk game. The fraction of endowment chosen for investment in the second risk 
game. 
Private Endowment. The value (tokens) of the endowment possessed by participant i at 
the end of the “private investment” stage. 
Joint venture endowment. The value (tokens) of the endowment jointly possessed by each 
pair of joint venture participants at the end of the “joint venture” stage. 
Sender. The participant that makes an ultimatum offer to the receiver, with respect to 
how to split the joint endowment. 
Receiver. The participant that can accept or reject the ultimatum offer made by the 
sender 
Law treatment. A dummy variable taking value of 1 if the game session included both the 
customary judge arbitration and the proportional law as outside options to the ultimatum 
game. 
Higher investor. A dummy taking value of 1 if respondent i has a higher than 50% share 
of the joint venture capital.  
Arbitration offer deviation from law (Adev). The deviation of the arbitration decision from 
a proportional split (the law), in percentage terms with respect to joint the endowment. 
Ultimatum offer deviation from law (Udev). The deviation of the ultimatum offer made by 
the sender from a proportional split (the law), in percentage terms with respect to joint 
the endowment. 
Joint venture inequality.  The ratio between the private endowment of the lower investor 
and the private endowment of the higher investor in each joint venture. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Synthesis  
 General discussion 7.1
In 1942 Hicks wrote that economics had made ‘better progress in the 
application of scientific methods to the study of human conduct than has 
been made by other human sciences’, and that ‘the study of economics can 
therefore take us a considerable way towards a general understanding of 
human society, that is, of men’s behavior to one another’ (1942: p.2). Since 
then the economic science has made unimaginable progress, particularly 
with respect to economic modeling and statistical inference. However, it 
has made relatively less progress in unraveling the dynamics of human 
behavior, perhaps considering it for too long ‘the province of the 
psychologist’ (Friedman, 1962: p.13).  
Yet, ‘as the complexity of the environment increases, or its speed of 
change, we need to know more and more about the mechanisms and 
processes that economic man uses to relate himself to that environment’ 
(Simon, 1959: p.279). Therefore economists have more recently returned to 
the behavioral underpinnings of individual decision making, primarily as 
tool to derive implications at a broader level. In fact, ‘while the economic 
approach to behavior builds on a theory of individual choice, it is not 
mainly concerned with individuals’ (Becker, 1993: p.402). Studying changes 
in individual decision making may reveal a great deal about how 
individuals respond to shocks, but it also contributes to narrow a gap in 
current economic scholarship—helping to understand the dynamics that 
undergird human interaction, and thus economic development.  
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The shocks discussed in this thesis do not necessarily refer to intrinsically 
negative “traumatic events”. Rather, they represent unforeseen exogenous 
changes in the context in which individuals and institutions are embedded. 
They reflect both the complexity and speed of change of the environment 
in which individuals and institutions operate. Ethiopian sesame farmers, 
for instance, may not be as capable as professional traders in calculating 
expected utility (see List and Haigh, 2009). If exposed to competitive 
markets, however, they may change their behavior to fit the new 
circumstances (Chapter 4). At the same time, if the new institutional 
environment persists, they may lose some of the skills that were an 
important asset in previous interlinked markets but less so in competitive 
ones—such as the capacity to build long-term relationships with buyers 
and brokers. Similarly, within-village informal rules of cooperative behavior 
may be undermined by something as “simple” as the introduction of a 
formal health insurance (Chapter 5). 
These responses are not passive processes of adaptation. Instead, they 
strongly support the idea that ‘actors do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social context’ (Granovetter, 1985: p.487). People respond to 
shocks through “rational” – although not necessarily conscious – changes in 
their behavior and decisions. This process of “creative destruction” is best 
exemplified through the long-lasting change in preferences for parochial 
altruism in response to conflict exposure (Chapter 3). While these changes 
result from direct experiences, they mirror the behavior that co-
evolutionary models predict would be “promoted” by conflict over the very 
long run. Another example is provided by the response of non-adopters of 
a formal health insurance (Chapter 5). Those who do not insure their 
families respond to this inequality-increasing innovation with the only 
“weapons of the weak” at hand—by reducing cooperation in other 
domains. At the same time, they rationalize these forms of “cautious 
resistance” through narratives ‘bemoaning the decreasing cooperation 
between villagers’ (Scott, 1985: p.188), and attributing the root of the 
problem to those who have adopted the innovation. 
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Every chapter contributes to the understanding of the micro-foundations of 
either preferences, institutions, or both. Nonetheless, the two chapters 
representing the beginning and end of the zoom-out process represented by 
this thesis perhaps best illustrate how field experimental evidence can 
contribute to economic theory. The first one introduces the concept of 
“fetal origins” to the domain of other-regarding preferences, finding that 
the latter are being shaped right from the womb (Chapter 2). The last one, 
instead, studies the decision making of informal institutions, finding that 
institutions too may “respond” to incentives (Chapter 6). Whether 
expected or unexpected, these findings emphasize the need to continuously 
underpin theoretical predictions with empirical evidence; not only as a 
confirmatory tool, but especially to examine off-path behavior. The next 
sections review the main lessons learned from each chapter, discussing the 
resulting policy recommendations, and the implications for future research. 
 The fetal origins of preferences 7.2
In Chapter 2 we looked at the impact of prenatal trauma on the social 
preferences of children born during an armed conflict. We learned that 
prenatal hormonal distress – proxied by the 2D:4D digit ratio – reduce the 
child’s probability of contribution to a public good. In other words, being 
exposed to traumatic events in the womb may shape later-life preferences 
away from cooperation. This finding represents the missing empirical link 
in an otherwise well-established causal chain across different disciplines. 
We already knew that violent conflict increases the likelihood of PTSD. 
Also, we knew that trauma and PTSD affect the hormonal releases 
transmitted to children during pregnancy—and that these have long 
lasting psychophysical effects on the fetus. Finally, markers of prenatal 
hormonal exposure were already known to correlate with other-regarding 
preferences. To the best of our knowledge, however, no study before had 
attempted to cover the entire causal chain.  
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What are the underlying policy implications? First, interventions in post-
conflict settings are still mostly concerned with those who experienced war 
violence, but other groups are often neglected. The post-conflict recovery 
programs that I have witnessed in northern Uganda, for instance, typically 
focused on recovery from postnatal traumatization, helping victims regain 
their confidence and build positive relationships with their peers. 
Recognizing the fetal origins of preferences means more attention should be 
given to those who suffered from trauma before being born, and to women 
that endure pregnancy in highly traumatizing environments. As a result, 
the time horizon of post-conflict interventions should be extended, and 
target beneficiaries should be reconsidered. Second, policymakers should 
take into account the heterogeneity of the responses to conflict. Prenatal 
epigenetic effects on the preferences for cooperation seem to follow a 
distinct path from postnatal conflict exposure (see Chapter 3). 
Acknowledging this difference may help improve the effectiveness of post-
conflict recovery programs. 
From a research perspective, the notion that preferences may be shaped 
right from the womb implies that economic models on the 
intergenerational transmission of preferences should acknowledge an 
additional path of preference transmission, beyond the standard nature-
nurture duality. Also, economists concerned with early life circumstances 
should not underestimate the direct impact of trauma on preferences. Yet, 
given that these results touch upon some of the basic underpinnings of 
economic theory, they need to be confirmed in different settings—to verify 
their generalizability outside the Ugandan context. Moreover, it would be 
important to test the stability of prenatal effects throughout life, preferably 
through panels of data eliciting the preferences of children at different 
points in time. Further research should also present more comprehensive 
evidence about the fetal origins of preferences, including primary 
determinants of savings and investments behavior such as risk and time 
preferences. Finally, the interaction between the prenatal and postnatal 
effects of conflict on behavior needs to be investigated in greater detail.  
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 Conflict and preferences 7.3
In Chapter 3 we looked at aggressiveness and willingness to compete 
against in- and out-groups. We learned that conflict exposure increases 
aggressiveness and willingness to compete towards the out-group, but not 
the in-group. These effects are in line with coevolutionary theories, 
highlighting the role of conflict in promoting parochial altruism. Taken 
together, the results of Chapter 2 and 3 contribute to the growing 
literature about the consequences of conflict for preferences and 
institutions. The temporary shock represented by conflict may induce long 
lasting behavioral changes on those who experience its violence, affecting 
local institutional and social equilibria—fundamental drivers of long-run 
economic performance that ‘govern whether a society recovers, stagnates, 
or plunges back into war’ (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: p.8). 
From the point of view of policymakers, the findings of Chapter 3 are most 
intriguing. Post-conflict recovery programs tend to see those that witness 
war violence as victims of ‘development in reverse’ (Collier et al., 2003: 
p.13). In fact, conflict remains a decisive factor generating and intensifying 
the problems of global poverty and underdevelopment. Yet, conflict may 
also contain the sprout of inclusive and dynamic societal transformations. 
First, it may foster in-group altruism and cooperation. A notable example 
of this rests in the unprecedented expansion of taxation – and the creation 
of the welfare state – experienced by Europe after the Second World War. 
Second, it may reduce the pressure of traditional redistributive norms that 
favor strict egalitarianism and disfavor competition (see Platteau, 2000; Di 
Falco and Bulte, 2011). Emblematic of this is the common choice among 
ex-child soldiers in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia and DRC to enter 
the “perfectly competitive” sector of motorcycle taxis. Policymakers should 
not overlook the significance of these autonomous responses. Instead, they 
should make use of these transformations to improve the process of 
demobilization of combatants, and to speed up reconstruction efforts.  
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A clear limitation of most empirical studies on the consequences of conflict 
is that they rely on the assumption that selection into victimization is not 
driving the results. Working with children born shortly before or during a 
conflict reduces this concern, but it does not eliminate it. Future research 
in this field should focus on case studies for which panels of data have been 
collected prior to the intensification of war violence. Moreover, it should 
look into the intergenerational effects of conflict on preferences. These 
changes matter in the long-run only insofar as the preferences of the 
generations that follow the cessation of violence do not return to a “steady 
state”. While this is not likely to be the case, direct evidence in favor or 
against this is still missing. Finally, within the theoretical framework of 
parochial altruism different studies have reported divergent results 
depending on whether the conflict sparked inter- or intra-community 
violence (Voors et al., 2012; Cassar et al., 2013; Rohner et al., 2013; 
Gilligan et al., 2014). A more comprehensive concept of in- and out-groups 
should be debated and defined, to limit ex-post rationalizations. 
 Endogenous rationality 7.4
In Chapter 4 we looked at the role of market experience in promoting 
rational choice. We learned that exogenous exposure to competitive 
markets fosters more rational behavior—proxied by fewer GARP violations 
in a simple choice experiment. This sustains the theory of “endogenous 
rationality”. Markets are not only neutral institutions to efficiently allocate 
resources. They also improve the rationality of the decision-making process 
of participants, introducing the possibility of dynamic efficiency gains 
associated with market expansion in developing countries. On the other 
hand, differentiated “competitive market experience” levels could affect 
partial equilibria and regional rent allocation.  
This is all the more salient in light of the increasing expansion of market 
institutions. If the process of globalization is not neutral, the penetration of 
international companies and markets in relatively remote areas of the 
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world may result in hard to gauge “externalities” at the local level. This 
may turn out to be a blessing for some, and a curse for others. 
Policymakers should consider differential “learning costs” when designing 
policies aimed at stimulating market developments. 
Traditional microeconomic theories typically rest on the assumption that 
human decision making is in some way approximated by rational choice, 
which is in turn determined by stable and clearly defined preferences. To 
this, the concept of “bounded rationality” introduces information sets, 
cognitive limitations, and the idea that agents may weigh the costs and 
benefits of different levels of cognitive effort when making a choice (see 
Simon, 1957; Rubinstein, 1998; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Yet, ‘when 
competence at decision making can be improved only at a cost, 
competence becomes endogenous’ (Conlisk, 2005: p.486). If market 
experience reduces the perceived “costs” associated with decision making – 
such that rational choice may become relatively easier to attain – treating 
rationality as exogenous may be untenable. Moreover, endogenous 
rationality may affect the endogenous formation of preferences in the 
longer run—even if the institutional shock that generated it is temporary. 
When developing models of human behavior in rapidly changing 
institutional environments, economists should not overlook the implications 
of both endogenous rationality and endogenous preference formation. 
 Formal institutions vs. informal institutions 7.5
In Chapters 5 and 6 we looked at how informal institutions respond to 
shocks, in the form of exogenous formal alternatives. The notion that 
institutions “respond” is perhaps hardest to comprehend, and is clearly 
intended as figurative. Yet, the process of adaptation of informal 
institutions can be analyzed through the behavioral lens of individual 
decision making. In a way, that is what studies exploring social capital do 
when using individual public good contributions to proxy the former (e.g. 
Fearon et al., 2009). In Chapter 5 we did exactly that. We learned that 
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formal insurance institutions may crowd-out informal social capital and 
cooperation. In contrast with some theoretical predictions, however, we 
find that social capital erodes because the non-adopters, and not those 
insured, lower their contributions.  
This finding highlights the need for greater communication between 
policymakers and researchers. In particular, it shows how seemingly 
harmless development interventions aiming to address a clear market 
failure – the absence of a functioning insurance market – may have 
unforeseen consequences for targeted communities. What would happen to 
social capital and informal sharing norms if the insurance program would 
suddenly terminate? Would they bounce back to the pre-program levels, or 
would they remain stably lower? The transient nature of development 
interventions makes these questions even more relevant. Many development 
programs I have witnessed only intended to target a group of beneficiaries 
for a relatively short time before moving on. The intervention object of 
study, for example, had an intended lifespan of five years. Donors should 
consider the unintended social implications of their interventions, following-
up on targeted communities even after projects have ended.  
From a research perspective, economic models should embrace the 
multidimensionality and embeddedness of social interactions. However, 
more empirical and experimental evidence is needed, especially with 
respect to long-run responses of informal institutions to the increasing 
penetration of formal alternatives. Moreover, these dynamics are likely to 
be at play beyond the domain of insurance. We need to understand the 
extent to which these results can be generalized to other institutional 
arrangements, such as microfinance, old-age care, and any other 
“extension” effort by formal institutions to replace informal ones (see 
Chapter 6 for an example). Once more evidence is collected economists 
should work towards a generalized theory about the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions.  
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 Institutions “respond” to incentives 7.6
In Chapter 6 we departed from the standard debate about the 
interdependence of formal and informal institutions. We did not investigate 
the direct effects of increased penetration of formal legal institutions, but 
rather their spill-over on the rulings of customary legal authorities. We 
learned that customary judges respond to the “threat of law” by changing 
their dispute-resolution decisions in the direction of the law itself. Those 
disadvantaged by the customary system, instead, do not take direct 
advantage of their increased bargaining power, perhaps in fear of social 
sanctioning.  
These responses are in line with the theoretical framework developed by 
Aldashev et al. (2012a, 2012b), in which customary judges are averse to 
the jurisdictional and reputational erosion deriving from plaintiffs 
appealing against their rulings. In other words, informal institutions 
change for the very reason that they do not “want” to be substituted. This 
finding has clear policy implications: informal dispute-resolution 
institutions may have a role to play in shifting the latter towards a desired 
outcome. In fact, while customary authorities may intrinsically value 
custom-compliant rulings, they do not necessarily face the social 
sanctioning associated with deviating from it. In areas where formal legal 
institutions have limited outreach, policymakers typically see informal legal 
institutions as change-inhibiting. As a result, they may delegitimize, if not 
outlaw, these institutions, expecting that formal laws would replace local 
customs and norms. Instead, policymakers should aim at increasing the 
integration between state law and other normative orders. One example of 
this is that of the Katarungang Pambarangay, in the Philippines. There, 
the traditional dispute-resolution institutions have been integrated in the 
formal legal system as “first instance” courts. Judges are still selected by 
disputants among the eligible residents of each village, but dispute 
settlements may be appealed to the higher level municipal court (see 
Silliman, 1985). 
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Future research on the penetration of formal law into predominantly 
customary settings should focus on dynamic outcomes. Moreover, greater 
attention should be devoted to the extent to which “moderately 
progressive” formal laws may have a greater “magnet effect” on customs 
than “radically progressive” ones (see Aldashev et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
Finally, it would be important to complement lab-in-field evidence with 
naturally occurring data—ideally through a natural field experiment. 
 Final remarks 7.7
This thesis started with the intention to investigate the endogenous 
formation of preferences and institutions. Through the lens of individual 
choices, it looked at endogenous responses to shocks at both the individual 
and community levels. Yet, ‘coming to an end always means that one is 
making a cut, leaving many questions not asked and others not answered’ 
(Balogh and Treumann, 2013: p.399). There is still a lot to be understood 
about how preferences and institutions evolve and interact. This thesis has 
helped scratch the surface, exploring some of the most pressing questions, 
and raising several new ones. One question that is not addressed, but 
weaves through all the findings, is: if preferences and institutions are 
endogenous and continuously reshaped, what can still be considered 
exogenous? Perhaps economic theory should increasingly move towards a 
“dynamic systems” approach. Until then, field experimental methods are 
likely to remain a fundamental tool to explore the complexity of human 
interactions, and should be employed in as diverse settings as possible. 
Even though all the evidence in this thesis comes from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
I believe that similar dynamics may be unraveling in very different 
environments too—hence the references to the recent history of China. 
This needs to be confirmed. To this end, I will be glad to share any of the 
questionnaires, experimental protocols, and datasets used for this thesis, 
and I strongly encourage other researchers to make use of them. 
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Summary 
In this thesis I investigate the formation of preferences and institutions. 
Although these concepts are central to economic theory, there is still a lot 
to be understood about how preferences and institutions change in 
response to shocks. I present field-experimental evidence from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, gradually zooming out through different levels of responses to 
shocks. In Chapter 1 I introduce the concepts of preferences and 
institutions, presenting an overview of the methodologies and research 
questions guiding the core chapters.  
In Chapter 2 I look at the fetal origins of preferences for cooperation. I 
study the effect of prenatal trauma on the cooperation of those born 
during the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency in northern Uganda. I find 
that a rise in the relative length of the index finger with respect to the ring 
finger – a marker for prenatal hormonal shock – reduces the child’s 
probability of contribution to the public good. I interpret this as evidence 
that prenatal trauma may affect later-life individual preferences, and that 
the nine months in utero may be more important than previously thought. 
In Chapter 3 I look at the preferences for competition towards in- and out-
groups, in relation to conflict exposure. I study aggressiveness and 
willingness to compete among youth in Sierra Leone, using the group 
dynamics generated by a local football tournament to separate in- and out-
group behavior. I find that football players that experienced more intense 
exposure to violence are more likely to get a foul card during a game. Also, 
I isolate competitiveness from aggressiveness in the lab, and find that 
conflict exposure increases the willingness to compete towards the out-
group—not the in-group. I conjecture that violent conflict is not only a 
destructive process, but that it may also trigger autonomous 
transformations in believes and preferences. 
 194 
 In Chapter 4 I look at the endogeneity of rational choice among adults. I 
study the relationship between market exposure and rationality in rural 
Ethiopia, through a laboratory experiment involving sesame brokers and 
farmers. Following a randomly assigned trading session in a competitive 
auction, I find that farmers and brokers selected for the treatment behave 
more rationally than their peers in the control group. Markets are thus not 
only neutral institutions; they change the way people make decisions. I 
speculate that, in the presence of endogenous rationality, a rapid market 
expansion may offer dynamic efficiency gains, but that it may also affect 
the distribution of rents and wealth at the local and regional levels. 
In Chapter 5 I look at the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions. I study the dynamics of social capital – proxied by 
contributions to a public goods game – in response to the introduction of a 
formal insurance scheme in southwestern Uganda. I find that formal 
insurance crowds-out social capital, but that it is not those adopting the 
formal insurance who reduce their contributions (as predicted by theory). 
Instead, social capital erodes because of the uninsured. I argue that this is 
consistent with “weapons of the weak” theories, emphasizing social 
embeddedness. Those who fear to lose from this inequality-increasing 
innovation respond with the only “weapons” at hand—by reducing 
cooperation in other domains. 
In Chapter 6 I look at how the penetration of formal law affects customary 
legal institutions. I study the effects of introducing a formal legal 
alternative on the arbitration decisions of real customary judges in 
Ethiopia. I find that introducing a legal fallback reduces arbitration biases 
and draws the decisions of customary judges significantly closer to the 
formal law. At the same time, agents disfavored by the custom do not take 
advantage of their increased bargaining power. I argue that most effects of 
increased competition between formal law and customary legal institutions 
may rise from changes in the latter, rather than from plaintiffs seeking 
justice under the rule of law. Chapter 7 offers a discussion and synthesis. 
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Samenvatting 
In deze dissertatie onderzoek ik de vorming van voorkeuren en instituties. 
Hoewel deze concepten centraal staan in economische theorieën, is er nog 
steeds veel onbekend over hoe voorkeuren en instituties veranderen als 
reactie op schokken. Ik presenteer resultaten uit veldexperimenten 
uitgevoerd in Sub-Sahara Afrika, waarmee er telkens op een hoger niveau 
naar de respons op schokken gekeken wordt. In Hoofdstuk 1 introduceer ik 
de concepten voorkeuren en instituties, en geef ik een overzicht van de 
onderzoeksmethoden en -vragen die de kernhoofdstukken vormgeven. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de foetale oorsprong van preferenties voor 
samenwerking. Ik bestudeer het effect van prenatale trauma’s op het 
samenwerkingsvermogen van personen die zijn geboren tijdens de opstand 
van de Verzetsleger van de Heer in het noorden van Oeganda. Ik vind dat 
een stijging van de relatieve lengte van de wijsvinger met betrekking tot de 
ringvinger – een kenmerk voor prenatale hormonale schokken – de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat een kind bijdraagt aan het ‘publieke goed’ 
vermindert. Ik interpreteer dit als een aanwijzing dat prenatale trauma’s 
voorkeuren in iemands latere leven kunnen beïnvloeden, en dat de negen 
maanden in de baarmoeder mogelijkerwijs belangrijker zijn dan 
oorspronkelijk gedacht.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 kijk ik naar de voorkeuren voor concurrentie jegens leden 
van de groep en buitenstaanders, in relatie tot blootstelling aan conflict. Ik 
bestudeer agressiviteit en de bereidheid om te concurreren onder jongeren 
in Sierra Leone, met behulp van groepsdynamiek gegenereerd door lokale 
voetbalwedstrijden, om zo gedrag jegens leden van de groep te 
onderscheiden van gedrag jegens buitenstaanders. De resultaten laten zien 
dat voetbalspelers die intensere blootstelling aan conflict hebben ervaren, 
meer kans hebben om een rode of gele kaart te krijgen tijdens een 
wedstrijd. Daarnaast isoleer ik competitiedrang van agressie waaruit blijkt 
dat blootstelling aan conflict de bereidheid om te concurreren buiten de 
groep – niet binnen de groep – vergroot. Ik vermoed dat gewelddadig 
conflict niet alleen een destructief proces is, maar dat het ook kan leiden 
tot autonome veranderingen in overtuigingen en voorkeuren.  
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In Hoofdstuk 4 kijk ik naar de endogeniteit van rationele keuzes onder 
volwassenen. Ik bestudeer de relatie tussen blootstelling aan de markt en 
rationaliteit in ruraal Ethiopië, door middel van een lab-experiment met 
sesamzaadmakelaars en -boeren. Na een willekeurig toegewezen 
handelssessie in een competitieve veiling, vind ik dat boeren en makelaars 
die geselecteerd zijn voor de interventie zich rationeler gedragen dan hun 
gelijken in de controlegroep. Markten zijn dus niet alleen neutrale 
instituties; ze veranderen de manier waarop mensen hun keuzen maken. Ik 
vermoed dat door endogene rationaliteit een snelle uitbreiding van de 
markt dynamische efficiëntie kan vergroten, maar dat het ook de verdeling 
van economische baten en welvaart op het lokale en regionale niveau kan 
beïnvloeden. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 bekijk ik de relatie tussen formele en informele instituties. 
Ik bestudeer de dynamiek van sociaal kapitaal - waarbij de bijdragen in 
een publiekegoederenspel als maatstaf hiervoor dienen - als reactie op de 
introductie van een formeel verzekeringsstelsel in het zuidwesten van 
Oeganda. Ik vind dat het stelsel sociaal kapitaal verdringt, maar dat het 
niet diegenen zijn die de formele verzekering aannemen, die hun bijdragen 
verminderen (zoals wordt voorspeld door de theorie). Integendeel, sociaal 
kapitaal wordt aangetast door de onverzekerden. Degenen die bang zijn om 
achteruit te gaan door deze ongelijkheid-vergrotende innovatie gebruiken 
het enige “wapen” dat zij hebben: het verminderen van de samenwerking 
op andere gebieden. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 bekijk ik hoe het binnendringen van formeel recht de 
instituties rondom gewoonterecht beïnvloedt. Ik bestudeer de effecten van 
het introduceren van een formeel en legaal alternatief op de arbitrale 
beslissingen van rechters binnen het gewoonterecht in Ethiopië. Ik vind dat 
het introduceren van een legaal alternatief arbitrale afwijkingen vermindert 
en dat de beslissingen van rechters binnen het gewoonterecht aanzienlijk 
dichter bij het formele recht komen. Tegelijkertijd maken degenen die 
kansarm zijn in het gewoonterecht geen gebruik van hun sterkere 
onderhandelingspositie. Ik betoog dat de meeste effecten van toegenomen 
concurrentie tussen formeel recht en gewoonterecht ontstaan door 
veranderingen in het laatstgenoemde, in plaats van door procespartijen die 
gerechtigheid zoeken middels de rechtsstaat. Hoofdstuk 7 biedt een 
discussie en synthese. 
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